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Abstract  
The first essay in this thesis is on gender wage differentials among 
manufacturing sector white-collar workers. The wage differential is decomposed 
into firm, job (within-firm) and individual-level components. Job-level gender 
segregation explains over half of the gap, while firm-level segregation is not 
important. After controlling for firm, job and individual characteristics, the 
remaining unexplained wage cap to the advantage of men is six per cent of men’s 
mean wage. 
In the second essay, I study how the business cycle and gender affect the 
distribution of the earnings losses of displaced workers. The negative effect of 
displacement is large, persistent and strongest in the lowest earnings deciles. The 
effect is larger in a recession than in a recovery period, and in all periods 
women’s earnings drop more than men’s earnings. 
The third essay shows that the transition from steady employment to disability 
pension depends on the stringency of medical screening and the degree of 
experience-rating of pension costs applied to the employer. The fact that firms 
have to bear part of the cost of employees’ disability pension costs lowers both 
the incidence of long sick leave periods and the probability that sick leave ends 
in a disability pension. 
The fourth and fifth essays are studies on the employment, wage and profit 
effects of a regional payroll tax cut experiment conducted in northern and eastern 
Finland. The results show no statistically significant effect on any of the response 
variables. 
Key words: Gender wage gap, gender segregation, displacement, earnings 
losses, disability pension, experience rating, payroll tax, tax incidence, labour 
demand 
 
Tiivistelmä 
Ensimmäisessä esseessä miesten ja naisten välinen keskipalkkojen ero jaetaan 
sukupuolisegregaatiosta johtuvaan osaan ja henkilökohtaisista ominaisuuksista 
johtuvaan osaan. Tulosten mukaan yksityisen sektorin toimihenkilöillä yritys-
tason segregaatio ei juuri ole osallisena palkkaeron syntyyn. Hiukan yli puolet 
kokonaiserosta selittyy naisten keskittymisellä matalapalkkaisiin töihin yritysten 
sisällä. Kun otetaan huomioon erot koulutuksessa, työkokemuksessa ja työn 
vaativuudessa on selittymätön palkkaero kuusi prosenttia miesten keskipalkasta. 
Toisessa esseessä näytetään, että irtisanomisen vaikutus ansiotulojakaumaan on 
pitkäkestoinen ja voimakkain jakauman alimmissa desiileissä. Irtisanomisen 
vaikutus tulojakaumaan on paljon suurempi laman aikana kuin kasvuperiodilla ja 
negatiivinen vaikutus naisten tuloihin on kaikissa oloissa voimakkaampi kuin 
miehillä. 
Kolmannen esseen tulokset osoittavat, että työntekijän terveydentilan lisäksi 
myös lääketieteellisten kriteerien tiukkuus ja yritysten omavastuu eläkkeen 
kustannuksista vaikuttavat työkyvyttömyyseläkkeelle jäämisen todennäköi-
syyteen. Vaikutus on kaksiosainen: omavastuu vähentää pitkiä sairaslomia ja 
kasvattaa työntekijöiden todennäköisyyttä palata takaisin töihin sairastumisen 
jälkeen 
Neljännessä ja viidennessä esseessä tutkitaan Pohjois-Lapin ja Kainuun alueella 
toteutetun yritysten sotumaksuvapautuksen vaikutusta yritysten työllisyyteen, 
palkkasummaan ja voittoihin sekä työntekijöiden palkkoihin. Kokeilulla ei 
havaittu olevan tilastollisesti merkitsevää vaikutusta yhteenkään vaste-
muuttujaan. 
Asiasanat: Sukupuolten palkkaero, segregaatio, irtisanominen, työkyvyttömyys-
eläke, yritysten omavastuu, palkan sivukulut, työn kysyntä, verotuksen kohtaanto 
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 1. Introduction 
This thesis contains five microeconometric studies where I explore wage 
formation and labour demand in the Finnish labour market. All the essays are 
based on linked employer-employee data. 
The first paper is an investigation into gender wage differentials. The focus is on 
to what extent these differentials arise from the segregation of the labour market 
into men’s jobs and women’s jobs on the one hand, and from segregation of men 
and women into different firms, and hence industries, on the other. The second 
essay is a distributional analysis of the earnings losses of displaced workers. The 
gender aspect is also present in the second study as clear differences are found in 
how the earnings of men and women respond to losing one’s job. The second 
essay also shows that macroeconomic labour demand conditions have a huge 
impact on the individual’s labour market success after displacement. The third 
study concerns the effects of experience-rating firms’ disability pension costs on 
the incidence of disability pensions. There I show that the design of institutions 
involved with disability pensions has a strong effect on firms’ labour demand 
decisions. In the fourth paper, I evaluate the employment and wage effects of a 
regional payroll tax cut. The last study widens the scope of the evaluation to 
include the effects of the tax cut on the profitability of firms. 
This introduction continues with a short description of each of the studies. I 
discuss the main results and conclusions and try to highlight the contributions to 
our knowledge of the Finnish labour market. The papers are independent in their 
surveys of previous literature, and the methods and datasets are also thoroughly 
described. Hence, rather than constructing the theoretical background, building 
the apparatus for analysis and describing the relevant institutions, I aim at brevity 
in this introductory chapter. 
1.1 A gender wage gap decomposition for matched employer-
employee data1 
In this paper the gender wage gap is decomposed based on a correlated random 
effects model. The decomposition makes it possible to assess the extent to which 
the overall gap is attributable to gender segregation at the firm level, gender 
segregation into jobs within firms and within-job wage differentials. The data set 
comes from the Confederation of Finnish Industries and covers large and 
medium-sized manufacturing sector firms. 
                                              
 
 
1 Korkeamäki, O. – Kyyrä, T. (2006): A gender wage gap decomposition for matched employer-employee 
data. Labour Economics, vol. 13(5), pp. 611–638. 
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By explicitly modelling the firm and job effects, the approach also proves to be 
informative regarding the sources of lower pay in predominantly female firms 
and jobs. The data contains a detailed measure of job complexity that makes it 
possible to compare jobs within firms. In this study I present the results for 
manufacturing sector white-collar workers. The working paper version also 
contains the results for blue-collar workers. 
The difference in mean wages between men and women is approximately 22 per 
cent of men’s mean wage, to the advantage of men. Firm-level segregation 
accounts for only a small part, three percentage points, of the differential. At the 
firm level, no firm or firm-averaged worker characteristics are strongly 
associated with the gap. The difference in the share of women of a firm’s 
employees between men and women explains only half of a percentage point of 
the total difference in wages. 
The majority of the gender wage differential, a little over half, is attributed to the 
disproportionate concentration of women in lower-paying jobs within firms. 
High-paid managerial jobs are mainly occupied by men, which explains one fifth 
of the total gap. Among other types of jobs, men are concentrated in positions 
with higher skill requirements – that explains a tenth of the gap. Apart from 
differences in skills and managerial ability, these parts of the gap may reflect 
discrimination through differential access to higher-paying jobs, or they may 
result from gender differences in preferences. Although the reasons for the 
preponderance of women in lower-paying jobs remain a puzzle, our findings 
highlight the importance of equal opportunities in education, hiring, and 
promotion. 
However, the results also suggest that predominantly female jobs pay lower 
wages than predominantly male jobs even if they are associated with a similar 
level of average education, tenure and job complexity. In other words, jobs of 
equal worth are differently rewarded depending on whether they are occupied by 
men or women. Of course, one can always speculate how accurate the job 
complexity variable is, but if we assume that this measure is reasonably good, the 
results would imply that policies like comparable worth should be considered. 
One third of the wage differential arising from the level of jobs within firms is 
due to the “femaleness” of the job and cannot be explained by other variables. 
Finally, I found that within jobs women are paid some six per cent less than their 
equally qualified male co-workers. The unexplained within-job gap is higher 
among more educated and more experienced workers. Eliminating the sources of 
unexplained within-job wage differentials can directly account for a quarter of 
the overall gender gap in pay. On the one hand, this six per cent gap is a lot 
smaller than the often-quoted figure of 20 per cent drawn from gender averages; 
on the other hand, it is far from being insignificant. It is surprising that a gap of 
this size in hourly pay exists for equally qualified workers in the same job and 
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firm. The findings are in line with results from Sweden and Norway, but in 
Denmark the unexplained within-job wage gap is much larger – 14%. 
The earliest gender pay differential studies concentrated mainly on personal 
characteristics, largely omitting the role of labour market segregation, whereas 
the first segregation-oriented papers used the female share at different levels of 
aggregation (industry, occupation, firm and job) as explanatory variables. In this 
study, the nested structure of the data is taken into account in the estimation and 
the results show that not doing so will give misleading results. 
1.2 A distributional analysis of earnings losses of displaced 
workers in an economic depression and recovery2 
The gender wage differential study is, strictly speaking, a descriptive cross-
section data story. The analysis is done meticulously, even obsessively so, but the 
dynamics leading to a certain wage distribution could only be guessed at. In the 
second study of this thesis, I look at a specific event in the labour market, 
displacement from a firm, and try to track its effects on the distribution of 
earnings over a period of time. 
I analysed the earnings losses owing to involuntary job loss among Finnish 
workers who became displaced during a period of depression (1992) or recovery 
(1997). These groups of displaced workers and the associated comparison groups 
were followed over an 11-year period beginning three years before and ending 
seven years after the year of possible displacement. A few years ago, the early 
1990s Finnish recession could have been considered an extreme case and not 
likely to have much relevance in more normal times. Now that the financial crisis 
has dealt a serious blow to a number of economies, the results could give some 
guidance to its possible labour market consequences. 
Using the quantile regression method, I estimated the effect of displacement at 
each decile of the earnings distribution. The findings from both periods suggest 
that 1) displaced workers suffer from substantial and persistent earnings losses, 
2) women are subject to larger earnings losses than men, and 3) the effect of 
displacement is very heterogeneous, being much larger in the lower quantiles and 
implying a sharp increase in the earnings dispersion following displacement. The 
fourth finding comes from the comparison of the effects of displacement at 
different phases of the business cycle: in a recession the earnings distribution of 
                                              
 
 
2  Unpublished manuscript. Earlier working paper version: Korkeamäki, O. – Kyyrä, T. (2008): A 
Distributional analysis of displacement costs in an economic depression and recovery. VATT Discussion 
Papers 465, Government Institute for Economic Research. 
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the displaced workers falls far below the counterfactual distribution; in a 
recovery period only the lower half of the earnings distribution is affected. 
The first finding is in accordance with results from the US labour market. The 
results from other European labour markets are more mixed in this respect. The 
second result is interesting given that most US studies have not found notable 
differences between women and men, whereas the gender aspect is given very 
little attention in European studies. One possible explanation for the larger 
earnings losses of women could be that in Finland, as in other countries, women 
are more frequently out of work for family reasons. That may induce employers 
to favour male employees when investing in managerial and professional skills. 
If so, and if such skills are generally transferable, i.e. not lost in job 
displacement, one can expect to find smaller earnings losses for displaced men. 
Taken together with the fact that managerial, professional and technical jobs are 
disproportionately held by men, employers’ investment behaviour may lead to 
larger earnings losses for women. It remains unclear why earnings losses differ 
between men and women in Finland, but not in the US. It should be stressed that 
women’s labour market position is quite different in Finland. On the one hand, 
the relatively generous maternity and parental leave schemes encourage career 
breaks, but on the other hand, public day care and school meals help the mothers 
of young children to work full-time if they want to. Moreover, part-time work 
among women in Finland is not very common and the labour force participation 
rate of women is relatively high.  
The third finding, the heterogeneity in the displacement effect, is the main 
contribution of the paper and has important implications. First, the positive effect 
on earnings dispersion means that job loss does not only cause a significant 
decline in expected earnings, but also creates uncertainty about the level of future 
earnings. This suggests an additional welfare loss for risk-averse workers. This 
effect has typically been ignored in the discussion of displacement costs. 
Secondly, the large effect at the lower end of the distribution is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the relative importance of transferable individual-specific 
skills, which are not lost in job displacement, is larger for high-ability workers, 
who tend to populate the upper part of the conditional earnings distribution. 
Finally, the disproportionately large effect on the first two deciles implies that the 
effect on the expected earnings loss is in large part driven by an increased risk of 
joblessness and low-paid employment following job displacement. This means 
that job training and job replacement programmes targeted at unemployed job 
seekers, if effective in enhancing re-employment, can provide a means to reduce 
the average displacement cost. 
By comparing the results from the two periods (displacement in 1992 or 1997), 
we found much larger earnings losses for those who lost their jobs during the 
depression period. Men (women) who were displaced in the middle of the 
depression had approximately 58% (65%) lower median earnings one year after 
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job loss and 15% (20%) lower median earnings seven years after job loss. 
Because of the exceptionally difficult labour market conditions, their earnings 
distribution as a whole remained below the counterfactual level through the end 
of the follow-up period. By contrast, job loss in the recovery period had a long-
lasting effect only on the lower half of the distribution. For workers displaced in 
1997 the effect on the median of the earnings distribution of men was 3.9% 
(women 7.1%) one year after being displaced. Seven years later the effect was 
still approximately 8% for women, whereas it did not differ from zero for men. 
These long-term losses do not vanish even if we account for income transfers. 
1.3 Institutional rules, labour demand and retirement through 
disability programme participation3 
The disability benefit scheme is one of the largest social security programmes in 
many countries, and therefore is of particular interest. In Finland, disability is the 
most common reason for early retirement, and disability expenditure accounted 
for some 3.5% of GDP in 2003, which was the third highest share in the EU after 
Sweden and Denmark. Disability enrolment rates of older employees vary 
strikingly across the European countries and the US. These cross-country 
differences cannot be explained by demographic or health-related factors. Over 
the past two or three decades, many countries have also experienced an 
expansion of disability benefit enrolment even though their ageing populations 
have become healthier. This is a serious concern given the common goal of 
inducing people to retire later. The widespread use of disability benefits as an 
early retirement instrument has been argued to be a particularly serious problem 
in Finland. 
When job cuts are necessary, firms often offload their oldest employees first. If 
the health requirements for disability benefit eligibility are weak, early retirement 
via the disability scheme can be a useful strategy in effective downsizing, 
providing a way to reduce the workforce in a “soft” way. Some firms may also 
target dismissals at those employees with a high risk of disability. In doing so, 
the employer can avoid disability costs arising from the experience-rated 
contributions of disability pension benefits. Encouraging disability retirement 
could also be an attractive strategy for an employer wanting to change the 
composition of the workforce at a time of stable or growing employment when 
dismissals are difficult to justify. 
Much previous empirical literature has been based on a simple labour supply 
framework in which an employee chooses whether to apply for disability 
                                              
 
 
3 Korkeamäki, O. – Kyyrä, T. (2011): Institutional rules, labour demand and retirement through disability 
programme participation. Journal of Population Economics, forthcoming, available online. 
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benefits, while the employer has no role at all. Surprisingly little effort has been 
made to study the labour demand side. This essay aims to shed light on the 
relationships between labour demand, institutional factors and early retirement 
through disability programmes. I consider the importance of the labour demand 
side by examining the relationship between the growth and restructuring rates of 
an establishment and entries into disability. In addition, I assess the effectiveness 
of two policy instruments: the strictness of medical requirements for disability 
pension eligibility and the experience-rating of disability expenditure. The first 
determines the ease of access to disability pension benefits, whereas the latter 
places part of the costs of early retirement on the employer. 
Transitions out of work to sick leave and disability retirement are modelled using 
matched employer-employee data for the Finnish private sector covering the 
years 1991–2005. The data set includes all active firms and employees can be 
tracked across all labour market states. To identify the role of institutional factors 
I exploit a law change that made the medical requirements for disability pension 
eligibility tougher for a certain group, as well as changes in partially experience-
rated employer contributions. 
The main findings can be summarized as follows. 1) For older employees a 
transition to sick leave is often a one-way street out of employment, leading 
eventually to disability retirement. Half of 50−55 year-olds and over two-thirds 
of older workers on sickness benefits end up in disability retirement within the 
next three years. This highlights the importance of preventive measures aimed at 
minimizing the flow into sick leave. 2) Those employees who could apply for a 
disability pension under more lenient medical requirements were much more 
likely to enter sick leave and to retire via disability pension benefits. Therefore, 
the abolition of the individual early retirement scheme in 2000 significantly 
reduced the flow into disability retirement in the affected groups. 3) I find strong 
evidence that experience-rating lowers the flow into sick leave and reduces 
transitions from sick leave to disability retirement. Moreover, those large firms 
that can easily bear their share of early retirement costs owing to their strong 
financial position more readily let employees who are already on sickness 
benefits exit via disability pension schemes than firms in a weaker financial 
position. Financial strength does not matter for smaller firms that are not subject 
to experience-rating. 4) The transition rates to sick leave and disability retirement 
are relatively large in establishments experiencing a high degree of excess 
worker turnover. When an establishment is growing, transitions to sick leave and 
disability retirement become less frequent. There is no evidence that employers 
exploited the disability pension scheme as a way of adjusting their workforce 
when downsizing. 
These findings imply two policy recommendations to reduce the disability 
benefit enrolment rate of older workers. First, the stringency of medical criteria 
and medical screening for disability benefit eligibility should be tough enough. 
Introduction 7 
When non-medical factors are weighted at the expense of medical criteria, 
disability benefits may distort labour supply decisions, thereby also inducing 
workers who are not truly disabled to retire via disability programmes. This 
appears to be mainly a labour supply issue, as I did not find evidence that 
employers encouraged disability retirement when downsizing. Secondly, the 
experience-rating of disability benefit costs seems to be an effective policy 
instrument. It probably induces employers to take preventive action to reduce the 
inflow into sick leave. Firms also put more effort into getting employees on 
sickness benefits back into work. This finding should be of considerable interest, 
not only for Finland, but also for the other countries that do not yet have an 
experience-rating system for disability benefits. Obviously, there are still a 
number of open questions regarding, for example, the optimal design of 
experience-rating and possible spillover effects on hiring and transitions out of 
work to other destinations than disability retirement. 
1.4 Employment and wage effects of payroll tax cut – evidence 
from a regional experiment4 
In this paper, I evaluate the employment and wage effects of a regional tax cut 
experiment in northern Finland. The experiment started in 2003 and it was due to 
continue for three years, but it was soon extended to 2009 and then again to the 
end of 2012. The experiment abolished employer contributions to the national 
pension insurance and national health insurance schemes for firms located in 
certain high-unemployment regions. Prior to 2003, these employer contributions 
varied between 2.95 and 6 per cent of the wage bill, depending on the capital 
intensity and size of the firm. The average payroll tax reduction of the 
experiment was 4.1 percentage points. 
The evaluation setup was designed well before the start of the experiment. First, I 
chose a comparison region closely resembling the target region and then 
continued by matching the target region firms to the comparison region firms to 
form groups of firms as comparable as possible. I did this step at an early stage to 
make the evaluation transparent and credible. The timing was not very fortuitous, 
however. The Kainuu self-government experiment, featuring a similar reduction 
in payroll taxes, started only two years after the experiment in Lapland – and its 
target area was in the middle of the comparison region. Hence this study 
considers only the first two years of the experiment. 
The main result was that the tax cut did not have a statistically significant effect 
on employment or the firms’ wage sum. The wage sum seemed to have risen but 
                                              
 
 
4 Korkeamäki, O. – Uusitalo, R. (2009): Employment and wage effects of a payroll tax cut – evidence 
from a regional experiment. International Tax and Public Finance, 16(6), pp. 753–772. 
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the standard errors of the estimates were too large to warrant any strong 
conclusions. These results were based on firm data acquired directly from the tax 
authorities. I also had data on individual wages from the employer associations. 
If the estimates from the sub-sample of firms for which wage data is available 
can be generalized to all firms, about half of the effect of the payroll tax 
reduction on labour costs was offset by faster wage growth. The remaining two 
per cent decrease in labour costs did not have a significant effect on employment. 
According to my estimates, the demand and supply elasticities are roughly equal. 
The point estimate that the tax cut increased employment by 1.3 percent indicates 
labour demand elasticity of around 0.6. This is well within the range of earlier 
estimates. Unfortunately the confidence bands around this estimate are too wide 
to give much guidance for future tax policy. 
The results are in line with findings from other micro-level empirical studies. 
Usually no employment effects are found and if any effect exists, it is a partial 
shifting of the tax cut to wages. The most relevant comparisons are with Sweden, 
where two payroll tax cut experiments were conducted. The first started in 1982 
in the four northernmost municipalities and was eventually extended to cover the 
whole of regional support area A, i.e. almost the northern half of the country, 
excluding the coast. Payroll taxes were cut by ten percentage points and there 
was no ceiling to the cut. The experiment, which had become a semi-permanent 
regional subsidy, had to be phased out by the end of 1999, owing to EU 
regulations. The second experiment, started in 2002, was similar in geographical 
scope. It also reduced taxes by ten percentage points but the maximum deductible 
amount was rather low. Neither of the experiments yielded a statistically 
significant employment effect. The effect on wages was not investigated for the 
first experiment and it was positive and significant in the latter case. 
The fact that the cut in payroll taxes was targeted at narrowly defined regions and 
the temporary nature of the tax cut limit the extent to which the results can be 
generalized to the potential effects of a permanent country-wide reduction in 
payroll taxes. First, the payroll tax experiment was financed by increasing payroll 
taxes in the rest of the country. In a national scheme, the budgetary cost would 
need to be financed by raising other taxes. Second, a regional experiment may 
have substitution effects if firms reallocate labour to the target region from the 
rest of the country. This might be beneficial in the sense that part of the reasons 
for the regional payroll tax cut was to boost employment in disadvantaged 
regions. However, this limits the usefulness of the results from the experiment in 
predicting the effects of a national programme. Third, the incidence of the tax cut 
may also be different in a regional programme since wage contracts are 
negotiated at the national level. Any nationwide changes in payroll taxes may 
have an impact on the outcome of these negotiations, while a regional 
programme that only affects a small share of employers has little weight in 
national bargaining. Finally, a temporary programme is likely to create smaller 
employment effects than a permanent reduction in payroll taxes. The expected 
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duration of three years might not have been a sufficiently long period for firms to 
adjust their labour demand to a relatively small change in labour costs. 
1.5 The Finnish payroll tax cut experiment revisited, or where 
did the money go?5 
The payroll tax exemption was originally planned to last for three years, from 
January 2003 to December 2005. Already in May 2003, the government had 
decided to start a regional self-government experiment in Kainuu, eastern 
Finland, beginning from 2005. That experiment contained a similar provision for 
lowered payroll taxes as the Lapland experiment. Hence it spatially enlarged and 
temporally extended the payroll tax experiment until the end of 2009. The 
experiment has been further continued until the end of 2012 and there is intense 
lobbying to make it a permanent arrangement. 
The first evaluation study was somewhat stunted by the start of the Kainuu 
experiment. The results from the first two years were in the expected direction 
but less than satisfying in their precision. For this study I had both more firms in 
the treatment group and more years of observations. I also had information on 
firms’ balance sheets and financial statements that allowed me to track whether 
the tax cut had an effect on firms’ profits, if not on employment or wages. To 
sum up the situation at the start of writing the fifth essay and to explain the need 
to re-evaluate the effects of the payroll tax cut. I stated the following: 
1) According to our previous research on the first two years of the payroll tax 
experiment, the tax cut in northern Finland does not seem to have had an immediate 
employment effect. This finding is consistent with evidence from other Nordic labour 
markets. 2) In the earlier study there was some indication of rising wages, but not 1:1 
with respect to the tax break – this is also a common finding from Sweden and Norway. 
From 1) and 2) and supported by results from the UK, where a minimum wage change 
had a negative effect on profits (but no employment effects), it seems likely that 
changes in payroll tax could also have an effect on firm profitability. Models of 
incomplete competition from the industrial organisation literature and matching models 
from the labour market side can accommodate these profit effects, but their size remains 
an empirical question. 
With the larger target area for the experiment, the evaluation setup of the 
previous study was no longer valid – the Kainuu region formed the main part of 
the comparison region. The target regions in northern Lapland and Kainuu are 
not geographically linked, but both are within the region eligible for the highest 
                                              
 
 
5 Korkeamäki, O. (2011): The Finnish payroll tax cut experiment revisited, or where did the money go? 
VATT Working Papers 22, Government Institute for Economic Research. 
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national firm subsidies. From 2000 to 2007, Kainuu was in the highest subsidy 
region and northern Lapland was part of the region eligible for the second-
highest subsidies. There was, however, a special provision that granted firms in 
Lapland access to subsidies almost as high as for firms in the first category. 
Instead of doing another matching exercise, I used firms within the same subsidy 
region but outside the target region of the payroll tax cut as a comparison group 
(see Figure 6.1). 
The target group consists of approximately 2900 firms that in 2001 employed an 
average of 3.4 workers and had an average turnover of 466,000 euros. The firms 
in the comparison area were slightly larger, having 3.7 employees and a turnover 
of 497,000 euros. Prior to the experiment the comparison area firms had also 
grown somewhat faster than the experiment region firms, but none of the firm-
level pre-experiment response measures (levels or growth) differed statistically 
significantly between the firm groups, even before controlling for industry, 
growth trends, etc. Therefore I claim that the setup was rather successful. The 
analysis was done with differences-in-differences regressions, with controls for 
either industry- and region-specific or firm-specific growth trends. 
The main result from this new study is that the payroll tax cut did not have a 
statistically significant effect on employment, the wage sum, profits or hourly 
wages in the private sector. Most of the estimates are positive but unfortunately 
the standard errors are so wide that they could accommodate values indicating a 
full shifting of the tax cut to either the wage sum, profits or, indeed, to 
employment. If we look at the point estimates in euro or employee terms, they 
indicate that the wage sum in the target region firms rose faster than in the 
comparison region, employment growth did not react and profits grew even a 
little more than the wage sum. Alternatively, if we consider the point estimates of 
the percentage changes, employment and the wage sum did grow by an equal 
amount and there was no effect on profits. The only unambiguous finding is that 
the tax cut is reflected in the financial statement data, although, even there, there 
was some uncertainty in the case of small and the least capital-intensive firms. 
The effect on hourly wages found in our earlier study is not found for the 
combined target region of Kainuu and Lapland. The effect is still found for 
Lapland – but the estimates for Kainuu would imply a negative wage effect and 
the effects cancel each other out when calculating the total. The results also show 
one statistically significant change in a non-experiment year that calls for caution 
in interpreting the results. Certainly, a region-specific shock could have taken 
place in Kainuu and caused the negative effect, but I found no reason to believe 
that the result for Lapland is trustworthy. 
Irrespective of the findings of this and other similar experiments in other Nordic 
countries, national pension insurance payment contributions have gradually been 
lowered in recent years on the premise that this is a cost-effective way of 
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boosting employment. From the beginning of 2010, they were abolished 
altogether. There was some debate as to whether this was the most effective way 
to help firms to generate jobs, but empirical findings had a rather minor role in 
the discussion. This is, of course, partly due to the lack of conclusive findings. 
The Finnish payroll tax experiment is a rare example of a tax change being made 
in an experimental setting with the stated aim of facilitating economic research. 
Hence it was important to evaluate the experiment, even if the results tell rather 
little about the effects. This was also an opportunity to learn about the 
experiment itself in order to understand better how possible future experiments 
should be designed and implemented to the greatest scientific advantage. I argue 
that it is still important to continue experimenting – it is also important to pre-
evaluate experiments to see if they are likely to yield accurate and reliable 
results.

 2. A Gender wage gap decomposition for matched 
employer-employee data6 
Abstract 
In this paper, we evaluate the extent to which the gender wage gap in the Finnish 
manufacturing sector is attributable to within-job wage differentials, gender 
differences in individual qualifications, and a disproportionate concentration of 
women in lower-paying firms and lower-paying jobs within firms. We use 
matched employer-employee data to compare wage differentials between 
similarly qualified female and male workers who are doing similar work for the 
same employer. Our modelling approach employs a correlated random effects 
specification to account for the hierarchical grouped structure of the underlying 
data. 
Key words: Gender wage gap, wage discrimination, gender segregation, random 
effects model 
JEL classification numbers: J14, J23, J26 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A huge body of literature has emerged to explain why the gender wage gap 
persistently exists in virtually all labour markets (see Altonji and Blank, 1999, 
and Blau and Kahn, 2000, for recent surveys). Traditional attempts to explain the 
wage gap focused on gender differences in individual qualifications and their 
rewards in the labour market. More recently, the importance of the segregation of 
women and men into different jobs has been recognized. This line of research 
emphasizes that wages are closely tied to the characteristics of jobs, not only to 
the individuals who hold them. If typical female jobs pay lower wages than jobs 
dominated by men, the mean earnings of women can fall short of men’s earnings 
even in the absence of within-job wage differentials between the sexes. 
                                              
 
 
6 Ossi Korkeamäki and Tomi Kyyrä.  
The earlier version of the paper was circulated under the title “Explaining gender wage differentials: 
Findings from a random effects model”. We appreciate the helpful comments received at the third Nordic 
Workshop on the Economic Analysis of Linked Employer-Employee Data in Bergen, the second Nordic 
Econometrics Meeting in Bergen, the CAED Conference in London, and the EALE Conference in 
Seville. We are grateful to the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers for access to their data. 
Antti Luukkonen kindly provided his measures of job complexity levels for our use. The suggestions of a 
co-editor and anonymous referees considerably improved the paper. 
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Attempts to quantify the segregation effects on the wage gap were for a long time 
distorted by a lack of appropriate data. Consequently, most early analyses 
focused on segregation among occupations, firms, or industries only. This is 
clearly unsatisfactory, as women and men are further segregated into different 
jobs within firms. In recent years, important advances have been made by access 
to large matched employer-employee data sets that contain multiple observations 
on workers with the same employer. When information on occupations or job 
titles is available, such data enable wage comparisons between male and female 
workers who are doing similar work for the same employer. This kind of 
comparative analysis has been conducted by Petersen and Morgan (1995), 
Petersen et al. (1997), Meyersson Milgrom et al. (2001), Groshen (1991), Datta 
Gupta and Rothstein (2001), and Bayard et al. (2003). In the first three of these 
studies observed sex differentials in mean wages within jobs are simply 
aggregated to form various wage decompositions. This approach has the obvious 
drawback that variation in individual characteristics is left uncontrolled. In the 
other studies, wages are regressed against a set of control variables and fraction 
female in the worker’s industry, firm, occupation, and/or job.7 The key idea is 
that the regression coefficients of the various fraction female variables capture 
the relationship between the wage rate and ‘femaleness’ of the underlying labour 
market structure. 
It should be noted that a common practice in the fraction female regressions 
above has been to neglect the grouping in the underlying data. For example, 
observations on workers resulting from the same firm are interpreted as being 
independent.8 However, intuition suggests that we should expect workers in the 
same firm to be more homogeneous than those in a sample drawn randomly from 
the population of all firms. Workers in the same firm share many common 
factors, some of which may be observable (e.g. firm size, fraction female) but 
many are not (e.g. market power, managerial ability). In the regression analysis 
the effect of such unobservables serves as a latent firm effect that will be 
absorbed into the error term. Moreover, since different jobs require different 
skills and qualifications, we can further expect that within a given firm workers 
who are doing the same job are more homogenous than the firm’s workforce as a 
whole. This implies an additional source of dependence between workers within 
jobs. 
In general, the matched employer-employee data exhibit a particular type of 
grouped structure, which contrasts the statistical properties of such data with the 
classical random sample case. A consequence of the grouping in the regression 
                                              
 
 
7 In a related paper, we apply this method to the Finnish data; see Korkeamäki and Kyyrä (2002). 
Groshen’s (1991) specifications do not include control variables. 
8 Bayard et al. (2003) report the standard errors adjusted for intra-establishment error correlation. 
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analysis is that, owing to the latent group effects, the errors will be correlated 
within groups. In the absence of correlation between the latent group effects and 
regressors included in the model, the OLS coefficients will be consistent, but the 
usual standard error estimates can be very misleading (Moulton, 1986). More 
generally, when the group effects are correlated with the regressors, the OLS 
coefficients will be inconsistent. 
In this study, we explore wage differentials between white-collar women and 
men in the Finnish manufacturing sector using a large matched employer-
employee data set. We view the data as having a nested structure with three 
levels: firms, jobs within firms, and workers in jobs within firms.9 A job is 
defined as an occupation within a firm. Along with individual characteristics, the 
wage rate is allowed to depend upon the employing firm and the job the worker 
holds within the firm. The latent firm and job effects are modelled as functions of 
group characteristics, including the mean characteristics of individuals within the 
groups. We end up with a regression model with variables measured at the 
individual, job, and firm levels, and an error term that has a two-way nested 
structure with separate intercepts for firms and jobs within firms. Using the 
regression results we decompose the overall gender gap in pay into the 
contributions of gender segregation, gender differences in the individual 
qualifications, and the unexplained within-job gap. 
Our approach departs from the existing segregation literature in that we explicitly 
model wage differentials between firms and jobs. In contrast to standard fraction 
female regressions, we obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest in 
the presence of the correlated group effects that are likely to arise in the case of 
the matched employer-employee data. With respect to job segregation, the 
previous studies have focused on quantifying what fraction of the overall wage 
gap can be attributed to a disproportionate concentration of women in lower-
paying jobs. In addition to identifying this quantity under less restrictive 
assumptions, we go a step further by addressing the issue of why typical female 
jobs are lower-paid. When evaluating the extent to which lower wages in 
predominantly female jobs can be explained by job attributes, we make use of an 
index of job complexity that measures the responsibility, skills and effort 
required by a given job. Thus we are able to assess whether wage differentials 
between typical female and male jobs can be viewed as justified or not, a 
question that is beyond the scope of earlier analysis but crucial, for example, in 
the view of comparable worth policy. 
                                              
 
 
9 Obviously, we could go further and introduce an additional level on top of this hierarchy by grouping 
firms by industry. For simplicity, we focus on the three levels and treat industry as a characteristic of 
firms rather than a hierarchy level of its own. 
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In the next section, we describe the econometric methods and contrast our 
approach with the fraction female decompositions in the previous studies. 
Section 2.3 gives details about the data and reports some descriptive statistics. 
The results are reported in Section 2.4, which is followed by a concluding 
section. 
2.2 Methodological framework 
2.2.1 The wage model 
Suppose our data consist of all employees of F firms. Within firms employees 
who do similar work are grouped together, in which case they are said to hold the 
same job. Observations across firms are regarded as being independent, but 
within firms wages are correlated owing to common firm and job characteristics. 
We model the log wage of worker i (i = 1, 2,…, njk) who holds job k 
(k = 1, 2,…, cj) in firm j (j = 1, 2,…, F) as 
 ,jki jki jki j jk jkiw s f vη ε′= + + + +xβ  (1) 
where s is the female dummy, x is a vector of other individual characteristics, ν is 
the job effect that is nested within the firm effect f. For the idiosyncratic errors ε, 
we assume  
 ( , , 0 and ( , , 0 for ,jki j j j jki jki j j jE f E f i iε ε ε ′ ′= = ≠X v X v  (2) 
where Xj includes x and s for all employees of firm j, and vj =(νj1, νj2,…, νjcj). 
Wage variation between firms and jobs beyond the observable individual 
characteristics is captured by f and ν respectively. Without loss of generality, the 
job effects are defined in deviation from the firm effects, with the expected value 
within each firm equal to zero. Thus, E(f + ν | firm j) = fj + E(ν | firm j) = fj. We 
emphasize that f and ν are likely to be correlated with s and x. In particular, 
women are expected to be concentrated in firms with low values of f, and further 
in jobs with low values of ν. Since different firms and jobs require different 
qualifications, the group effects f and ν are likely to be correlated also with the 
variables in x. If fj > fj’, workers in firm j earn more on average than workers in 
firm j’ after controlling for s and x. Similarly, provided that νjk > νjk’, workers in 
job k are more highly paid on average than those in job k’ within the same firm j, 
after controlling for s and x. 
Within jobs wage differentials are related to workers’ sex (s), other individual 
characteristics (x), and unobservables (ε). A parameter of particular interest is η 
that gives the expected wage differential between equally qualified (in terms of 
x) women and men who are doing the same work for the same employer. One 
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may be tempted to view a negative value of η as evidence of wage discrimination 
against women. Such an interpretation is justified only if all relevant explanatory 
variables were included in x. This may not be the case in practice. In general, the 
influences of possible discrimination and unmeasured individual characteristics 
are indistinguishable in the value of η. Therefore, we interpret η simply as a 
measure of the unexplained within-job wage differential between sexes. 
At this point, a few remarks on the restrictions imposed above are in order. First, 
the returns to individual qualifications, β, are assumed equal for women and men. 
One should recognise that the interpretation of β is conditional on the position 
held in the labour market (i.e. conditional on f and ν), so β measures the returns 
within a given job. Since employers cannot apply very different reward schemes 
to their female and male employees who are doing the same work, our 
assumption is not as restrictive as it might first look. We will return to this issue 
and present results from a regression model with gender-specific slopes. The 
assumption that the unexplained within-job wage gap is of the same size 
everywhere is rather restrictive. One might wish to allow the coefficient of the 
female dummy to vary across jobs, i.e. replace η with ηjk. We adopt a very 
narrow definition for jobs in our empirical application. This results in a huge 
number of jobs, many of which include either female or male employees only, 
making the estimation of job-specific coefficients infeasible in practice. 
2.2.2 Decomposing the gender gap in pay 
The gender wage gap is defined as the difference in the expected wages between 
men and women, i.e. the wage difference between a randomly chosen man and 
woman. Using the model outlined above we decompose it as  
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( | 0) ( | 1)
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E w s E w s E s E s
E f s E f s
E s E s
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ν ν
′
= − = = − + = − =
+ = − =
+ = − =
x xβ
 (3) 
where the contributions of gender segregation among firms and jobs are captured 
by the last two terms. A positive value of E(f | s = 0) – E(f | s = 1) indicates that 
women are disproportionately concentrated in lower-paying firms. This term 
would be zero, if there were no variation in f across firms or if women and men 
were identically distributed across firms. If women are relatively more frequently 
allocated to lower-paying jobs within firms, E(ν | s = 0) – E(ν | s = 1) will take a 
positive value. It would be zero, if there was no systematic wage variation across 
jobs within firms beyond the differences in individual characteristics or if, within 
all firms, women and men were allocated identically across jobs. The amount of 
within-job wage differentials between sexes not accounted for by the explanatory 
variables x equals –η. The contribution of gender differences in individual 
characteristics is captured by the remaining term on the right-hand side. 
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To obtain an empirical counterpart of the decomposition, the conditional means 
of w and x can be replaced with the sample means over women and men but the 
other components need to be estimated. Since the latent group effects are 
expected to be correlated with the explanatory variables, we will focus on 
estimation by fixed effects and correlated random effects. 
2.2.3 The fixed effects approach 
In our first approach, we take f and ν as fixed constants to be estimated along 
with η and β. Therefore, we consider the model conditional on the firm and job 
effects: 
 ( | , , ) .jki j j j jki jki j jkE w f s f vη ′= + + +X v xβ  (4) 
In this case, η and β could be estimated by regressing w on s, x and the full set of 
job dummies. As the number of job dummies may be too large to make 
estimation feasible, we obtain analytically equivalent estimators of η and β by 
applying pooled OLS to the transformed model: 
 ( ) ( ) ,jki jk jki jk jki jk jki jkw w s sη ε ε′⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅− = − + − + −x xβ  (5) 
where jkw ⋅ , jks ⋅ , jk⋅x , and jkε ⋅  denote averages over workers in the k-th job of 
firm j. Under the assumptions (2), the resulting “fixed effects” (FE) estimators ηˆ  
and βˆ  are consistent under arbitrary correlation between (s, x) and (f, ν). Given 
the restriction E(ν | firm j) = 0 for all j, the firm and job effects can be estimated 
as 
 ˆ ˆˆ ,j j j jf w sη ′⋅⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅⋅= − − xβ  (6) 
 ˆˆˆˆ ,jk jk jk jk jv w s fη ′⋅ ⋅ ⋅= − − −xβ  (7) 
where jw ⋅⋅ , js ⋅⋅ and j⋅⋅x  denote averages over the employees of firm j. The point 
estimates of f and ν are noisy because the number of observations per firm and, 
especially, per job can be small. However, the estimates of their expected values 
among women and men based upon sample averages are expected to be 
reasonably accurate. Thus, we proceed by inserting ηˆ  and βˆ  along with the 
sample means of fˆ  and vˆ  over women and men into (3). This gives the first 
version of our wage gap decomposition. It allows us to distinguish the 
contributions of gender segregation among firms and jobs to the overall wage 
gap from the contributions of the unexplained within-job gap and gender 
differences in individual characteristics. 
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2.2.4 The correlated random effects approach 
In an alternative approach, we take an explicit account of the relationship 
between the latent group effects and the explanatory variables. More precisely, 
we specify the expected values of f and ν conditional on observables via auxiliary 
linear regressions. Let Xj* = (Xj, zj, gj1,…, gjcj) be the extended set of conditioning 
variables that includes firm attributes zj (firm size, industry, etc.) and job 
attributes gjk’s (job size, job complexity index, etc.) in addition to Xj. We specify 
the conditional mean of the firm effect as 
 0 1 2( | )j j j j jE f sα δ∗ ′ ′⋅⋅ ⋅⋅= + + +X x zδ δ  (8) 
and that of the job effect as  
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2( | ) ,jk j jk j jk j jk jE v s sθ∗ ′ ′⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅= − + − + −X x x g gθ θ  (9) 
i.e. the first moments of the marginal distributions of f and ν are assumed to be 
linear functions of the group means of s and x and of other group level variables. 
All the explanatory variables on the right-hand side of (9) are measured in 
deviation from the firm mean in order to enforce the expected value of ν within 
firms to zero.10 
Now we consider the model conditional on Xj*: 
( | ) ( | ) ( | ).jki j jki jki j j jk jE w s E f E vη∗ ′ ∗ ∗= + + +X x X Xβ  
Defining ξj ≡ fj – E(f | Xj*) and ωjk = νjk – E(νjk | Xj*), we obtain the estimating 
wage equation: 
 0 0 1 1
2 2
( ) ( )
( ) ,
jki jki j jk j jki j jk j
j jk j jki
w s s s s
u
α η δ θ ′ ′ ′
⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅ ⋅⋅
′ ′
⋅
= + + + − + + + −
+ + − +
x x x x
z g g
β δ θ
δ θ
 (10) 
where ujki ≡ ξj + ωjk + εjki. Conditional on Xj*, all components of ujki are assumed 
to be mutually independent, with zero means and constant variances σξ2, σω2, and 
σε2 respectively. Within firm j, the variance-covariance structure of the errors is 
given by 
                                              
 
 
10 This is only a matter of parameterization provided that j ⋅g  is included in the set of firm covariates zj. 
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This is known as the two-way nested error structure in econometrics (Fuller and 
Battese, 1973). It models the residual correlation within firms that remains after 
conditioning on the observed firm, job, and individual characteristics. Such a 
correlation is likely to exist owing to unobservable job and firm factors. We 
estimate the model with generalized least squares (GLS) that exploits the 
particular form of the error structure for efficiency and produces appropriate 
standard errors. 11  It should be stressed that including the group means of 
individual explanatory variables in (8) and (9) provides a way of allowing s and x 
to be correlated with f and ν, an old idea by Mundlak (1978).12 To emphasize this 
point, we refer to the specification outlined above as the “correlated random 
effects” (CRE) model.13 
Coefficients of the fraction female variables in (8) and (9) are of particular 
interest. A negative value of δ0 implies that firms with a high density of female 
workers pay lower wages after controlling for j⋅⋅x  and zj. If within firms 
employees in predominantly female jobs are lower paid given ( )jk j⋅ ⋅⋅−x x  and 
( )jk j⋅−g g , it will be indicated by a negative value of θ0. In other words, δ0 and θ0 
are kind of “residual gender effects”, which imply that predominantly female 
firms and jobs pay different wages for reasons not accounted for by the observed 
worker and group characteristics. 
Because E(f | s = 0) = E[E(f | X*) | s = 0] by the law of iterative expectations, we 
obtain an estimate of E(f | s = 0) by averaging the right-hand side of (8) over all 
men. E(f | s = 1) is estimated analogously by averaging over women. The 
contribution of gender segregation among firms can then be expressed as 
                                              
 
 
11 The large unbalanced data raise some computational issues, as the inverse of the error variance-
covariance matrix is required by the GLS procedure. These issues and the estimation of the variance 
components are discussed in Korkeamäki and Kyyrä (2003). 
12 Chamberlain (1984) considers a general case where the latent group effects are modelled as linear 
predictors of s and x of all employees within the group. Mundlak’s (1978) specification is obtained by 
imposing a restriction that the coefficients of s and x in the linear predictor are identical for all i within 
the group. The unrestricted specification becomes cumbersome in our case where group sizes vary and 
some firms are very large. 
13 The model defined by (10) and (12) is known under a variety of other names, including the nested error 
components model, variance components model, random intercepts model, mixed model, and hierarchical 
model. 
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where ojf (ojm) is the fraction of all women (men) allocated to firm j. Similarly, the 
contribution of gender segregation among jobs within firms is given by 
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where ofjk (omjk) is the fraction of all women (men) allocated to the k-th job of firm 
i. Substituting (12) and (13) into (3) along with the GLS estimates of the 
regression coefficients gives us the second version of our wage gap 
decomposition. 
In the case of the CRE model, the segregation contributions can be expressed as 
sums of various terms. These terms pass on useful information, which is not 
available from the FE model. For example, if typical female jobs are found to be 
characterised by low values of ν, one may speculate that lower wages in such 
jobs result from lower skill requirements. If this is the case, a large fraction of the 
contribution of gender segregation among jobs in (13) will be attributed to 
differences in the mean education (incorporated in jk j⋅ ⋅⋅−x x ) and job complexity 
(incorporated in jk j⋅−g g ), while the component associated with the fraction 
female ( jk js s⋅ ⋅⋅− ) will be close to zero. By contrast, if wage differentials between 
typical female and male jobs arise largely from some unobserved sources, this 
will be indicated by a strong effect of the fraction female term in (13). 
2.2.5 Discussion 
In the case of the FE model, we cannot say anything about why predominantly 
female firms and jobs are lower paid on average. This of course is a cost of the 
robustness of the fixed effect method: we do not assume anything about the 
relationship between the group effects and regressors. Compared with the FE 
model, the CRE specification is more restrictive, as the conditional expectations 
of f and ν are assumed linear. However, when the group means of s and x are 
included in (8) and (9), the GLS estimators of η and β are identical to their FE 
estimators, and hence not affected by these additional restrictions. In this respect, 
we do not lose anything by imposing more structure on the model. The additional 
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structure of the CRE model is exploited in explaining wage variation between 
firms and jobs. While both the FE and CRE model are able to produce identical 
results for the effects of individual-level regressors, only the latter is informative 
about wage differentials between firms and jobs. For this reason, the CRE model 
is our preferred choice. A potential drawback of the method is that the sum of 
various contributions does not necessarily equal the raw wage gap in finite 
samples. This is a consequence of the more complex error structure. 
Our approach departs from the decomposition exercises in Groshen (1991), Datta 
Gupta and Rothstein (2001), and Bayard et al. (2003) in some essential ways. Of 
course, the main difference is that our CRE approach is informative about the 
determinants of lower wages in predominantly female firms and jobs. Secondly, 
the interpretation of the regressor coefficients η and β comes from the wage 
model defined in (1) and (2), i.e. they measure wage differentials within jobs (In 
other words, the firm and job effects held constant). This interpretation is trivial 
when the model is estimated by fixed effects, but the coefficients have the same 
meaning also in the CRE specification as we allow f and ν to be correlated with s 
and x. The coefficients in the standard fraction female regressions do not 
generally have the same interpretation. Thirdly, we define the segregation 
contributions as differences in the mean values of the firm and job effects 
between men and women.14 
Despite the differences in the modelling framework, the estimating wage 
equation in (10) and the associated decomposition are not much different from 
those in the previous studies. If occupational segregation is omitted, the standard 
fraction female decompositions can be viewed as special cases of our CRE 
decomposition. If we set δ1, δ2, θ1, and θ2 to zero, we obtain a specification 
similar to those in Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2001) and Bayard et al. (2003). If 
we impose further β = 0, the model is reduced to Groshen’s (1991) specification. 
Within our framework, the restriction δ1 = θ1 = 0 is equivalent to assuming that 
the firm and job effects are uncorrelated with x. This of course is a rather 
restrictive assumption, and it may lead to inconsistent estimates of η and β. The 
importance of this sort of restrictions is an empirical issue, and it depends on the 
data in hand. For example, both Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2001) and Bayard et 
al. (2003) find only a minor change in the female dummy coefficient when the 
fraction female variables were replaced with the full set of job dummies. In 
general, it does make a difference whether one conditions on the job held or only 
on the femaleness of the worker’s position. In our application, we find 
quantitatively significant discrepancies in the estimated coefficients, standard 
                                              
 
 
14 Additional, less important, differences are: (1) we measure the fraction female in job as a deviation 
from the firm mean, (2) we do not include the fraction female in occupation nor in industry in our model, 
and (3) we apply GLS, not OLS. 
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errors, and decomposition results between the CRE model and standard fraction 
female specification. 
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
2.3.1 The TT data and job classification 
Our data come from the records of the Confederation of Finnish Industry and 
Employers (TT). TT is the central organisation of manufacturing employers and 
its member firms account for more than three-quarters of the value added of the 
Finnish manufacturing sector. Each year TT conducts three surveys covering 
almost all employees of its member firms. All surveys are directed to the 
employer, one asking information about white-collar workers and the other two 
about blue-collar workers. The focus of this paper is restricted to white-collar 
workers because of differences in the available records and compensation 
schemes between the two worker groups. 15  In the subsequent analysis, we 
include all the full-time white-collar workers aged between 18 and 65 who were 
employed in 2000 by TT firms with at least 5 workers. The resulting data contain 
observations on almost 150,000 employees in 1,464 firms. This is not a 
representative sample of the Finnish manufacturing firms: while all the large 
firms are included, many small and medium sized firms are not members of TT 
and hence do not appear in the data. However, the data are rather representative 
of the white-collar population, covering roughly 60% of the salaried employees 
in the Finnish manufacturing sector. Compared with the entire population of 
white-collar manufacturing workers, individuals in the data are somewhat more 
educated and slightly higher paid, but there are no notable differences in the sex 
or age composition, or in the allocation of workers across different industries.16 
In Finland working conditions are regulated by collective agreements, which are 
made along industrial lines between employer organisations and unions. In the 
collective agreements, white-collar workers are grouped into managerial, 
technical, and clerical workers, where the latter two groups are combined in some 
industries. Each group is covered by a separate industry-specific agreement, 
which determines, among other working conditions, a minimum rate of pay for a 
particular type of work. For this purpose, job tasks of technical and clerical 
employees are evaluated according to the responsibility, skills, and effort they 
                                              
 
 
15 The working paper version includes a separate analysis for blue-collar workers; see Korkeamäki and 
Kyyrä (2003). 
16 Of course, white-collar manufacturing workers as a whole are a very selective group of all workers. 
Compared with the most other worker groups, women are underrepresented and the gender wage gap is 
higher within this group. We focus on this narrow group to be able to exploit information on the unique 
measure of job complexity. In Section 4, we briefly discuss wage gap decomposition results for blue-
collar manufacturing workers and workers in the private service sector. 
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require, and thereby mapped onto a scale of complexity levels. Each level of 
complexity is then associated with a given basic wage that serves as the wage 
floor for that type of work. It should be stressed that the employers do not hold 
the evaluation of job tasks in the palm of their hands; it is highly regulated and 
supervised by the representatives of unions. The key principle is that the basic 
wage is determined by job attributes only, independently of the individual 
characteristics of the jobholder (e.g. sex and education). Actual wages received 
by workers generally exceed the basic wages, owing to firm premiums and 
rewards for individual qualifications and performance. 
Workers are also classified into 78 occupational groups that are common to all 
white-collar groups and all industries. We define a job as an occupation within 
the employing firm (this results in 26,236 jobs). 17  However, where workers 
covered by different agreements are allocated to the same job, we split the job 
into parts, each one including only technical, clerical, or managerial employees. 
The number of jobs increases to 30,281. Finally, jobs that include workers with 
differing levels of job complexity are further divided into jobs including only 
workers with the same level of job complexity. This raises the number of jobs to 
40,664. At the end, all workers within a given job have the same occupation and 
job complexity classification and are covered by the same collective agreement. 
The evaluation process of jobs explicitly states that wages are closely tied to 
jobs, not only to the workers who hold them. The knowledge of job complexity 
ranking provides valuable information that can be used to explain wage variation 
between jobs. There are two complications, however. First, job complexity 
information is missing for all the managerial jobs, which are not subject to any 
evaluation process. Secondly, the scale of the complexity classification is not 
constant but 9 different scales are applied in different industries. Where no 
distinction between the technical and clerical employees is made, the number of 
complexity levels lies somewhere between 3 and 15 (being 8, 9, or 10 in most 
cases). In other industries the number of complexity levels is 6 for technical 
employees and 12 for clerical employees. However, the different scales for job 
complexity cover roughly the same range of logarithmic basic wages and the 
relationship between the job complexity levels and basic wages is approximately 
log-linear within each scale. Therefore, we re-scale the original complexity 
                                              
 
 
17 Additionally, we use information on each worker’s job location (municipality) to sub-divide jobs within 
firms. Workers with the same occupation who are working in different plants of the same firm are 
allocated to separate jobs, if the plants are located in different municipalities. We do not consider it 
prudent to divide firms into plants with this indirect information on job locations. Thus, the employer unit 
in our analysis is firm, not plant. 
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variables on the interval 0 to 9 by applying a suitable stretch or compression 
factor to each industry-specific scale.18 
2.3.2 Sample statistics 
From Table 2.1 we see that some 37% of white-collar workers are female and 
they earn on average 22% less than their male counterparts do. There are no large 
gender differences in the average age, work experience, or firm tenure. Women’s 
slightly longer average experience and tenure reflect the strong labour market 
attachment of the Finnish women. On the other hand, the potential years of work 
experience has a tendency to overestimate the actual years spent in the labour 
market especially for women. Firm tenure is not subject to such a bias, however. 
Roughly equal mean tenures for women and men suggest that mobility patterns 
are rather similar for both sexes. This view is in accordance with the results of 
Lilja (1995) who finds no evidence of gender differences in the exit rates from 
the TT firms for white-collar women and men. While men are only slightly more 
educated as measured by the education level, gender differences in terms of the 
field of education are quite substantial. Of men, 65% have received a technical 
education, compared with 17% of women. Moreover, 41% of women have 
obtained a degree in social sciences, business, or law. The mean value of the job 
complexity level is clearly higher for men, indicating that more demanding 
clerical and technical jobs are mainly occupied by men. 
To give a hint of the role of gender segregation, Table 2.2 shows the gender wage 
ratio and sex composition by 2-digit occupation group and white-collar group 
(i.e. managerial vs. technical and clerical workers). Variation in the female share 
indicates a large degree of gender segregation among occupations, perhaps 
reflecting differences in education. Women appear to be concentrated in the 
administrative occupations. By contrast, less than 10% of white-collar workers in 
production occupations are female. The gender wage ratio within the occupation 
groups ranges from .670 to 1.062, being on average clearly higher than the raw 
wage gap on the bottom line. This suggests that occupational segregation plays a 
role in explaining the gender wage gap. There is no clear relationship between 
the female share and the size of the within-occupation gender wage gap: the 
correlation coefficient between these variables is .26 and statistically 
insignificant at the 5% level.19 
 
                                              
 
 
18 This conversion idea came from Antti Luukkonen, who found by comparing various wage regressions 
that the single variable works relatively well compared with the huge number of industry-specific 
complexity dummies. 
19 When the observations are weighted by the size of the occupation group, the correlation coefficient is 
even lower (.06). 
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Table 2.1 Sample statistics by gender 
 Women Men All 
Hourly wage, euro 12.107 (3.926) 15.763 (5.59) 14.409 (5.336)
Log hourly wage 2.452 (.276) 2.702 (.326) 2.610 (.331)
Age 41.146 (9.794) 41.128 (9.920) 41.135 (9.874)
Schooling years 12.065 (2.164) 12.810 (2.200) 12.534 (2.216)
Firm tenure, years 12.395 (10.648) 11.860 (10.552) 12.058 (10.591)
Work experience, years 22.081 (10.632) 21.318 (10.381) 21.601 (10.481)
Job complexity (0–9 scale) 3.707 (1.69) 4.909 (2.201) 4.379 2.078
Job complexity missing, share .437 .569 .520 
Job size 242 (665) 310 (754) 285 (723)
Employer size 3,445 (4,772) 3,526 (4,759) 3,496 (4,764)
  
Education level, %  
Basic or unknown 19.256 11.966 14.665 
Secondary 29.916 22.621 25.322 
First stage of tertiary 31.544 27.030 28.701 
Bachelor’s degree 8.247 22.559 17.259 
Master’s degree 10.528 14.808 13.223 
PhD .509 1.017 .829 
  
Field of education, %  
General 8.070 6.382 7.007 
Education .372 .069 .181 
Humanities and art 2.825 0.413 1.306 
Social sciences, business and law 40.975 9.500 21.156 
Science 2.687 2.491 2.563 
Technical 17.091 64.722 47.083 
Agriculture 1.115 3.062 2.341 
Health and welfare 2.591 0.364 1.188 
Services 5.006 1.029 2.502 
Unknown 19.270 11.969 14.673 
  
Fraction female in firm .436 (.165) .332 (.137) .370 (.156)
Fraction female in job .778 (.293) .131 (.185) .370 (.388)
  
Sample size 55,158 93,786 148,944 
Notes: Unless otherwise indicated, the figures in the table are means. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Hourly wage is computed dividing the monthly wage by regular working hours. Schooling years is 
defined as the mean years of schooling attached to a given level of education. Work experience is 
approximated by subtracting the years of schooling and seven years for time prior to the age of school 
entry from the worker's age. The mean level of job complexity is computed using non-missing values 
only. Employer and job sizes are the average firm and job size over workers. The mean firm size in the 
data is 102 and the mean job size is 3.7. The total number of firms is 1,464 and that of jobs is 40,664. 
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Table 2.2 Fraction female and gender wage ratio by 2-digit occupation 
and white-collar group 
 Managerial Technical & clerical All white-collar 
Occupational group N Fem Gap N Fem Gap N Fem Gap 
R&D 28,128 .163 .909 19,102 .422 .791 47,230 .268 .759
R&D management 1,320 .135 .847 4,956 .528 .859 6,276 .445 .614
Product design 21,444 .133 .914 8,824 .279 .826 30,268 .176 .843
Quality management 1,397 .327 .894 3,316 .555 .854 4,713 .487 .800
Research 3,967 .277 .885 2,006 .572 .846 5,973 .376 .781
Production 8,469 .079 .842 24,627 .102 .865 33,096 .096 .841
Production and maintenance 
management 5,498 .053 .864 17,810 .074 .857 23,308 .069 .836
Production support 2,971 .127 .858 6,817 .177 .866 9,788 .162 .842
Logistics 2,082 .230 .812 4,870 .460 .908 6,952 .391 .794
Materials and logistics 472 .138 .825 2,515 .274 .883 2,987 .252 .825
Purchasing 1,467 .241 .811 1,647 .583 .842 3,114 .422 .725
Shipping 143 .413 .844 708 .833 .930 851 .763 .805
Sales and marketing 8,807 .231 .831 14,231 .663 .765 23,038 .498 .662
Sales 7,211 .207 .823 12,720 .681 .767 19,931 .510 .643
Sales promotion 709 .453 .845 721 .544 1.009 1,430 .499 .876
Production and marketing  
co-operation 887 .246 .828 790 .467 .764 1,677 .350 .766
PR 1,828 .398 .884 2,992 .575 .846 4,820 .508 .803
PR 650 .697 .836 629 .812 .891 1,279 .754 .806
Information technology 1,178 .233 .861 2,363 .512 .817 3,541 .419 .750
Juridical & tax assistance 366 .377 .868 402 .560 .670 768 .473 .723
Administration 4,169 .658 .763 14,480 .915 .871 18,649 .857 .682
Administration management 1,470 .468 .836 400 .678 .864 1,870 .513 .800
Pay office 100 .790 .746 1,734 .948 .961 1,834 .939 .837
Bookkeeping 328 .811 .869 2,832 .951 .942 3,160 .937 .832
Accounting 975 .461 .915 1,595 .669 .830 2,570 .590 .804
Secretarial work 1,264 .977 .932 5,049 .992 .956 6,313 .989 .893
Office services 18 .778 1.062 1,746 .861 .953 1,764 .861 .953
Clerical work, small firms 14 .857 .758 1,124 .943 .887 1,138 .942 .878
Human resources 1,650 .524 .798 2,953 .858 .813 4,603 .739 .674
HR management 388 .479 .874 95 .663 .968 483 .516 .865
Competence development 417 .511 .887 179 .508 .845 596 .510 .877
Recruiting and employing 279 .616 .820 131 .740 .835 410 .656 .799
Payroll administration 101 .832 .866 1,670 .985 .963 1,771 .976 .800
Safety and health care 336 .351 .710 465 .619 .889 801 .507 .705
Personnel services 129 .713 .847 413 .850 .859 542 .817 .802
Other groups together 9,788 .299 .957 9,788 .299 .957
All 55,499 .221 .877 93,445 .459 .839 148,944 .370 .768
Notes: N is the number of observations. Fem is the fraction of female employees in the group. Gap is the 
sex wage ratio as obtained by dividing the women's mean wage by men's mean wage. 2-digit occupational 
groups are split into managerial and non-managerial occupations (technical and clerical groups are 
combined). 
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We emphasize that the allocation of workers to different jobs is based on a more 
detailed 3-digit occupation code, which corresponds to the finest classification 
level. In other words, each occupation group in Table 2.2 includes 1–6 more 
detailed occupations, resulting in 78 occupations. For example, Office services in 
Administration include Receptionists, Switchboard Operators, Copyists and Mail 
Dispatchers, and Office Messengers; and Purchasing in Logistics includes 
Purchasing Managers, Purchasers, and Purchasing Assistants. Recall that 
employees of a given firm with the same detailed occupation are assumed to be 
doing the same job only if they are covered by the same collective agreement, 
their jobs are located in the same municipality, and in the case of technical and 
clerical employees their job tasks have been ranked to be of equal worth. Given 
this narrow definition of the job, we expect that most jobs include only a few 
employees. We have 5,002 jobs with five or more workers that employ 95,531 
workers, and 24,339 jobs with a single worker (see Table 2.3). The number of 
integrated jobs, i.e. jobs with both sexes present, is 5,018 and 78,631 persons are 
working in such jobs. We shall discuss the significance of the single worker and 
fully segregated jobs in the section where we consider how sensitive our results 
are with respect to the inclusion or exclusion of these groups. 
Table 2.3 Distribution of jobs across different size categories 
# of women # of men in job    # of 
in job 0 1 2 3–4 5–9 10–50 > 50 Total  Job size jobs 
0 – 12,272 3,126 2,099 1,190 524 19 19,230   
1 12,067 1,128 436 327 321 198 12 14,534  1 24,339
2 2,336 354 171 153 130 108 5 3,257  2 6,590
3–4 1,295 232 93 112 110 121 16 1,979  3–4 4,732
5–9 530 128 75 75 109 119 23 1,059  5–9 2,983
10–50 184 55 45 34 61 118 47 544  10–50 1,799
> 50 3 4 0 3 8 11 31 60  > 50 220
Total 16,415 14,173 3,946 2,848 1,929 1,199 153 40,663  Total 40,663
Notes: 27,670 women and 50,965 men are working in 5,018 integrated jobs; 42,825 men are working in 
19,230 jobs with no women; and 27,488 women are working in 16,415 jobs with no men. The total 
number of jobs is 40,663. 
 
It is obvious that the results of segregation studies are sensitive to the 
characteristics of the data used. Furthermore, the extent to which our findings are 
comparable with the results of other studies depends on how similar the analysed 
worker populations are. We have collected some key characteristics of the data 
sets used in some other similar, mostly Scandinavian, studies in Table 2.4. Where 
possible, i.e. in the cases of Norwegian and Danish data, statistics reported refer 
to white-collar workers in the manufacturing sector. Compared with the other 
studies, we have the smallest number of occupational categories. However, when 
we move to the job level by looking at occupations within employers, the 
discrepancies disappear in the sense that the average job size, i.e. the average 
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number of workers with the same occupation in the same plant, is quite similar 
across the data sets. In contrast to the Finnish data, the employer unit in the other 
data sets is plant, not firm. The largest plant size in the US data results from the 
constraints required to match a sample of workers to plants. For example, Bayard 
et al. (2003) kept only plants with 25 or more employees in their data. Women’s 
mean wage as a share of men’s mean wage ranges from .687 in the US to .768 in 
Finland, being very similar in Norway, Sweden, and Finland. The share of 
women is between 30 and 40% in the Nordic data sets. The US data include also 
blue-collar workers as well as a different set of industries, which may explain the 
clearly higher female share for the US (47%). In sum, compared with the other 
Nordic data, our data set seems rather similar in terms of the average job size, sex 
composition, and gender wage gap. 
Table 2.4 Data sets used in similar studies 
 This Study Petersen et al. 
(1997) 
Datta Gupta & 
Rothstein (2001) 
Meyersson et al. 
(2001) 
Bayard et al. 
(2003) 
Country Finland Norway Denmark Sweden US 
Sector Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing Private sector Private sector 
Worker group White-collar White-collar White-collar White-collar All workers 
Sample year 2000 1990 1995 1990 1990 
# of workers 148,944 99,486 86,242 391,997 637,718 
# of occupations 78 210 98 280 13 / 72 / 491 
# of plants/firms 1,464 2,599 2,485 22,031 32,931 
# of jobs 40,664 31,692 19,722 146,940 not reported 
Mean plant/firm size 102 38 35 18 180 
Mean job size 3.66 3.14 4.37 2.67 not reported 
Female share .370 .312 .390 .346 .468 
Gender gap .768 .732 .698 .730 .687 
Notes: Only the Finnish data include firms, the other data include plants. The mean plant size for the US 
data is taken from the last row of column 4 of Table 1 in Bayard et al. (2003).The other US figures are 
sample statistics from the New Worker-Establishment Characteristics Database, where 52 per cent of 
workers are from manufacturing. 
 
Unfortunately, the other studies lack descriptive characteristics for white-collar 
manufacturing sector workers. We collected some information on educational 
attainments of all manufacturing workers in 2000 for Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
and the US.20 We found that over 40% of manufacturing workers have received a 
secondary education in each country. In general, women and men seem to be 
                                              
 
 
20  Information for Swedish and Danish workers was obtained from Statistics Sweden and Statistics 
Denmark respectively. The US figures were calculated from the 5 per cent Public Use Microdata Sample 
of U.S. Census Bureau 2000 Census of Population and Housing. The Finnish statistics are from the TT 
data, i.e. the data used in this study combined with the TT sample of blue-collar workers. Educational 
information separately for blue- and white-collar manufacturing workers was not available. 
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allocated rather equivalently across various levels of education, though there may 
be substantial gender differences in the field of studies. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Wage regressions 
Table 2.5 displays results from the various wage regressions. The explanatory 
variables are grouped into individual regressors (sjki and xjki), job regressors 
( ,jk js s⋅ ⋅⋅−  ,jk j⋅ ⋅⋅−x x and jk j⋅−g g ), and firm regressors ( ,js ⋅⋅  ,j⋅⋅x  and zj). We begin 
with the fixed effects (FE) model where the full set of job fixed effects (i.e. job 
dummies) is present. The coefficient of the female dummy takes a value of  
–.0627, indicating that women and men are not equally rewarded by employers. 
A woman can expect to be paid some 6% lower wages than her equally qualified 
male co-worker doing the same job within the same firm. One additional year of 
schooling is estimated to increase the expected wage in a given job by 2.5%. This 
is clearly below the conventional estimates for the returns to schooling. The 
much lower estimate obtained here by conditioning on the job held suggests that 
the wage effect of education works largely through the differential allocation to 
jobs. Wages increase with tenure and the effect of work experience takes the 
familiar quadratic form. 
The next two specifications include only the fractions of female employees in the 
set of job and firm regressors. These specifications resemble the specifications 
estimated by Groshen (1991), Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2001), and Bayard et 
al. (2003). The random effects (RE) specification is estimated with GLS, 
assuming zero correlation between the latent group effects and variables in x. As 
expected, the coefficients of both fraction female variables are negative and 
statistically highly significant, indicating lower wages for predominantly female 
firms and jobs mainly occupied by women within firms. It is illustrative to 
consider the OLS estimates of the same model. The usual OLS standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity but derived under the assumption of random 
sampling are given in the parentheses. In addition, the standard errors that are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-firm correlation are shown in the 
square brackets (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 328–331). The difference between 
the standard errors is substantial for all coefficients. The usual OLS standard 
errors that do not take into account the grouped structure of the underlying data 
are dramatically understated. 
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Table 2.5 Wage regression results 
 Model Specification 
 FE OLS RE CRE1 CRE2 
Intercept 1.3483 (.0059) [.0834] 1.8744 (.0083) 1.6734 (.0555) 1.6540 (.0561)
Individual regressors  
Female –.0627 (.0012) –.0732 (.0023) [.0054] –.0653 (.0015) –.0627 (.0012) –.0627 (.0012)
Schooling years .0257 (.0003) .0886 (.0003) [.0051] .0425 (.0003) .0258 (.0003) .0257 (.0003)
Experience .0151 (.0002) .0182 (.0003) [.0013] .0175 (.0002) .0151 (.0002) .0151 (.0002)
Experience2 / 100 –.0228 (.0004) –.0224 (.0006) [.0040] –.0254 (.0004) –.0228 (.0004) –.0228 (.0004)
Firm tenure  .0138 (.0004) –.0065 (.0006) [.0038] .0085 (.0005) .0138 (.0004) .0138 (.0004)
Job regressors  
Fraction female –.1794 (.0028) [.0124] –.2155 (.0026) –.1266 (.0022) –.0779 (.0023)
Mean schooling .0324 (.0006) .0218 (.0006)
Mean experience .0075 (.0005) .0046 (.0005)
Mean (experience2 / 100) –.0084 (.0010) –.0044 (.0010)
Technical .0317 (.0030) .0363 (.0029)
Managerial .3070 (.0022) .3112 (.0030)
Mean Firm tenure  –.0102 (.0010) –.0110 (.0009)
Complexity level  .0457 (.0006)
Complexity missing  .0348 (.0027)
Large city .0535 (.0029) .0460 (.0028)
Log (job size) –.0151 (.0009) –.0137 (.0008)
Firm regressors  
Fraction female –.1796 (.0048) [.0572] –.1407 (.0157) –.0758 (.0129) –.0637 (.0130)
Mean schooling .0280 (.0037) .0258 (.0038)
Mean experience –.0006 (.0030) –.0067 (.0030)
Mean (experience2 / 100) .0179 (.0064) .0198 (.0064)
Fraction technical jobs .0496 (.0127) .0554 (.0128)
Fraction managerial jobs .2021 (.0120) .1667 (.0138)
Mean Firm tenure  –.0329 (.0030) –.0321 (.0030)
Mean job complexity  .0099 (.0015)
Fraction complexity 
missing 
 .0681 (.0108)
Fraction jobs in large cities .0441 (.0044) .0438 (.0044)
Worker mix .0734 (.0106) .0688 (.0107)
Mean log (job size) –.0187 (.0046) –.0198 (.0048)
Log (firm size) .0197 (.0028) .0191 (.0029)
Variance components  
2
εσ  (individual error) .0270 .0173 .0173
2
ωσ  (job random effect) .0192 .0117 .0101
2
ξσ  (firm random effect) .0115 .0029 .0031
Notes: RE, CRE1, and CRE2 are the (correlated) random effects models with the GLS standard errors in 
parentheses. The standard errors in parentheses for the fixed effects (FE) and OLS models are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. The FE model corresponds to the model with the full set of job dummies. The standard 
errors in square brackets for the OLS model are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and intra-firm 
correlation. All job regressors are measured in deviation from the firm mean. The clerical jobs also 
include non-managerial jobs in industries where no distinction between the clerical and technical jobs has 
been made. Models CRE1 and CRE2 include 38 industry dummies. The worker mix variable is the ratio 
of white-collar employees to all employees. Number of observations is 148,944 in all regressions. 
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Compared with the fixed effects model, the coefficients of the RE and OLS 
models are quite different for some individual regressors. Within the random 
effects framework, this calls into question whether the error components 
associated with firms and jobs are uncorrelated with the individual explanatory 
variables. In the presence of such a correlation the regression coefficients in the 
RE model (and in the OLS model) are inconsistent. In the CRE1 model a number 
of job and firm controls, including the group means of the individual variables, 
are added to the model. Testing statistical significance of the coefficients of the 
group means can be interpreted as a version of the Hausman test for the random 
effects specification (Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 288–290). Since the coefficients of 
the group means of x in the CRE1 model are highly significant, we conclude that 
the RE model is not valid (i.e. the firm and job error components are correlated 
with x). By implication, the OLS model must be miss-specified as well. In the 
CRE1 and CRE2 specifications this problem is solved by adding the group 
means of x to the model, as proposed by Mundlak (1978). Consequently, the 
coefficients of all individual regressors are identical to those of the FE model. 
In the CRE1 model the coefficients of the fraction female variables are reduced 
by half in absolute value when compared with the RE model. This implies that 
the fraction female variables in the RE model serve in part as a proxy for other 
factors responsible for wage differentials between firms and jobs within firms. 
Coefficients of job and firm regressors generally have signs that seem intuitively 
reasonable. Larger firms pay higher wages. Firms and jobs within firms that 
require higher education are associated with higher wages. Workers whose jobs 
are located in large cities receive better wages, perhaps to compensate for higher 
living costs. Within firms wage differentials between technical and clerical jobs 
are relatively small, being around 3% in favour of technical jobs. Managerial jobs 
are associated with clearly higher wages than technical and clerical jobs. 
In the CRE2 specification, the job complexity level is added to the model. This is 
our preferred model specification. Information on job complexity is missing for 
all managerial jobs and for some non-managerial jobs. In these cases the dummy 
for missing job complexity takes a value of one. One additional level of job 
complexity is found to be associated with a wage increase of almost 5%. 
Compared with the CRE1 model, the coefficients of managerial and technical 
jobs remain almost unchanged. If more complex jobs require higher education, it 
is not surprising to find a considerable fall in the effect of the mean schooling 
years in job. The coefficient of the fraction female in job is reduced by over one-
third in absolute value. Even after controlling for job complexity, average 
education, and many other factors, it is quite remarkable that wages remain 
negatively associated with the fraction female variables. In other words, firms 
and jobs within firms mainly occupied by women pay lower wages for reasons 
that cannot be explained by observables. This may be due to gender differences 
in preferences but it may also reflect discrimination through differential access to 
higher-paying jobs at the point of hire or subsequent promotions. These findings 
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are partly driven by missing job complexity information for the managerial jobs, 
however. We address this issue below. 
Let us consider the estimates of variance components shown on the bottom lines 
of the Table 2.5. The variances imply that most of the unexplained wage 
variation is related to individuals within jobs. In the CRE2 specification the 
individual error variance σε2 accounts for about 60% of the total error variance, 
σε2 + σω2 + σξ2. The variance of the firm random effects is very low, so that adding 
more firm-level regressors to the model cannot notably improve the model’s fit. 
The residual intra-job correlation, (σω2 + σξ2) / (σε2 + σω2 + σξ2), describes correlation 
between the wage outcomes of two randomly chosen workers in a randomly 
chosen job within a randomly chosen firm, after controlling for s and x. In the 
CRE2 model this correlation is as high as .43, which highlights the importance of 
accounting for the grouped data structure in the econometric modelling. 
2.4.2 Wage gap decompositions 
Table 2.6 shows the gender wage gap decompositions corresponding to the 
different model specifications in Table 2.5. From the fixed effect specification 
we conclude that roughly one-third of the overall gender wage gap of .2505 can 
be attributed to unexplained within-job wage differentials between sexes (.0627) 
and gender differences in education, work experience, and firm tenure (.0154). 
Gender segregation among firms explains some 15% (.0391), while over one-half 
of the overall gap is owing to gender segregation among jobs within firms 
(.1334). The OLS and RE models, which were found to be inconsistent, give a 
different picture about the relative importance of the various determinants of 
gender wage differentials. The CRE1 and CRE2 models, however, produce 
decompositions consistent with the fixed effect specification. Contrary to the 
fixed effects approach, these models allow us to address the question as to why 
predominantly female firms and jobs are lower paid. 
Consider the decompositions associated with the CRE1 and CRE2 models. There 
are no dominating factors that could be argued to be responsible for most of the 
aggregate effect of gender segregation among firms (which in turn is quite 
moderate). Especially, the fraction female in firm has only a minor impact on the 
gender wage gap, accounting for less than .0080 in both specifications. Likewise, 
the industry dummies and hence gender segregation among industries do not play 
any role in explaining the gender wage gap. Gender segregation among jobs 
within firms is a more interesting case. Over .0500 of the overall wage gap is 
owing to the disproportionate concentration of men in high-paid managerial jobs. 
This accounts for about 40% of the aggregate effect of gender segregation among 
jobs. Among technical and clerical jobs women are more likely to hold less 
complex jobs, which explains .0256 of the overall gap in the CRE2 
decomposition. Once we control for job complexity, the contribution of the 
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fraction female in job falls from .0688 to .0423, which still accounts for 17% of 
the overall wage gap. 
Gender wage gap decomposition 35 
Table 2.6 Gender wage gap decompositions 
 Sample means  Contribution to the wage gap 
 Men Women Difference  FE OLS RE CRE1 CRE2 
Individual regressors          
Female .0000 1.0000 –1.0000  .0627 .0732 .0653 .0627 .0627
Schooling years 12.8100 12.0654 .7446  .0192 .0660 .0316 .0192 .0192
Experience 21.3181 22.0808 –.7627  –.0115 –.0139 –.0133 –.0115 –.0115
Experience2 / 100 5.6217 6.0056 –.3839  .0088 .0086 .0097 .0088 .0088
Firm tenure  3.0579 3.1327 –.0748  –.0010 .0005 –.0006 –.0010 –.0010
  .0781 .1344 .0933 .0781 .0781
Job regressors    
Fraction female –.2011 .3420 –.5431  .0974 .1170 .0688 .0423
Mean schooling .1784 –.3033 .4817   .0156 .0105
Mean experience –.0465 .0791 –.1257   –.0009 –.0006
Mean (experience2 / 100)  –.0242 .0412 –.0654   .0005 .0003
Technical job .0334 –.0568 .0901   .0029 .0033
Managerial job .0620 –.1054 .1674   .0514 .0521
Mean Firm tenure   –.0066 .0112 –.0178   .0002 .0002
Complexity level .2075 –.3527 .5602    .0256
Complexity missing .0340 –.0579 .0919    .0032
Large city .0008 –.0014 .0022   .0001 .0001
Log (job size) .1778 –.3023 .4801   –.0073 –.0066
  .1334 .0974 .1170 .1312 .1304
Firm regressors    
Fraction female .3318 .4359 –.1042  .0187 .0147 .0079 .0066
Mean schooling 12.6462 12.3440 .3022   .0085 .0078
Mean experience 21.3802 21.9753 –.5950   .0033 .0040
Mean (experience2 / 100) 5.6635 5.9345 –.2711   –.0049 –.0054
Fraction technical jobs .1353 .1122 .0231   .0011 .0013
Fraction managerial jobs .3992 .3274 .0719   .0145 .0120
Mean Firm tenure   3.0445 3.1554 –.1108   .0036 .0036
Mean job complexity 4.2717 4.0381 .2336    .0023
Fraction complexity missing .5345 .4952 .0393    .0027
Fraction jobs in large cities .5859 .5698 .0161   .0007 .0007
Worker mix .6724 .6855 –.0131   –.0010 –.0009
Mean log (job size) 2.8923 2.8272 .0651   –.0012 –.0013
Log (firm size) 6.8822 6.8259 .0563   .0011 .0011
Industry dummies   .0043 .0051
  .0391 .0187 .0147 .0380 .0395
    
Overall sum  .2505 .2505 .2243 .2473 .2480
Notes: The raw wage gap, as measured by the sex difference in mean log wages, is .2505. The first two 
columns report the sample means of all regressors among men and women; the third column gives the 
difference. The last five columns show the absolute contribution of each regressor obtained from the 
various model specifications. The contributions are obtained by multiplying the coefficients in Table 2.5 
by the gender differences in sample means in Table 2.1. The cumulative effect of each group of regressors 
is shown below the horizontal lines. 
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2.4.3 Robustness of the results 
We have carried out several exercises to test the robustness of our results with 
respect to the model specification and data restrictions adopted.21 
Missing job complexity information 
Information on job complexity is missing for many observations, including all 
workers in managerial jobs and some workers in technical and clerical jobs. This 
has two implications. Firstly, the degree of detail in the classification of 
managerial jobs is low compared with the classification of technical and clerical 
jobs. This is likely to have an effect on the relative importance of job segregation 
and that of within-job wage differentials. Secondly, job complexity is only partly 
controlled for in the CRE2 specification. Therefore, we have performed the same 
analysis for a sample that excludes observations with missing values for the level 
of job complexity. This sub-sample represents only technical and clerical 
workers (some 72,000 individuals), among whom the raw wage gap is much 
lower (.1570). The magnitude of coefficients in the CRE2 model is different but 
signs remain unchanged compared with the results in Table 2.5.22 In particular, 
the coefficient of the female dummy drops to a value of –.0283, that of the 
fraction female in job drops to a value of –.0335, and that of the fraction female 
in firm is reduced by one-third. Compared with the results in Table 2.6, the 
overall relative contribution of individual-level regressors is lower for the sub-
sample. In particular, the unexplained within-job wage gap of .0283 accounts for 
18 per cent of the overall gap among technical and clerical workers (compared 
with 25 per cent for the entire data). The importance of gender segregation 
among firms appears to be slightly weaker, whereas the contribution of 
segregation among jobs dominates, accounting for two-thirds of the overall gap. 
A major part of the effect of gender segregation among jobs within firms (74%) 
is attributable to gender differences in complexity levels in the jobs held by 
women and men. This, in fact, explains approximately one-half of the overall 
gender wage gap among technical and clerical employees. 
Varying size thresholds for jobs 
Obviously, our definition for the job is quite strict. This leads to a large number 
of jobs with only one or two workers in the data. One might wonder whether this 
feature of the data would be partly driving the results. To explore this possibility, 
we replicated our analysis by excluding all workers in jobs with less than three 
workers (25% of all observations). This restriction has only a minor effect on the 
size of the raw wage gap. While the regression results of the CRE2 model remain 
                                              
 
 
21 These results are available from the authors on request. 
22 See Table 8 in Korkeamäki and Kyyrä (2003). 
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qualitatively unchanged, the variance of the job random effects shrinks (by 20%) 
and the coefficients of the job regressors change to some extent. Importantly, 
changes in the wage gap decomposition turned out to be very small. 
Jobs with both sexes present 
Another potential problem with our data setup is that apart from being small, 
quite many jobs consist of only men or women. It is obvious that observations in 
such jobs contribute to the role of gender segregation, but not to the role of 
gender wage differentials within jobs. Therefore, we replicated our analysis using 
a sample restricted to integrated jobs with at least three workers. This restriction 
results in considerably smaller data. The number of jobs drops from 40,663 to 
3,890, the number of workers drops from 148,944 to 76,375, and the raw wage 
gap shrinks from .2505 to .2070. Considering the CRE2 specification, the 
coefficients of job regressors are affected but those of individual and firm 
regressors remain almost unchanged. The most notable difference is more 
negative coefficients for the fraction female variables. In the wage gap 
decompositions these changes are reflected in the relative importance of the 
various sources of gender wage differentials. In the CRE2 decomposition the 
absolute contribution of job segregation drops from .13 to .05, that of firm 
segregation rises from .04 to .09, whereas the contribution of unexplained within-
job wage differentials and gender differences in individual characteristics 
remains around .08. The decrease in the importance of job segregation stems 
from a smaller degree of gender segregation among jobs and from smaller 
complexity differences between female and male jobs in this sub-sample. 
Gender-specific slopes 
In the Oaxaca-type decompositions, the regression coefficients are usually 
allowed to be gender-specific. Table 2.7 shows results from an extended version 
of the CRE2 model where all individual-level regressors are interacted with the 
female dummy. For ease of interpretation the education, experience, and tenure 
variables are measured in deviation from their values for the average worker. The 
intercept of the model and the female dummy coefficient are shown in the first 
row of columns 4 and 5 respectively. The other coefficients in column 4 measure 
returns to education, experience, and tenure for men. Women’s returns are 
obtained as the sum of the coefficients in columns 4 and 5. The female dummy 
coefficient gives the size of the unexplained within-job gender gap in pay for 
workers with the average years of education, experience, and tenure. We do not 
show results for job and firm-level regressors, as they remain unchanged. 
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Table 2.7 Regression coefficients and gender wage gap decompositions 
from the CRE2 model with female interactions in individual-level 
variables 
 Sample means CRE2 coefficients Contribution to the 
wage gap 
 Men Women Difference Male coefficient Female 
interaction 
Means Coeff. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 1.0000 1.0000 .0000 2.1946 (.0515) –.0795 (.0018)  .0000 .0795
Schooling years .2757 –.4688 .7446 .0289 (.0003) –.0105 (.0004)  .0215 –.0049
Experience –.2824 .4802 –.7627 .0180 (.0002) –.0081 (.0003)  –.0137 .0039
Experience2 / 100 .9559 1.3398 –.3839 –.0276 (.0005) .0127 (.0007)  .0106 –.0171
Firm tenure  –1.4146 –1.3398 –.0748 .0127 (.0005) .0026 (.0007)  –.0010 .0035
    .0174 .0649
Notes: From education, experience, and tenure variables, we have subtracted their values for the average 
worker. Coefficients of the regressors and their interactions with the female dummy are given in columns 
4 and 5 respectively. The interaction for the intercept corresponds to the female dummy. The GLS 
standard errors are in parentheses. The contributions of gender differences in background characteristics 
in column 6 are obtained by multiplying the coefficients in column 4 with the gender differences in the 
variable means in column 3. The contributions of gender differences in coefficients in column 7 are 
obtained by multiplying the interaction coefficients with the sample means for women in column 2 and 
changing the sign. Cumulative contributions are shown below the horizontal lines. 
 
When β is allowed to differ between sexes, we find lower returns to education 
and work experience but a higher return to firm tenure for women. In the 
presence of substantial gender differences in the field of received education, 
women’s lower return to education may indicate that the employers value most 
technical education, which is received by the majority of men. The absolute value 
of the female dummy coefficient is slightly higher than in the corresponding 
specification where β was restricted to be equal for both sexes. Among workers 
with the average years of education, experience, and tenure, women are found to 
receive some 7.6% lower wages than their male co-workers who are doing the 
same job. The expected wage rate increases over the first 35 years of experience 
but at a lower rate for women. Consequently, the unexplained wage gap within 
jobs is small for workers with little experience but grows with experience.23 
There is no evidence of the within-job gender gap in favour of men among 
workers with no experience and tenure; in fact, women may be even slightly 
better paid in such cases. 
                                              
 
 
23 Strictly speaking, the within-job wage gap between women and men begins to shrink after 35 years of 
experience. This phenomenon is driven by the imposed quadratic form for the effect of experience, and 
does not occur when the experience dummies are used. 
Gender wage gap decomposition 39 
The potential years of work experience has a tendency to overestimate actual 
experience, and the problem is more acute for women because of their higher 
propensity to be out of work owing to family responsibilities. The imposed 
functional form for the effect of work experience is also rather rigid. These 
remarks suggest that our findings may be sensitive with respect to how work 
experience is measured and incorporated in the model. If we adjust our measure 
of experience for likely career interruptions and replace the quadratic experience 
terms with the set of experience terms,24 our main findings remain unchanged, 
though the female interaction with tenure becomes insignificant. 
The last two columns of the Table 2.7 show the contributions of gender 
differences in the background characteristics (column 6) and regressor 
coefficients (column 7), i.e. the explained and unexplained part of the wage 
differential between the average woman and average man who are doing the 
same work for the same employer respectively. Some 80% of the within-job 
wage differential of .0823 remains unexplained, being attributed to different 
coefficients for women and men. Only a small fraction of the gender wage 
differential is attributable to gender differences in the background characteristics, 
namely to women’s lower education level. Not surprisingly, these are the same 
conclusions we jumped to in the case of the model without gender-specific 
slopes. 
It is important to recognize that the results of decomposition exercises with 
gender-specific slopes are somewhat arbitrary. Firstly, the male coefficients are 
taken as a reference structure that is used to evaluate the contributions of gender 
differences in the background characteristics in Table 2.7. Alternatively, one 
could choose the female coefficients or some weighted average of male and 
female coefficients. If we use the female coefficients as the reference structure, 
our main insights do not change, though the relative contribution of women’s 
lower education level is reduced. Secondly, the estimated contributions of gender 
differences in the slopes are affected by the location transformations of the 
explanatory variables (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999). We found that the 
unexplained within-job wage differential in the last column is attributed mainly 
to the female dummy coefficient, while women’s lower returns to education and 
experience have only moderate contributions. These findings are driven by our 
choice to measure the education, experience, and tenure variables in deviation 
from their values for the average worker. If these variables were transformed to 
range from zero upwards, we would find a negligible (or slightly negative) 
                                              
 
 
24 From men’s experience we subtracted one year for military service. We subtracted 1,2, or 3 years from 
women’s experience if the original experience variable was 2–4, 5–7, or more than 7 years respectively. 
These modifications are based on Asplund’s (2001) comparisons of the potential and actual (self-
reported) years of work experience. 
40  Gender wage gap decomposition 
female dummy effect and strong positive contributions for women’s lower 
returns to education and experience. In such a case, the female dummy 
coefficient would pick up the size of the within-job gender gap in pay among the 
lowest educated workers with no experience and tenure. In other words, the 
results in the last column depend on the interpretation we put on the female 
dummy coefficient. Importantly, the overall effect of gender differences in the 
regression coefficients is not affected by the location transformations, or the 
estimated contributions of gender differences in the background characteristics in 
column 6. 
Despite these difficulties in interpretation, it is safe to make the following 
conclusions: 1) only a small fraction of the within-job wage gap between sexes is 
attributable to women’s lower education level, while most of the gap remains 
unexplained. 2) The unexplained within-job wage differential increases with 
education and experience, being very small or negligible among low educated 
workers with little experience and tenure. 
2.4.4 Comparisons with findings from other studies 
We conclude this section by contrasting our main findings with the findings from 
other studies that explore the importance of labour market segregation and wage 
differentials occurring within jobs (i.e. within occupations within plants) in 
explaining the gender wage gap.25 There are only a few such studies, as the 
evaluation of within-job wage differentials calls for high quality matched 
employer-employee data, which are not widely available. Our results are most 
directly comparable with evidence for white-collar workers in Norway (Petersen 
et al., 1997), Sweden (Meyersson Milgrom et al., 2001), and Denmark (Datta 
Gupta and Rothstein, 2001).26 We found that in Finland white-collar women earn 
some 22% less on average than men do, compared with 30% in Denmark and 
27% in Norway and Sweden. Gender segregation among firms accounts for 
about 16% of the Finnish raw gap, while the industry effects have no significant 
role at all. These results are consistent with the findings for other Nordic 
countries where gender segregation among industries or employers does not play 
an important role in the case of white-collar workers. Roughly one-half of the 
                                              
 
 
25 The most up-to-date and comprehensive study of gender wage differentials in Finland that does not go 
to the job-level is Vartiainen (2002). It includes the standard Oaxaca decompositions for workers in the 
private service sector, for white- and blue-collar manufacturing workers, and for local and central 
government workers. 
26 The Norwegian data of Petersen et al. (1997) contain (almost) all workers in six business sectors in 
1984 and 1990. The data used by Meyersson Milgrom et al. (2001) is more extensive, covering most 
privately employed workers in Sweden over the period 1970–1990. Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2001)’s 
Danish data include (almost) all salaried workers in 1984 and 1995 in the private sector. In the text we 
refer only to the results for the latest period available, and for Norway and Denmark we report figures for 
white-collar manufacturing workers. 
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raw gap of the Finnish white-collar workers is attributable to the disproportionate 
concentration of women in lower-paying jobs within firms. In Denmark 
occupational and job segregation explains roughly one-half of the raw gap but in 
Norway and Sweden a much higher share. Finally, we found that within jobs 
white-collar women are paid some 6% lower wages on average than their male 
co-workers with equal education, work experience, and tenure. This figure is 
roughly identical to the size of the (unconditional) within-job wage gap found for 
Sweden and Norway but much lower than what has been found for Denmark 
(about 14% after controlling for a number of individual characteristics). 
In Korkeamäki and Kyyrä (2003) we also analyse blue-collar workers in the 
Finnish manufacturing sector, among whom women’s mean wage is 16% lower 
than men’s mean wage. Petersen et al. (1997) and Meyersson Milgrom et al. 
(2001) report somewhat lower wage gaps for blue-collar workers in Norway and 
Sweden respectively. We found that most of the gender gap among blue-collar 
workers results from gender segregation among firms. This is in accordance with 
a strong effect of establishment segregation among the Swedish blue-collar 
workers.27 By contrast, Petersen et al. (1997) find employer segregation less 
important in the case of Norway. Furthermore, we found that blue-collar women 
are paid 3.5% less than their equally qualified male counterparts who are doing 
the same job for the same employer. This figure is very close to the 
(unconditional) within-job gap in Norway, being above the Swedish level. 
In a complementary study, Luukkonen (2003) explores gender wage differentials 
in the Finnish service sector using the methods developed in this paper. White- 
and blue-collar workers were not analysed separately. Half of the overall gap of 
20% in the service industries results from gender segregation among jobs, one-
third from gender segregation among firms, and one-sixth is owing to 
unexplained within-job wage differentials and gender differences in individual 
characteristics. Within-job wage differentials between sexes remain mostly 
unexplained, women being paid 3.7% less for the same job than their equally 
qualified male co-workers. 
Comparisons with US evidence are less straightforward because the US findings 
are mixed and because the US studies do not make a clear difference between 
white-collar and blue-collar workers. Groshen (1991) and Petersen and Morgan 
(1995) find that the segregation of women into lower-paying occupations, 
industries, and establishments essentially explains all of the gender wage 
                                              
 
 
27 Carrington and Troske (1998) find that in the US manufacturing sector gender segregation among 
plants is more extensive and explains a higher fraction of the gender wage gap among blue-collar workers 
than among white-collar workers. 
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differentials in the US labour market.28 By contrast, Bayard et al. (2003) report 
large and significant within-job wage differentials in the US labour market, even 
though gender segregation accounts for at least one-half of the gender wage 
gap. 29  Compared with Bayard et al. (2003), our results point to a smaller 
(unexplained) within-job gender gap and a stronger role for gender segregation in 
Finland. These conclusions are reversed, if the findings of Groshen (1991) or 
Petersen and Morgan (1995) are taken as a reference. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have introduced a new way of decomposing the gender wage 
gap based upon the correlated random effects model. The decomposition allowed 
us to assess the extent to which the overall gender gap is attributable to within-
job wage differentials and gender segregation among firms and jobs within firms. 
Importantly, by explicitly modelling the firm and job effects, the approach 
proved to be informative about the sources of lower pay in predominantly female 
firms and jobs. Compared with the standard fraction female decomposition, the 
correlated random effects specification led to quantitatively different results. 
These differences suggest that the latent firm and job effects may bias the 
coefficients in the simple fraction female regressions and lead to misleading 
conclusions. 
A major part of the gender wage differentials among white-collar manufacturing 
workers was attributed to the disproportionate concentration of women in lower-
paying jobs. Within firms, high-paid managerial jobs are mainly occupied by 
men, and among other types of jobs men are concentrated in positions with 
higher skill requirements. This may reflect discrimination through differential 
access to higher-paying jobs, or it may result from gender differences in 
preferences. Becker (1985), for example, illustrates how women’s greater 
responsibility for childcare and housework may induce them to crowd into less-
demanding jobs, as well as to expend less effort in the same job than men do. 
Although the reasons for the preponderance of women in lower-paying jobs 
remain a puzzle, our findings highlight the importance of equal opportunities in 
education, hiring and promotion. 
When explaining wage differentials between jobs, we found that lower wages in 
predominantly female jobs are in large part attributable to lower skill 
requirements and job complexity (especially when managerial jobs were 
                                              
 
 
28  The data used by Groshen (1991) and Petersen and Morgan’s (1995) cover a narrow subset of 
occupations in few industries. 
29  While not entirely representative, the data used by Bayard et al. (2003) include workers and 
establishments from all sectors of the US economy. In the data, women’s mean wage is 31 per cent lower 
than men’s. 
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excluded). However, our results suggest that, in the same firm, predominantly 
female jobs pay lower wages than predominantly male jobs that are associated 
with the same level of average education, average tenure and job complexity. In 
other words, jobs of equal worth are differently rewarded depending on whether 
they are occupied by men or women. Of course, one can always speculate how 
accurate our job complexity variable is, but if we assume that this measure is 
reasonably good, our results would imply that policies like comparable worth 
might be worth considering. This does assume that men and women exert equal 
effort in these jobs (e.g. Becker, 1985). Even if effectively implemented, the 
scope of such measures is likely to be relatively limited, however, because the 
share of lower wages in predominantly female jobs that was left unexplained 
accounts for less than a fifth of the overall gender gap. Finally, we found that 
within jobs women are paid some 6% less than their equally qualified male co-
workers. The unexplained within-job gap is higher among more educated and 
more experienced workers. Eliminating the sources of unexplained within-job 
wage differentials can directly account for a quarter of the overall gender gap in 
pay. 
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 3. A distributional analysis of earnings losses of 
displaced workers in an economic depression 
and recovery30 
Abstract 
We study the earnings losses of Finnish private sector workers who lost their jobs 
at two very different points in the business cycle. The first group was displaced 
in 1992 (depression period) and the second one in 1997 (recovery period). The 
focal point of the analysis is the quantile displacement effect, the change in the 
earnings distribution due to involuntary job separation. We use mass layoffs and 
plant closures to identify groups of workers who were displaced for exogenous 
reasons. The effect of displacement is strongest at the lower end of the earnings 
distribution, and small or negligible at the upper end. Women and those 
displaced during the depression period were subject to the largest earnings losses. 
Keywords: Displacement, earnings losses, unemployment, quantile regression. 
JEL classification: J31, J63, J65 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In all labour markets, a large number of workers lose their jobs every year. Some 
job losers are re-employed quickly without significant earnings losses. Others 
remain unemployed for long periods or have to accept large cuts in wages, or 
they may be pushed out of the labour market. Job displacement can lead to 
substantial individual costs in terms of foregone earnings and employment. These 
costs have been the focus of a number of recent studies. Evidence from US 
studies suggests that the average earnings losses of displaced workers are large 
and persistent, being around 10–25 per cent even several years after the job loss 
(see Ruhm, 1991, Jacobson et al., 1993, Stevens, 1997, and Couch and Placzek, 
2010). However, the reduction in employment following displacement has been 
found to be relatively short-lived in the US labour market. Some studies, 
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including Couch (2001), Burda and Mertens (2001), and Bender et al. (2002) for 
Germany, Huttunen et al. (forthcoming) for Norway, and Hijzen et al. (2006) for 
the UK, suggest that the long-term costs of job loss are small or non-existent in 
the European labour markets. On the other hand, studies by Borland et al. (2002) 
for the UK, Margolis (1999) for France, Carneiro and Portugal (2006) for 
Portugal, Eliason and Storrie (2006) for Sweden, and Appelqvist (2007) for 
Finland find the long-term losses to be much larger and more concordant with the 
findings from the US. Although the results from these studies are not directly 
comparable due to the different time periods analysed and large dissimilarities in 
the underlying data and research design, there seem to be significant differences 
in the displacement cost between countries. 
Traditional analysis of earnings losses associated with displacement has typically 
employed classical least-squares regression methods. Although the resulting 
effect on the conditional mean of earnings is of considerable interest, the 
distributional aspects of earnings losses are equally important. Earnings 
dispersion provides, for example, a measure of uncertainty about future earnings. 
For a given mean loss, a larger increase in dispersion following displacement 
implies a larger welfare loss for the risk-averse worker. Furthermore, the mean 
impact is not indicative of the size and nature of the effect of displacement in the 
tails of the earnings distribution, which might be of primary interest from the 
policy point of view. A strong negative effect in the upper tail would suggest 
lower chances of being re-employed in a highly paid job for the displaced 
worker. An equally strong effect in the lower tail is perhaps more alarming, 
because it would imply a high risk of joblessness or low-paid employment. If 
such an effect still exists several years after the displacement period, it may call 
for directed supportive measures. When the focus of the analysis is restricted 
solely to the mean impacts, these pieces of information will remain missing. In 
general, the change in the conditional mean gives an incomplete picture of the 
consequences of displacement. A more complete picture can be obtained by 
estimating a family of conditional quantile functions, which is the approach we 
take in this study. 
This study considers the effect of job displacement over the entire distribution of 
earnings in Finland. We use linked employer-employee panel data to construct 
groups of private sector employees who lost their jobs at two very different 
points in the business cycle. The first group was displaced in 1992 (depression 
period) and the second group in 1997 (recovery period). Following the standard 
practice, we take separations associated with mass layoffs and plant closures to 
be job displacements, as they are likely to be exogenous from the workers’ 
standpoint. These groups of displaced workers and the associated comparison 
groups are followed over an 11-year period beginning three years before and 
ending seven years after the year of possible displacement. To include all the 
costs of job loss we also include periods with no earnings resulting from long-
term unemployment or non-participation in the analysis. 
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Our two follow-up periods reflect markedly different macroeconomic conditions. 
At the end of the 1990s, the Finnish economy grew at a high rate and 
unemployment was declining. By contrast, GDP dropped over 10% between 
1991 and 1993, causing the unemployment rate to exceed 16%. As a result, 
workers who were displaced in 1992 lost their jobs in the middle of one of the 
deepest recessions in advanced countries since the 1930s. A few years ago, one 
might have viewed the depression that hit the Finnish economy in the early 1990s 
as an extraordinary event, being comparable only to the experiences of a few 
other countries during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Nevertheless, because 
of the current global economic crisis trigged by the US subprime mortgage 
collapse in 2007, several countries across the world are experiencing production 
and employment losses akin to those seen in Finland in the early 1990s. By 
analysing the consequences of displacements in the Finnish depression, we get at 
least a rough picture of the size and duration of the earnings losses that millions 
of people losing their jobs during the current crisis are likely to experience in the 
near future. 
According to our results, earnings losses are especially large when job loss 
occurs in the depression period. In that case, the entire earnings distribution still 
lies below the counterfactual distribution (without job loss in the reference 
period) seven years after the job loss. Losing a job in a recovery period also has a 
long-lasting effect, but only at the lower end of the distribution. Women tend to 
suffer from larger earnings losses irrespective of the timing of job loss in the 
business cycle. We also find evidence of considerable heterogeneity in the 
displacement effect. The effect of job loss is concentrated in the lower end of the 
distribution, being relatively moderate (the depression period) or even negligible 
(the recovery period) at the upper end. Finally, we show that job loss not only 
causes a decline in expected earnings, but also raises uncertainty about the future 
earnings level due to a substantial increase in the earnings dispersion. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
evaluation issues and define the quantile displacement effect. Section 3.3 
describes our data and the selection of varioius worker groups for the regression 
analysis. Descriptive evidence is presented in section 3.4, which is followed by 
the quantile regression results in section 3.5. The final section concludes. 
3.2 Evaluation issues 
We are interested in the effect of job displacement in a past period on the current 
earnings. Since the involuntary job loss can be viewed as a “treatment”, we can 
discuss the evaluation issues along the lines of the extensive literature on 
programme evaluation. Let Y1 be the earnings in the current period if the worker 
was displaced in a reference period, and let Y0 be the earnings in the 
counterfactual situation without displacement in the reference period. If we could 
measure workers earnings in both states, the displacement effect, Y1 – Y0 would 
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be directly observed. The fundamental problem of causal inference is that both Y1 
and Y0 are never observed for the same individual (Holland, 1986). 
The observed earnings can be expressed as 
 ( )1 01 ,Y DY D Y= + −  (14) 
where D = 1 if the worker was displaced, and D = 0 otherwise. Displacements are 
certainly not randomly assigned but dismissed workers are selected in a 
complicated procedure that takes into account individual characteristics, some of 
which may not be observable for the researcher. This implies dependence 
between D and (Y1, Y0) even after controlling for a wide array of individual 
characteristics. For example, a good match between a worker and a job in the 
reference period may imply a high value of Y0 and a low probability of 
displacement. One consequence of this is that simple comparisons of outcomes 
between displaced and non-displaced workers do not have a causal interpretation. 
A vast majority of displacement studies have exploited mass layoffs or plant/firm 
closures to detect workers who lost their jobs from exogenous reasons. Such 
workers are less likely to be laid off because of their own characteristics or 
performance, but because of a shock that hit their employer. Under this 
assumption, one can overcome the endogeneity problem by choosing a sample 
where displacements result from mass layoffs or plant/firm closures. This 
approach is taken also in this study. Thus D is hereafter an indicator of a 
displacement associated with a mass layoff or a plant closure, and it is assumed 
to be independent of (Y1, Y0) given observed individual characteristics. 
3.2.1 Expected earnings losses 
Since the individual effects of displacement cannot be identified, the focus of the 
evaluation literature has been on estimating the average effect, E(Y1 – Y0), or the average effect on the displaced, E(Y1 – Y0 | D = 1). Let us assume that 
E(Y0 | X = x) = x’β and Y1 = Y0 + α, where α is an individual-specific effect of 
displacement which is independent of D and X. Under these assumptions we 
could estimate δ = E(α) = E(Y1 – Y0) = E(Y1 – Y0 | D = 1) by least squares from  
 .y dβ δ ε= +x' +  (15) 
The estimates of displacement costs have usually been obtained from regressions 
similar to this stylized example.31 There are some pitfalls worth noting. First, the 
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involved than (2) due to repeated observations on the same workers over time. With panel data, one can 
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data on earnings typically involve observations of zero earnings for the long-term 
unemployed and those who withdrew from the labour market. It follows that the 
outcome variable takes on the value zero with a positive probability (In other 
words, there is a mass point at zero) but is continuously distributed over strictly 
positive values. A common practice in the displacement cost literature has been 
to restrict the analysis to a subset of observations with strictly positive earnings. 
This results in a selective sample of those who were able to return to work after 
displacement, and hence the estimated effects of displacement are potentially 
subject to selection bias. Angrist (2001) argues that, in the context of limited 
dependent variables, estimates obtained using positive outcomes only do not 
have a meaningful causal interpretation as treatment effects even if the data come 
from an ideal randomized experiment. Keeping zero observations in the analysis 
and applying least squares to the full sample is arguably a better alternative, even 
though the conditional mean is unlikely to be linear in x and d. Alternatively, 
non-linear models for the conditional mean of limited dependent variables, like 
Tobit or sample selection models, can be used, but such models rely on strong 
parametric assumptions (about homoskedasticity, symmetry or functional forms) 
that may be difficult to justify in practice. 
The displacement effect in (15) is also assumed to be homogeneous in the sense 
that it shifts the location of the earnings distribution (though possibly in an 
individual-specific way) without affecting other distributional aspects, such as 
dispersion, skewness or tail behaviour. The ranking of workers in the earnings 
distribution (conditional on X = x) is, however, partly determined by past luck 
and success in the labour market. In the theoretical models of job search, 
employed workers are looking for better jobs and climb up the job ladder when a 
higher-paying job is found. When this time-consuming process is interrupted by 
involuntary job loss, the worker has to restart the job search from the bottom. 
Search theory suggests that the upper end of the distribution of Y0 given X = x is 
disproportionately populated by workers who have been lucky to find good jobs 
through several switches to better jobs over a long period. In the case of job loss, 
these workers are likely to experience larger earnings losses than their less lucky 
counterparts at the lower end of the distribution of Y0 who would probably be 
employed in bad jobs also without a displacement. In other words, the effect of 
displacement increases with Y0 given X = x. Here the displacement effect 
heterogeneity stems from random events that may be independent of workers’ 
characteristics. 
Alternatively, the ranking of observationally identical workers in the earnings 
distribution may reflect individual-specific characteristics not observed by the 
                                                                                                                                    
 
 
also allow the displacement status to be correlated with the error term by introducing fixed individual 
effects. These panel data models are subject to the same pitfalls discussed in the text. 
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researcher. The upper end of the distribution of Y0 (conditional on X = x ) may be 
populated by high-ability workers who are able to return to work quickly after a 
job loss at a wage rate close to their previous wage. In contrast, those at the lower 
end of the earnings distribution without displacement may be less able workers 
who would have trouble in finding work after displacement, and hence are 
subject to potentially large earnings losses due to long periods out of work if 
displaced. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the relative importance of 
transferable individual-specific skills, which are valuable also in a new job 
following displacement, is higher for high ability persons who can qualify for 
high-end occupations.32 This kind of reasoning would suggest that the effect of 
displacement decreases with Y0 given X = x.  
In general, the displacement effect is likely to be heterogeneous, in which case 
the mean impact does not tell the whole story. The quantile regression method of 
Koenker and Bassett (1978) for distributional analysis provides an alternative 
approach. 
3.2.2 Distributional analysis 
To define our displacement effect we follow the quantile treatment literature, 
going back to Lehmann (1974) and Doksum (1974). Let Fy1 and Fy0 be the 
cumulative distribution functions of Y1 and Y0 respectively. We define the 
quantile displacement effect (QDE) at the θ-th quantile as 
 ( ) ( )1 1
1 0
,Y YF Fθα θ θ− −= −  (16) 
where 1 inf{ | },
j jY j Y j
F y F yθ θ− ( ) = ( ) ≥  j = 0, 1, for θ ∈ (0, 1). In other words, αθ 
equals the horizontal distance between the distribution functions of potential 
earnings with and without displacement at given θ. A family of αθ over θ 
captures heterogeneity in the displacement effect over the distribution of 
potential earnings. More precisely, what is captured is the difference between the 
two marginal distributions. For example, α0.5 describes the difference in the 
median earnings with and without displacement, not the effect of displacement 
on the earnings of a worker with median earnings in the absence of displacement. 
The difference in the distributions is all we can identify from the observed data, 
without imposing strong additional restrictions. Nevertheless, the QDE estimates 
can be very informative, as they reveal whether job displacement reduces 
expected earnings (the distribution shifts left), increases uncertainty about the 
                                              
 
 
32 Kletzer (1989) finds that a larger part of returns to tenure is individual-specific as opposed to match- or 
job-specific, and hence not lost in job displacement, for managerial, professional and technical workers 
than for blue-collar workers in the US labor market. 
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future earnings (dispersion increases), or has different effects at the lower and 
upper ends of the distribution. 
In the absence of covariates, the natural and simple estimator of the QDE is 
obtained by replacing 1
1
( )YF θ−  and 10 ( )YF θ
−  with their empirical counterparts. This 
would require two randomized samples of individuals: those who were displaced 
in the reference period and those who were not. Then, for example, the difference 
in median earnings in the current period between the displaced and non-
displacement groups would give an estimate of the QDE at θ = 0.5. We do not 
believe that our sample design based on mass layoffs and plant closures is 
comparable to a randomized experiment, but we do assume independence of the 
displacement status conditional on the control variables. Since this assumption is 
crucial for causal interpretation of the estimated displacement effects, we shall 
provide (indirect) empirical evidence to support its validity in our application. 
Koenker and Bassett (1978) introduced the quantile regression method for 
estimating conditional quantile functions. Powell (1986) developed an estimator 
for the conditional quantiles of limited dependent variables. We parameterize the 
conditional quantiles of the potential earnings as: 
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 (17) 
where the limited support of the earnings distributions is explicitly accounted for. 
Provided that D is independent of (Y1 , Y0) given X = x, the conditional quantile 
function for observed earnings can be written as 
 ( ) { }1 | , max 0, ' .YF d dθ θθ β α− = +x x  (18) 
This type of model can be applied to corner solution data or to censored data with 
the fixed censoring point. In our application, the issue is not data observability: 
the earnings are observed for all workers but they are zero for those who did not 
work in the period in question. In other words, the outcome variable is not 
censored but has a mass point at zero, being continuously distributed over strictly 
positive values. Wooldridge (2002) calls models for such outcome variables 
corner solution models. These are statistically identical to models for censored 
data, but are conceptually very different, which should be kept in mind when 
interpreting the results. Under the corner-solution interpretation, the conditional 
θ-th quantile of Y is zero for x’βθ + αθ d ≤ 0, while it is strictly positive and linear 
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in x and d for x’βθ + αθ d > 0.33 In the former case, the worker is predicted to be 
out of work – and hence has zero earnings – with a probability no less than θ.  
Since Powell’s (1986) estimator does not require additional parametric 
assumptions, we can recover the effect of displacement over the conditional 
distribution in a robust way despite the limited support of the outcome variable. 
In summary, we apply the same identifying assumption – the conditional 
independence of D – that has been commonly assumed in linear specifications 
like (15), but we explicitly model heterogeneity in the effect of D (which is of 
particular interest) without excluding observations with zero earnings from our 
analysis (which would lead to the selection bias).34 
3.3 Data and sample construction 
Our data come from the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Database of 
Statistics Finland. This database combines information from several 
administrative registers for all working age persons with a permanent residence 
in Finland. It includes detailed information on employment and earnings history 
along with a number of background characteristics, like education, marital status 
and age. Since the data include all people, not just those who are currently 
employed, we can follow individuals irrespective of their labour market state, 
provided they have not emigrated or died. This is important because job loss may 
be followed by periods of unemployment and non-participation. For example, a 
worker who loses his or her job in a sunset industry may withdraw from the 
labour force temporarily in order to acquire new skills required by jobs in other 
industries. Thus, if all costs of job loss are to be included, we should not exclude 
periods out of work from our analysis. The database also includes unique 
identification codes for all plants (and firms) operating in Finland. This 
information allows us to detect all employees of a given plant at the end of any 
given year, as well as to identify plants that were downsizing or exiting the 
market in a given year. 
Starting from Ruhm (1991) and Jacobson et al. (1993), practically all of the 
recent studies on the cost of job loss have employed a methodology that involves 
a comparison of displaced workers with a control group that did not experience 
                                              
 
 
33 It should be stressed that we view that the limited support of the dependent variable is a technical 
problem. The mass point in the earnings data at zero implies that the linearity assumption of the 
conditional quantile function is not valid in the left tail of the distribution, whereas the consequences for 
higher regression quantiles are negligible. In our application, the standard quantile regression method, 
which ignores the limited support of the dependent variable, would lead to highly similar estimates to the 
corner-solution approach except for the first decile, which is the lowest quantile analyzed. 
34  Carneiro and Portugal (2006) also apply a quantile regression model to study earnings losses in 
Portugal but they exclude observations with zero earnings from their analysis. 
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displacement during a given reference period. Displacements are typically 
defined as permanent and involuntary separations caused by an employer-
specific shock, not related to the worker’s job performance. In practice, it is not 
possible to distinguish directly between layoffs and quits on the one hand, and 
between employer-specific and individual-specific reasons for separations on the 
other. A common solution in empirical work has been to interpret separations 
associated with a mass layoff or a plant/firm closure to be displacements. The 
underlying assumption is that such separations are driven by employer-specific 
shocks, and hence exogenous from the worker’s standpoint. 
Obviously, this strategy is not completely accurate. First, displacements defined 
in this way may also include some voluntary quits. Second, the employer has an 
incentive to get rid of the least productive workers first, although the seniority 
rules and unions may prevent the employer from choosing freely the group to be 
laid off. This suggests that workers who are displaced in a mass layoff are 
probably not a completely random group. Therefore, some researchers prefer the 
use of plant (or firm) closures to mass layoffs. A counter-argument is that those 
plants that closed down are a more selective group of all plants (for example, 
they are much smaller on average) than downsizing plants are, suggesting that 
their employees may also be a rather selective group. In the absence of a superior 
solution, we include both groups in our analysis, but estimate distinct 
displacement effects for those who lost their jobs in mass layoffs and for those 
who were displaced due to plant closures. 
Finally, the plant closure or mass layoff is likely to be expected by employees, 
and thereby some of them may quit earlier in anticipation of the forthcoming 
reduction in the workforce. If workers with better outside options are more likely 
to leave early, those who are displaced in the year of the mass layoff or plant 
closure form a selective group. On the other hand, the downsizing process can be 
longer than one year, so that the employer may have laid off some workers well 
before the period of the mass layoff or plant closure. This suggests that some of 
the early leavers may be low productivity employees. One could classify the 
early leavers as displaced workers, but then more voluntary quits and more 
selective dismissals would be included as well. Therefore, we instead include 
workers who left their jobs a year before a mass layoff or plant closure as a 
separate group in our analysis. 
We construct two separate samples using 1992 and 1997 as base years when the 
event of displacement possibly took place. We focus on workers who all have 
initially a strong labour market attachment, and thereby require that everyone 
included in the sample have at least three years of tenure with the same private 
sector employer before the base year. We also require that during these three 
years everyone included in the sample had exactly one employer, were not self-
employed, and did not have any unemployment spells. The employers are 
identified using plant codes and we only include workers from plants that employ 
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at least ten workers at the end of the year preceding the base year.35 Furthermore, 
we require that all workers in the sample were 20 to 51 years old in the base 
year.36  
For both base years, we identify a group of displaced workers (the displacement 
group) as well as a group of workers who were not displaced at that time (the 
control group). The control group includes employees who did not separate from 
their employer during the base year, In other words, had the same plant code at 
the end of the base year as they had a year earlier. The displacement group 
consists of two subgroups: those who lost their jobs in mass layoffs and those 
who were displaced due to plant closures. The former subgroup includes all 
workers who separated during the base year from plants from which at least 50% 
but not all of their employees left by the end of the base year.37 The latter 
subgroup consists of separating workers whose plant disappeared entirely (in 
terms of employment) by the end of the base year. From the displacement group 
we exclude workers who return to the pre-displacement plant or firm at some 
later period (cf. our definition of displacement). We also include a group of 
workers who, during the base year, left their jobs in plants that downsized or 
closed down in the next year (the early-leaver group). These workers are 
analyzed separately and the results for this group are used as a robustness check. 
To summarize, we have defined the following groups for the base year t  (1992 or 
1997): 
Control group: Workers who did not change their employer during year t. 
Displacement group: Workers separating in year t from plants that closed down 
during year t (plant-closure subgroup) and from plants that reduced workforce at 
least by 50% between years t – 1 and t but were still in operation at the end of 
year t (downsizing subgroup). 
Early-leaver group: Workers separating in year t from plants that closed down 
during year t + 1 (plant-closure subgroup) and from plants that reduced their 
                                              
 
 
35 We consider plants, not firms, as production units that are subject to a risk of downsizing and closure. 
In doing so, we avoid problems with artificial firm closures that result from changes in the firm identifiers 
due to mergers or dispersals and changes in ownership or industry classification. The plant codes do not 
suffer from the same problems, as the plant is defined as a local kind-of-activity unit in the underlying 
register data. 
36 By excluding individuals over 51 years of age, we rule out the possibility of early retirement via the 
unemployment tunnel scheme that consists of extended unemployment benefits and a particular 
unemployment pension scheme for the older long-term unemployed. The older unemployed entitled to 
this scheme are a very distinctive group, as roughly half of them have been estimated to have effectively 
withdrawn from job search and to be waiting passively for early retirement (Kyyrä and Ollikainen, 2008). 
37 We discuss the robustness of our results with respect to this threshold value in section 3.5.3. 
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workforce by at least 50% between years t and t + 1 but were still in operation at 
the end of year t + 1 (downsizing subgroup). 
These groups are followed over an 11-year period beginning three years before 
and ending seven years after the base year: from 1989 until 1999 and from 1994 
until 2004, respectively. This results in two large unbalanced panel data sets. The 
1992 sample has 2,471,751 observations (225,919 individuals) and the 1997 
sample 2,872,552 observations (262,487 individuals).38 
We allow separations in the control group after the base year, implying that 
workers in the control group may be displaced later. In this respect, we follow 
Huttunen et al. (forthcoming), Hijzen et al. (2006), and Eliason and Storrie 
(2006). Some other studies require that individuals in the control group remain 
employed (possibly in the same firm) over the whole observation period. Of 
course, the members of the displacement and early-leaver groups can experience 
additional job losses in the later periods. Subsequent job losses can significantly 
increase the costs from the initial job loss (Stevens, 1997), whereas the likelihood 
of multiple job losses may be much higher during economic downturns (Eliason 
and Storrie, 2006). 
3.4 Descriptive evidence 
3.4.1 Macroeconomic environment 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Finland suffered an exceptionally severe 
recession. GDP contracted three years in a row (1991–1993), and at the worst, in 
1991 GDP decreased by over 6% (see Figure 3.1).39 Overall, GDP declined by 
over 10% between 1991 and 1993, and the unemployment rate increased from 
3.2% in 1990 to over 16% by 1993. According to one classification, episodes 
with peak-to-trough declines in output exceeding 10% are called depressions. 
Since the 1930s, there have been only a few such episodes in advanced 
economies before the ongoing global crisis trigged by the US subprime crisis in 
2007. The latest depression occurred in Finland in the early 1990s. Hence, the 
experiences of Finnish workers who lost their jobs in 1992 represent an extreme 
case that highlights the consequences that may follow from a displacement 
during exceptionally difficult labour market conditions, providing a worst-case 
scenario for job losers. 
                                              
 
 
38 Persons disappear from our data only if they die or move abroad. In the 1992 sample the attrition is 
3,608 persons from 1992 to 1999 and in the 1997 sample 3,706 persons from 1997 to 2004. There is no 
selection pattern according to the displacement status. 
39 For a discussion of the Finnish depression, see e.g. Honkapohja and Koskela (1999). 
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The depression years were followed by a period of strong and steady economic 
growth. At the end of the 1990s, the economy grew 3–6% a year and the 
unemployment rate declined about one percentage point each year. In 2001, 
economic growth slowed down and unemployment stabilized around the 9% 
level for the next few years. Compared to the depression sample, our second 
group displaced in 1997 encountered an entirely different situation. In many 
ways, this period is more typical and hence more in line with the research on 
displacement conducted elsewhere, although the unemployment rate remained at 
a high level by international standards.  
Figure 3.1 GDP growth and unemployment rate in Finland, 1985–2004 
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Our depression period is related to the economic environment analyzed by 
Eliason and Storrie (2006). They followed Swedish workers displaced in 1987 
until 1999. The displacements occurred during a boom period that was followed 
by a deep recession four years later, during which the unemployment rate rose 
from under 2% to over 8% and GDP fell by 6%. In other words, also Sweden 
experienced a severe recession in the early 1990s, though it was clearly less deep 
than the one experienced in Finland. Eliason and Storrie (2006) find that the 
negative impact of the displacement decreased over the first years but then 
started to increase at the beginning of the recession period. They concluded that 
displaced workers are more vulnerable to subsequent shocks, resulting in the 
long-lasting earnings losses for those whose post-displacement period is subject 
to adverse shocks. By implication, the prospects of earnings recovery are likely 
to be exceptionally poor for those people who lose their jobs in the middle of the 
recession period. 
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3.4.2 Background characteristics 
We present summary statistics by displacement group status and sex in Table 3.1 
and Table 3.2. Most of the variables are measured a year before the base period, 
but the earnings variables and plant and firm sizes are tracked for three pre-
displacement periods. The outcome variable in our analysis is annual earnings, 
covering all salaries and wages received during a year. In section 5.3, we also 
discuss the results obtained using annual income as the outcome variable. 
Table 3.1 Sample statistics for the 1992 sample 
 Men Women 
 Control Displaced Early-leavers Control Displaced Early-leavers 
  d.s. p.c. d.s. p.c.  d.s. p.c. d.s. p.c. 
Age 37.67 37.61 37.59 36.81 37.40 38.04 37.66 37.37 35.58 37.47
Years of education 11.36 11.08 11.03 11.71 10.88 11.06 10.87 10.88 11.13 10.76
Tenure (years) 11.30 9.06 8.72 7.27 7.97 11.25 10.79 9.78 8.30 8.74
Married (share) 0.66 0.63 0.65 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.61 0.59 0.58
Children under 7 0.40 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.48 0.30
Annual earnings:     
1989 22,814 21,106 21,551 22,213 21,025 15,811 14,869 15,062 14,423 15,197
1990 25,111 23,163 23,878 24,256 23,223 17,300 16,270 16,419 15,775 16,700
1991 26,169 23,727 24,244 24,701 23,191 18,424 16,707 16,478 15,251 16,743
Percentile:     
1989 64 62 64 59 62 45 41 45 35 43
1990 65 62 64 58 62 45 41 46 35 43
1991 65 61 63 56 60 45 38 42 30 40
Plant size:     
1989 467 145 65 294 73 364 188 49 286 64
1990 448 125 58 302 67 354 154 46 279 61
1991 436 111 41 266 50 339 140 39 271 45
Firm size:     
1989 2134 1259 645 973 751 2066 1588 381 1311 518
1990 1945 1178 523 954 527 1978 1650 324 1399 442
1991 1739 901 349 768 389 1757 1228 265 1012 334
Industry (share):     
Manufacturing 0.48 0.38 0.42 0.23 0.39 0.31 0.36 0.38 0.26 0.32
Construction 0.07 0.34 0.23 0.40 0.32 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08
Trade 0.14 0.14 0.21 0.15 0.13 0.23 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.30
Transport 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05
Business 
services. 
0.10 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.18
Other 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.06
     
N 125,267 2175 1790 639 2728 89,961 1058 908 361 1032
Notes: Unless otherwise indicated, the numbers are for 1991. d.s. = downsizing subgroup. p.c. = plant-
closure subgroup. Percentile = Earnings percentile within the plant. Trade also includes hotels and 
restaurants. Transport also includes telecommunications. 
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Table 3.2 Sample statistics for the 1997 sample 
 Men Women 
 Control Displaced Early-leavers Control Displaced Early-leavers 
  d.s. p.c. d.s. p.c.  d.s. p.c. d.s. p.c. 
Age 38.68 39.09 37.73 36.29 38.57 39.48 38.88 37.96 36.19 37.90
Years of education 11.40 11.30 11.63 11.71 11.12 11.29 11.45 11.25 11.70 11.07
Tenure (years) 12.52 12.63 8.52 8.54 12.20 12.06 11.21 9.01 9.07 10.27
Married (share) 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.55 0.55
Children under 7 0.42 0.38 0.50 0.46 0.37 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.46 0.33
Annual earnings:     
1989 25,881 26,817 25,289 24,576 24,377 19,091 18,655 17,602 18,481 17,779
1990 27,943 28,820 26,806 27,178 26,200 20,391 20,161 18,760 20,474 18,759
1991 29,240 30,295 27,497 28,931 28,041 21,403 20,774 19,714 19,738 19,770
Percentile:     
1989 61 58 67 56 54 42 40 45 33 44
1990 62 59 66 57 55 44 42 49 36 45
1991 63 60 66 60 56 45 42 49 32 45
Plant size:     
1989 370 371 43 261 134 304 346 44 435 99
1990 379 377 42 274 197 315 313 46 421 228
1991 399 533 36 276 124 329 363 40 442 134
Firm size:     
1989 1778 2370 898 797 894 1705 1541 743 1623 1041
1990 1813 2224 900 813 1194 1878 1507 761 1729 1697
1991 2160 1778 743 907 1232 1980 1351 749 1710 1704
Industry (share):     
Manufacturing 0.57 0.65 0.19 0.25 0.44 0.37 0.40 0.07 0.22 0.36
Construction 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.00
Trade 0.12 0.09 0.33 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.45 0.18 0.26
Transport 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.05
Business 
services. 
0.09 0.09 0.19 0.29 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.30 0.45 0.30
Other 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.21 0.06 0.04 0.02
     
N 162,484 1075 336 112 327 96,724 820 248 108 253
Notes: Unless otherwise indicated, the numbers are for 1996. d.s. = downsizing subgroup. p.c. = plant-
closure subgroup. Percentile = Earnings percentile within the plant. Trade also includes hotels and 
restaurants. Transport also includes telecommunications. 
 
The displacement and control groups are similar in terms of age, education, and 
family background. With the exception of men displaced in 1997 from 
downsizing plants, the members of the displacement groups have somewhat 
shorter job tenures compared to the control group. The earnings percentile in the 
plant describes the worker’s relative position in the earnings hierarchy within the 
employing plant. Since the average value of this measure is rather similar for 
displaced and control workers, there is no evidence of selective displacements 
towards the lower-paid employees within the plants. 
Distributional analysis of earnings losses of displaced workers 59 
As expected, the relative share of displaced workers is considerably higher in the 
1992 sample compared to the 1997 sample: 2.6% vs. 0.9% (4.7% vs. 1.2% if the 
groups of early leavers are included).40 The share of women seems to be slightly 
lower among workers displaced in 1992 and conversely higher in 1997 (33% vs. 
43%), which is due to an exceptionally high layoff rate in the male-dominated 
construction sector in 1992. In the 1997 sample a disproportionate number of 
workers who lost their jobs in plant closures worked in trade (including also 
hotels and restaurants) and in business services, which are industries 
characterized by a high share of small business units. Not surprisingly, the 
average plant and firm sizes are smallest for the plant-closure subgroup. 
There are only moderate differences between the early-leaver and displacement 
groups. With a few exceptions, the early leavers have more young children and 
have shorter job tenures on average. Differences in annual earnings are rather 
small, but the early leavers seem to be located at lower levels in the plant-specific 
earnings distributions, which may indicate that they did not quit but were 
dismissed. The average plant and firm sizes as well as the industry allocation are 
also quite different for the early leavers and displaced workers. 
3.4.3  Empirical earnings distributions 
Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the 1st decile, median, and 9th decile of the 
annual earnings for the control and displacement groups of men displaced in 
1992, Figure 3.3 describes the earnings for the men in 1997 group. The earnings 
development for women is described in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. The earnings 
dispersion, as measured by the ratio of the 9th to 1st decile, increases quite 
strongly over time in the control group in all graphs. This trend is mainly driven 
by increasing variation in the annual working time within the control group. The 
declining pattern of the 1st decile, in particular, is due to an increasing fraction of 
control workers who leave full-time employment. 
In the 1992 sample, the dip in earnings after displacement is very pronounced 
and clear at all parts of the distribution, which results from the substantial 
increase in non-employment. Median earnings declined from 1991 to 1993 by 
some 60% among displaced women and men. While the 9th decile declines less, 
the 1st decile drops all the way to zero and remains there until 1999 for the 1992 
displacement groups, suggesting that a large share of displaced workers was out 
of work in each post-displacement year. Largely, the patterns of the earnings 
distributions of the two distinct displacement groups in the 1992 sample are very 
                                              
 
 
40  The total numbers of separations is, of course, much larger: Of those having been continuously 
employed in the same plant for the past three years, 18.5% and 12.3% separated during 1992 and 1997, 
respectively. 
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similar. The only notable difference is the higher 9th decile of male job losers in 
the plant-closure group over the pre-displacement years. Furthermore, the overall 
picture is very similar between women and men who were displaced in 1992. 
Figure 3.2 The 1st decile, median, and 9th decile of (nominal) annual 
earnings for control and displacement groups for men displaced 
in 1992 
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Figure 3.3 The 1st decile, median, and 9th decile of (nominal) annual 
earnings for control and displacement groups for men displaced 
in 1997 
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Figure 3.4 The 1st decile, median, and 9th decile of (nominal) annual 
earnings for control and displacement groups for women 
displaced in 1992 
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Figure 3.5 The 1st decile, median, and 9th decile of (nominal) annual 
earnings for control and displacement groups for women 
displaced in 1997 
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The earnings quantiles of the displacement groups in the 1997 sample exhibit 
much smaller declines compared to the 1992 sample. There is no difference in 
the median earnings between those displaced in mass layoffs and the control 
group. Workers displaced from plants exiting in 1997 have lower median 
earnings in all years, and the difference increases somewhat after the 
displacement. Interestingly, the lower and upper tails of the distributions of the 
two displacement groups evolve somewhat differently over the post-
displacement years. The 9th decile of the job losers of downsizing plants drops 
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only a little, while the 1st decile declines more clearly compared to the control 
group. In the plant-closure group, the 9th decile of the distribution follows very 
closely that of the control group, but the 1st decile of men declines sharply 
compared to the other displacement group. By contrast, there are no notable 
differences in the behaviour of the lower tail of the earnings distribution between 
women in the two displacement groups. As a result, displacement led to the 
largest increase in the earnings dispersion for male job losers in the plant-closure 
group. 
Unlike in the 1992 sample, the earnings distribution of the plant-closure group in 
the 1997 sample differs from those of the other groups already in the pre-
displacement years. This suggests the possibility that the plants exiting the 
market in the recovery period (and, hence, their employees) form a rather 
selective group. There may also be more early leavers in the 1997 sample 
because the chances of finding work in other plants were much better and 
because the economic environment was more predictable at the end of the 1990s. 
By conditioning on the control variables, we can eliminate these differences for 
men but not for women (see our quantile regression results below). Therefore, 
the female plant-closure group in the 1997 sample remains a problematic group 
due to a potential selection problem. 
3.5 Quantile displacement effects 
The descriptive analysis suggests that displacement had a notable and long-
lasting negative effect on the earnings distribution. This effect seems clearly 
heterogeneous, as the ratio of the earnings quantiles between the displacement 
and control group was found to evolve differently over time at the lower and 
upper end of the distribution. We also recovered some differences in the 
background characteristics between the groups. Using the quantile regression 
method, we can model heterogeneity in the displacement effect while controlling 
for differences in the background characteristics. 
Our specification for the conditional earnings quantiles differs slightly from the 
stylized example in section 3.2.2. First, we model relative effects by taking the 
log of the strictly positive values of annual earnings (but we do not drop zero 
earnings). Because of the equivariance of the quantiles to monotone 
transformations, this transformation of the dependent variable is completely 
transparent. Second, we have four groups of separating workers to be compared 
to the control group. These are indicated by the following dummy variables: dCt 
equals 1 for workers displaced in year t from plants that closed down in that year 
(plant-closure displacement group), dDt equals 1 for workers displaced in year t 
from downsizing plants (downsizing displacement group), eCt equals 1 for those 
who left their jobs in year t in plants that closed down in year t + 1 (plant-closure 
early-leaver group), and eDt equals 1 for those who left their jobs in year t in 
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plants that downsized in year t + 1 (downsizing early-leaver group). The control 
group – those who did not change the plant during year t – serves as the reference 
group in the analysis. Thus, our model for the conditional θ-th quantile of the 
earnings in year s is 
 ( ) { }1 '| max 0, ,t t t ts C D C Ds s s s C s D s C s DYF d d e eθ θ θ θ θθ β α α η η−∗ = + + + +z x  (19) 
where sY
∗  is log annual earnings for strictly positive earnings and zero otherwise, 
t ∈  {1992, 1997} is the base period, s ∈  {t – 3, t – 2,…, t + 7}, 
θ ∈ {.1, .2,…, .9}, and zs = (xs, dCt , dDt , eCt , eDt). The vector of control variables 
xs includes age, age squared, pre-displacement tenure, education level (5 levels), 
place of residence (5 regions), marital status, indicator of children under the 
schooling age, the log annual earnings in year t – 4 and the size category (4 
classes) and industry (6 main industries) of the firm in year t – 1. The past 
earnings are included to control for the effect of unobserved characteristics. 
By taking the exponent of the right-hand side of (19), provided it is not zero, we 
obtain the conditional θ-th quantile of the annual earnings in year s. Coefficients 
of the group dummies capture proportional differences compared to the non-
displacement case. For example, provided that 0s sθβ >'x  and 0,Cs s sθ θβ α+ >'x  
exp( )Csθα  gives the ratio of the θ-th quantile in year s if displaced in year t due to a 
plant closure to the θ-th quantile without displacement in year t. This 
proportional effect is independent of the values of control variables. If 0s sθβ >'x  
and 0,Cs s sθ θβ α+ ≤'x  the conditional θ-th quantile of annual earnings is zero with 
displacement but strictly positive without displacement, and thereby the ratio of 
the quantiles with and without displacement is zero, not exp( )Csθα . In other words, 
the proportional effect interpretation does not apply to arbitrarily values of 
control variables. This is a relevant concern when exp( )Csθα  is close to zero, 
which is the case with some lowest deciles in our application below. In those 
cases, the θ-th quantile of annual earnings of some people is predicted to drop to 
zero after displacement, which should be kept in mind when interpreting our 
results below.41 
Using Powell’s (1986) method,42 we have estimated the model (19) separately for 
women and men in the two samples. All regression parameters of each nine 
                                              
 
 
41 If 0s sθβ ≤'x  and 0,Cs s sθ θβ α+ ≤'x  the displacement has no effect at all because the conditional θ-th 
quantile is zero in any case. This is not a very relevant case in our application. 
42 For details, see Jolliffe et al. (2000). 
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deciles were allowed to vary freely across the 11 cross sections. This amounted 
to 396 distinct quantile regressions. The point estimates of Csθα  and 
D
sθα  are 
reported in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, whereas the time patterns of exp( )Csθα  and  
)exp(  
D
sθα  are shown in Figure 3.6–Figure 3.13. Each curve in the graphs shows 
how the proportional displacement effect at a particular decile evolves over time. 
In section 3.5.3 we also discuss briefly the results for the early leavers; in other 
words, the estimates of Csθη  and Dsθη . 
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Table 3.3 Quantile displacement effects for 1992 
θ 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
A. Men displaced from a downsizing plant, Dsθα   
.1 -0.006 -0.014 -0.024 -0.851 -6.815 -6.806 -6.914 -6.100 -6.039 -5.851 -6.197
.2 -0.001 -0.010 -0.025 -0.500 -5.179 -3.404 -2.524 -1.896 -1.686 -1.192 -1.153
.3 -0.001 -0.008 -0.025 -0.330 -2.260 -1.723 -1.261 -0.964 -0.660 -0.511 -0.440
.4 0.000 -0.005 -0.023 -0.215 -1.410 -1.147 -0.719 -0.506 -0.359 -0.272 -0.229
.5 -0.002 -0.008 -0.020 -0.166 -0.834 -0.694 -0.402 -0.305 -0.227 -0.180 -0.165
.6 -0.004 -0.005 -0.022 -0.132 -0.479 -0.377 -0.272 -0.219 -0.173 -0.141 -0.132
.7 -0.003 -0.006 -0.020 -0.114 -0.283 -0.252 -0.203 -0.171 -0.147 -0.120 -0.113
.8 -0.003 -0.010 -0.020 -0.096 -0.225 -0.195 -0.161 -0.137 -0.126 -0.102 -0.099
.9 -0.008 -0.011 -0.027 -0.087 -0.171 -0.160 -0.124 -0.107 -0.097 -0.087 -0.091
            
B. Men displaced due to plant closure, Csθα   
.1 -0.007 -0.017 -0.028 -1.059 -7.622 -6.358 -5.773 -7.372 -8.671 -5.732 -5.778
.2 -0.004 -0.011 -0.015 -0.586 -7.252 -3.251 -3.093 -2.472 -1.468 -1.353 -1.154
.3 -0.005 -0.008 -0.015 -0.317 -2.437 -1.518 -1.278 -1.083 -0.690 -0.461 -0.460
.4 -0.005 -0.008 -0.014 -0.211 -1.528 -0.996 -0.660 -0.510 -0.349 -0.240 -0.227
.5 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009 -0.147 -0.916 -0.591 -0.349 -0.283 -0.214 -0.170 -0.173
.6 0.000 0.004 -0.014 -0.120 -0.422 -0.317 -0.228 -0.196 -0.155 -0.139 -0.141
.7 0.002 0.002 -0.014 -0.095 -0.250 -0.228 -0.177 -0.161 -0.138 -0.131 -0.133
.8 0.003 0.008 -0.016 -0.078 -0.210 -0.180 -0.150 -0.143 -0.131 -0.115 -0.126
.9 0.011 0.020 0.005 -0.077 -0.186 -0.148 -0.143 -0.124 -0.129 -0.096 -0.104
      
C. Women displaced from a downsizing plant, Dsθα   
.1 -0.002 -0.006 -0.057 -1.056 -6.277 -5.641 -10.165 -5.582 -6.203 -5.253 -2.976
.2 -0.006 -0.005 -0.033 -0.651 -6.690 -4.613 -3.019 -1.989 -2.076 -2.064 -2.245
.3 -0.008 -0.004 -0.030 -0.428 -2.563 -1.825 -1.386 -0.969 -0.932 -0.915 -0.806
.4 -0.008 -0.009 -0.024 -0.245 -1.665 -1.264 -0.895 -0.647 -0.545 -0.432 -0.419
.5 -0.009 -0.009 -0.022 -0.153 -1.017 -0.882 -0.478 -0.353 -0.281 -0.248 -0.247
.6 -0.010 -0.012 -0.024 -0.106 -0.475 -0.459 -0.290 -0.228 -0.194 -0.169 -0.151
.7 -0.009 -0.012 -0.029 -0.090 -0.228 -0.227 -0.195 -0.167 -0.156 -0.128 -0.104
.8 -0.009 -0.012 -0.032 -0.068 -0.154 -0.173 -0.138 -0.133 -0.112 -0.107 -0.081
.9 0.008 0.003 -0.022 -0.046 -0.093 -0.110 -0.115 -0.085 -0.061 -0.036 -0.031
      
D. Women displaced due to plant closure, Csθα   
.1 -0.004 -0.011 -0.084 -1.282 -7.518 -5.599 -4.873 -4.820 -8.401 -3.239 -4.000
.2 0.002 -0.004 -0.059 -0.837 -7.544 -3.309 -3.151 -2.826 -2.174 -1.997 -1.396
.3 0.003 -0.003 -0.041 -0.450 -2.538 -1.764 -1.459 -1.237 -0.996 -0.923 -0.789
.4 0.002 -0.005 -0.035 -0.275 -1.587 -1.242 -0.919 -0.859 -0.655 -0.391 -0.337
.5 0.000 -0.007 -0.022 -0.188 -1.118 -0.865 -0.517 -0.448 -0.327 -0.253 -0.203
.6 -0.003 0.000 -0.025 -0.137 -0.568 -0.510 -0.281 -0.236 -0.219 -0.175 -0.161
.7 0.002 0.012 -0.024 -0.106 -0.258 -0.233 -0.183 -0.162 -0.158 -0.127 -0.125
.8 0.007 0.011 -0.025 -0.106 -0.191 -0.180 -0.146 -0.141 -0.135 -0.126 -0.121
.9 0.037 0.018 0.003 -0.043 -0.158 -0.139 -0.137 -0.129 -0.108 -0.112 -0.117
Notes: Significantly (95%-confidence level) non-zero coefficients in bold. Statistical inference based on 
the standard errors bootstrapped using 100 replications. 
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Table 3.4 Quantile displacement effects for 1997 
θ 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
A. Men displaced from a downsizing plant, Dsθα   
.1 0.005 0.006 0.006 -0.088 -0.370 -0.465 -0.444 -0.278 -0.439 -0.768 -0.802
.2 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.017 -0.075 -0.082 -0.072 -0.064 -0.063 -0.074 -0.076
.3 0.004 0.004 0.006 -0.005 -0.057 -0.045 -0.028 -0.023 -0.027 -0.021 -0.018
.4 -0.001 0.007 0.005 0.003 -0.042 -0.033 -0.020 -0.011 -0.020 -0.008 -0.004
.5 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.006 -0.036 -0.022 -0.018 -0.010 -0.019 -0.008 -0.012
.6 0.004 0.010 0.006 0.006 -0.024 -0.014 -0.020 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.016
.7 0.006 0.020 0.006 0.019 0.001 -0.006 -0.015 0.012 0.001 -0.006 -0.002
.8 0.006 0.024 0.013 0.022 0.020 0.006 -0.010 0.010 -0.004 -0.007 -0.012
.9 0.004 0.024 0.018 0.031 0.023 0.004 -0.016 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.003
      
B. Men displaced due to plant closure, Csθα   
.1 -0.031 -0.023 -0.057 -0.412 -1.042 -1.138 -1.164 -2.005 -1.558 -1.793 -1.769
.2 -0.012 -0.010 -0.038 -0.125 -0.285 -0.205 -0.291 -0.215 -0.280 -0.252 -0.288
.3 -0.007 -0.003 -0.026 -0.087 -0.149 -0.100 -0.137 -0.091 -0.136 -0.132 -0.137
.4 -0.006 -0.007 -0.014 -0.057 -0.095 -0.051 -0.091 -0.063 -0.078 -0.086 -0.100
.5 -0.005 -0.002 -0.013 -0.026 -0.052 -0.034 -0.049 -0.013 -0.056 -0.039 -0.055
.6 0.003 0.003 -0.011 -0.028 -0.024 -0.016 -0.029 -0.009 -0.025 -0.032 -0.031
.7 0.004 -0.003 -0.020 -0.014 -0.020 -0.008 -0.030 -0.024 -0.019 -0.034 -0.048
.8 -0.010 -0.024 -0.027 -0.027 -0.030 -0.008 -0.013 -0.027 -0.011 -0.041 -0.038
.9 0.011 -0.005 -0.045 -0.063 -0.027 0.003 -0.013 -0.033 -0.040 -0.050 -0.058
      
C. Women displaced from a downsizing plant, Dsθα   
.1 -0.010 -0.005 -0.019 -0.524 -1.446 -1.815 -1.554 -0.901 -0.868 -2.247 -2.904
.2 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.187 -0.487 -0.318 -0.256 -0.213 -0.248 -0.365 -0.421
.3 -0.009 -0.002 -0.005 -0.056 -0.087 -0.075 -0.064 -0.089 -0.092 -0.138 -0.134
.4 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.028 -0.062 -0.057 -0.052 -0.066 -0.061 -0.078 -0.075
.5 -0.011 -0.014 -0.016 -0.027 -0.057 -0.052 -0.048 -0.056 -0.053 -0.066 -0.080
.6 -0.011 -0.020 -0.019 -0.032 -0.064 -0.061 -0.050 -0.053 -0.053 -0.057 -0.083
.7 -0.026 -0.034 -0.036 -0.047 -0.075 -0.078 -0.063 -0.066 -0.063 -0.061 -0.073
.8 -0.043 -0.047 -0.050 -0.057 -0.086 -0.091 -0.082 -0.086 -0.083 -0.085 -0.083
.9 -0.061 -0.062 -0.061 -0.062 -0.101 -0.104 -0.101 -0.090 -0.102 -0.084 -0.099
      
D. Women displaced due to plant closure, Csθα   
.1 -0.055 -0.104 -0.080 -0.697 -2.141 -3.139 -2.687 -1.142 -1.320 -1.531 -4.320
.2 -0.031 -0.023 -0.022 -0.239 -0.640 -0.868 -0.626 -0.412 -0.303 -0.259 -0.312
.3 -0.011 -0.007 -0.010 -0.148 -0.353 -0.292 -0.329 -0.250 -0.226 -0.205 -0.171
.4 0.002 -0.003 -0.015 -0.074 -0.194 -0.189 -0.190 -0.199 -0.138 -0.123 -0.120
.5 0.003 0.006 -0.002 -0.025 -0.132 -0.131 -0.100 -0.137 -0.091 -0.089 -0.087
.6 0.008 0.007 -0.005 -0.021 -0.076 -0.101 -0.069 -0.103 -0.048 -0.051 -0.042
.7 0.014 -0.009 -0.003 -0.007 -0.078 -0.067 -0.068 -0.076 -0.017 -0.004 -0.040
.8 0.017 -0.020 0.003 0.015 -0.048 -0.044 0.007 -0.025 -0.021 -0.005 0.014
.9 0.046 0.017 0.038 0.042 -0.015 0.026 0.058 0.077 0.050 0.059 -0.008
Notes: Significantly (95%-confidence level) non-zero coefficients in bold. Statistical inference based on 
the standard errors bootstrapped using 100 replications. 
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Figure 3.6 Men displaced from downsizing plants in 1992, proportional 
quantile displacement effects exp( Dsθα ) 
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Figure 3.7 Men displaced from downsizing plants in 1997, proportional 
quantile displacement effects exp( Dsθα ) 
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Figure 3.8 Men displaced from closing plants in 1992, proportional 
quantile displacement effects exp( Csθα ) 
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Figure 3.9 Men displaced from closing plants in 1997, proportional 
quantile displacement effects exp( Csθα ) 
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Figure 3.10 Women displaced from downsizing plants in 1992, proportional 
quantile displacement effects exp( Dsθα ) 
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Figure 3.11 Women displaced from downsizing plants in 1997, proportional 
quantile displacement effects exp( Dsθα ) 
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Figure 3.12 Women displaced from closing plants in 1992, proportional 
quantile displacement effects exp( Csθα ) 
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Figure 3.13 Women displaced from closing plants in 1997, proportional 
quantile displacement effects exp( Csθα ) 
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3.5.1 Pre-displacement effects 
Under the assumption that the displacement status is exogenous, we can interpret 
differences in the conditional earnings distributions between the control and 
displacement groups as the causal effect of displacement. This conditional 
independence assumption also implies that, given the control variables, there 
should be no notable earnings differences between the groups in the periods 
when the displacement group was not yet affected. Although the earnings of the 
displacement group may have been affected some time before the actual 
displacement took place, the earnings differences between the groups should 
disappear at some point when we go further back in time. If that does not happen, 
we take it as evidence against the validity of the conditional independence 
assumption. 
As seen in Table 3.3, the earnings distributions of workers who were displaced in 
1992 due to plant downsizing or closure are very similar to that of the control 
group three years before the displacement year. Only one displacement dummy 
out of 18 for men in Table 3.3 gets a significantly (at the 5% risk level) non-zero 
coefficient in 1989. Namely, the 1st decile of the earnings distribution of men 
losing their jobs due to plant closure in 1992 is estimated to be 0.7% lower than 
that of the control group. In Table 3.3, there are five statistically significant 
coefficients for women in 1989. Except for the highest decile for women in the 
plant-closure group, all significant effects imply less than 1% difference in the 
deciles compared to the control group. These very small discrepancies between 
the female groups may result from sample noise, because only one coefficient 
differs significantly from zero a year later in 1990 (the 4th decile in panel C in 
Table 3.3). It should be stressed that at the 1% risk level, which might be a more 
reasonable choice given our sample sizes, only one coefficient out of 36 differs 
significantly from zero in 1989 in Table 3.3.43  In other words, the earnings 
distributions of the displacement and control groups for both sexes are virtually 
identical four years before the base period, suggesting that the conditional 
independence assumption holds in the 1992 sample. 
There are some statistically significant differences for men in 1990, but these are 
very modest in absolute value. For both women and men we find a decline in the 
earnings distributions of the displacement groups in 1991. At the left tail of 
women’s distribution, the difference compared to the control group exceeds 5%, 
but elsewhere the differences are still only around 2%. This implies a possibility 
that the annual working hours of female employees with relatively low earnings 
have a tendency to decline prior to job loss. Many of these workers are probably 
                                              
 
 
43 Because of the large number of point estimates, we are expected to recover some spuriously significant 
effects even if there were no true effects. 
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part-timers whose working time and, hence, earnings vary with firm-specific 
business conditions. This could explain a stronger effect for women who are 
more likely to be employed on a part-time basis. 
Overall, the estimates for the pre-displacement periods show very modest 
earnings differences between the displacement and control groups in the 1992 
sample. One might expect these small pre-displacement effects to be attributable 
to an unexpected nature of the 1990s depression. This explanation does not sound 
very convincing because the pre-displacement effects appear to be rather small, 
or even smaller, in the 1997 sample (see Figure 3.7, Figure 3.9 and Table 3.4). In 
the 1997 sample, the earnings distributions of the displacement and control 
groups in 1994 are equally similar for men as they were in 1989 in the 1992 
sample. In particular, none of the effects for men in 1994 differs statistically 
significantly from zero in Table 3.4, which is consistent with the conditional 
independence assumption. Surprisingly, one year later the upper half of the 
earnings distribution of men to be displaced from downsizing plants lies slightly 
above that of the control group. In addition to being very small in absolute value, 
these differences also vanish in the next year (with the exception of the effect at 
the 9th decile). The displacement effect for men in the plant-closure group 
becomes statistically significant for the first time in 1996 at the lower end of the 
distribution. 
For women our setting does not work quite as well. The group of women to be 
displaced from downsizing plants seem to earn less than the control group 
already in 1994 (panel C in Table 3.4). The differences in the deciles are 
relatively small, being 0.9–5.9%, but statistically significant from the 3rd decile 
upwards and around 5% at the right tail of the distribution. This raises a doubt 
that our sample design fails and a selection problem remains for this particular 
group of women. For women in the plant-closure group we find only one 
statistically significant coefficient in 1994. The absolute value of this effect is 
relatively high, implying a difference of 5.4% in the 1st decile compared to the 
control group. On the other hand, the effect is associated with a rather high 
standard error (0.020) and it disappears by 1996. 
To summarize, with the exception of women displaced in 1997 due to plant 
downsizing, the earnings distributions of all other displacement groups are 
almost identical to that of the control group three or four years prior to the base 
period. Hence, our approach to detect exogenous displacements using mass 
layoffs and plant closures seems successful, though one female group might pose 
some problems. We also found relatively small pre-displacement effects one to 
two years before the displacement year. 
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3.5.2 Post-displacement effects 
Losing a job in the middle of the depression in 1992 has a huge effect on the 
earnings distribution. In the year following the displacement, the median 
earnings of displaced men are less than half of the median of the control group 
(see Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.8). The decline in the median earnings is even 
slightly more pronounced for displaced women. Not only does the entire 
distribution shift down, but also its shape changes drastically. The deciles above 
the median drop less, whereas the lower deciles decline much more than the 
median. The huge proportional effect in the left tail of the distribution implies 
that a large fraction of displaced workers were unable to return to paid 
employment 
After the sharp initial drop in the first two years following the job loss, the 
earnings distributions of the displacement groups start to converge toward that of 
the control group. This recovery is rather strong between the 2nd and 6th deciles, 
though it slows down after a few years for women who lost their jobs in mass 
layoffs. This pattern can be attributed to an increasing probability of having 
found a suitable job after displacement.44 It is striking, however, that the 1st 
decile does not show any sign of recovery, suggesting that the displaced worker 
has a notable risk of remaining outside paid work at the end of the follow-up 
period. 
Displacement has a much weaker effect in the upper part of the distribution. At 
the 9th decile, for example, the displacement effect never exceeds 20%. Hence, a 
job loser can sometimes perform relatively well in the labour market compared to 
what would have happened without the displacement. On the other hand, the 
recovery of the upper deciles is rather slow and, consequently, the upper tail does 
not catch up with the counterfactual level by the end of the observation period. 
Except for the effect at the 1st and 9th deciles for women displaced from 
downsizing plants, the displacement effect is statistically significant at all deciles 
in 1999 (see Table 3.3). The two lowest deciles for the displaced worker are less 
than half of the counterfactual values without displacement, whereas the medians 
and upper deciles are 3–25% below the counterfactual values. It is remarkable 
that the displacement in the depression still has an effect on the entire distribution 
seven years after the job loss. Note also that the consequences of job loss in 1992 
are rather similar for workers displaced from downsizing plants and those 
displaced from exiting plants. 
                                              
 
 
44 The average number of employment months in the displacement group increased quite rapidly from 
1993 to 1998. 
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Women are subject to larger long-term earnings losses than men. Among those 
displaced from downsizing plants, the displacement effect at the median is 15% 
and 22% in 1999 for men and women, respectively. Except for the two lowest 
deciles, the sex difference in the displacement effects is even larger below the 
median, whereas it is rather small in the upper part of the distribution. A similar 
pattern exists for the plant-closure group, though the sex difference in the 
displacement effects at the median is less pronounced for that group. 
When we turn our attention from the severe depression to the ensuing recovery 
period, the picture of earnings losses changes dramatically (see Figure 3.7, 
Figure 3.9, Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.13). Compared to the 1992 effect, the effect 
of displacement in 1997 is much smaller on average but even more concentrated 
in the lower end of the distribution. The displacement effect exhibits relatively 
little variation between the 3rd and 9th deciles (compared to the 1992 sample), but 
it is of a different order of magnitude at the two lowest deciles. In all 
displacement groups, the lowest decile drops more than 50% compared to the 
control group. Despite very large absolute values, the displacement effect at the 
1st decile is occasionally statistically insignificant in the last years of the 
observation period (see Table 3.4), which may be due to the relatively small 
sample sizes of the 1997 displacement groups. 
In 1997, the displacement has a statistically significant negative effect for men 
only at the lower end of the earnings distribution. This effect is more pronounced 
for those who were displaced from exiting plants. The displacement effect in the 
lower part of the earnings distribution gets stronger in 1998, the median being 
around 5% below the median of the control group. The displacement effect for 
men is not statistically significant above the 6th decile after 1997 except at one 
decile in 2004 for the plant-closure displacement group. By the end of the 
observation period, the displacement effect for men at the median disappears but 
the negative effect at the lower deciles remains statistically significant. This 
heterogeneity implies that a large fraction of workers experienced rather 
moderate earnings losses, if any, after a job displacement that took place during 
the period of economic growth. In other words, much of the decline in mean 
earnings can be attributed to a relatively small group of displaced workers who 
suffered from notable earnings reductions due to difficulties to return to work. 
Women displaced in 1997 due to plant closures suffered from larger earnings 
losses than male job losers. One year after the displacement, the effect is 
statistically significant between the 1st and 8th deciles for the plant-closure group 
(see panel D in Table 3.4). This displacement effect gets weaker over time, but 
remains statistically significant in the lower half of the distribution until the end 
of the observation period. In 2004, the effect is still some 8% at the median and 
even larger at the lower deciles. The effect of being displaced from an exiting 
plant is slightly larger in 2004 for women than for men. In the earlier years, the 
displacement effect is clearly stronger for women. These findings are in line with 
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the larger losses for women in the 1992 sample. There seems to be a positive 
displacement effect for the female plant-closure group at the highest decile over 
the years 1999–2003, but this effect is not significantly different from zero in any 
year. 
The displacement effect for women who lost their jobs in mass layoffs is 
significantly negative at each decile between 1997 and 2004 (panel C in Table 
3.4). In other words, the entire earnings distribution of this group is estimated to 
lie below the distribution of the control groups for the complete post-
displacement period. The effect of being displaced from a downsizing plant for 
women is relatively weak but very persistent, as there is little or no recovery at 
all over time. These estimates should be treated with caution, however, as the 
pre-displacement effects raised some doubts about the validity of the conditional 
independence assumption for this particular group. 
In the 1992 sample, there are no systematic differences in the displacement 
effects between workers who lost their jobs in mass layoffs and those who 
became displaced from exiting plants. By contrast, men in plants that closed 
down in 1997 were subject to much larger earnings reduction than those 
displaced from downsizing plants in that year. Our findings for women who were 
displaced in 1997 are inconclusive due to a potential selection problem in the 
downsizing subgroup. A potential explanation is that, during the exceptionally 
deep (and to some extent unexpected) depression, mass layoffs and plant closures 
were rather common, and hence perhaps less selective, events. 
One of our key findings is that the effect of displacement is very heterogeneous, 
being much larger in the lower quantiles, and this holds for women and men in 
both periods. This also implies a higher degree of earnings dispersion, as 
measured by the ratio of the upper deciles to the lower ones, for the displaced 
workers. In other words, job loss increases uncertainty about the future earnings 
level, suggesting an additional welfare loss for the risk-averse workers. 
3.5.3  Robustness of the results 
We have checked the robustness of the main results with respect to various 
departures from our benchmark setting. Here we describe the main findings 
briefly, but do not report any parameter estimates due to a huge number of 
them.45 First, our analysis involves an implicit assumption that better workers did 
not quit and less able workers were not laid off in any significant scale in the 
periods preceding a mass layoff or plant closure. In section 3.5.1 we did not find 
evidence of notable differences in the earnings distributions between the 
                                              
 
 
45 Of course, the detailed results are available from the authors on request. 
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treatment and control groups 3–4 years before the base periods (except for 
women in the 1997 downsizing group). While these findings support the validity 
of our sample design, it is of interest to compare the earnings of the early leavers 
to that of the control and displacement groups. As discussed earlier, two 
subgroups of early leavers are included in the data: workers who separated in the 
base year (1992 or 1997) from plants that downsized or closed down during the 
next year. Differences in their earnings distributions compared to that of the 
control group are captured by the coefficients Csθη  and Dsθη  in (19). 
In the 1992 sample, these effects exhibit very similar patterns over time but are 
(almost) uniformly larger (in absolute value) than the associated displacement 
effects, Csθα  and ,
D
sθα  in the post-displacement period. In other words, between 
1992 and 1999 each decile of the earnings distribution of the early-leaver group 
typically dropped more than the corresponding decile of the associated 
displacement group. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
employers laid off their least productive employees prior to the period of mass 
layoff or plant closure. On the other hand, we do not detect notable differences in 
the earnings distribution between the early leavers and the control groups 3–4 
years before 1992,46 implying that the early leavers are not a selective group 
compared to the control and displacement groups. Following Gibbons and Katz 
(1991), a potential explanation is that the early leavers are otherwise similar but 
are affected by a stigma effect compared to those who separated during the 
period of a mass layoff or plant closure.  
In the 1997 sample, we find much larger earnings losses for the early-leaver 
group than for the displacement group. In this case, there seems to be a selection 
problem. With an exception of men in downsizing plants, the earnings 
distribution of the early leavers was below that of the control group already in 
1994. Therefore, the early leavers in 1997 seem to be a selective group of 
workers in terms of unobserved characteristics, and thereby their exclusion from 
the control and displacement groups is important for appropriate statistical 
inference. 
Second, our threshold value for mass layoffs – a 50% reduction in employment – 
is essentially arbitrary. We have checked the robustness of our results with 
respect to this choice by lowering the threshold value to 30%. Our results remain 
qualitatively unchanged, but the displacement effect right after the period of job 
loss becomes a few percentage points stronger at the 6th and lower deciles in the 
1992 group and at the 1st and 2nd decile in the 1997 group. We interpret this as an 
effect of including more selective dismissals in our displacement group. 
                                              
 
 
46 At the 5% risk level, 3 out of 36 coefficients differ significantly from zero in 1989. 
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Third, so far we have discussed the consequences of job losses that occurred at 
two specific points in time. Those years were not randomly chosen but we have 
conducted similar analyses for all displacements taking place in the period  
1992–2001. The results from this exercise show that workers displaced in 1992 
were subject to the largest earnings losses. The earnings losses exhibit a 
gradually decreasing trend as a function of the displacement year from 1992 to 
1997. There is no notable variation in the displacement costs with respect to the 
timing of job loss after 1997. Thus, our results for the 1997 sample describe the 
costs of job loss under “normal” economic conditions, whereas the 1992 results 
provide an upper bound for the displacement costs that the worker can face in an 
exceptionally difficult economic environment. 
Finally, as the dependent variable in our analysis is earnings, our estimates 
describe a reduction in labour income that results from shorter working time 
and/or lower wage rates following the displacement. When out of work, 
individuals are typically entitled to income transfers, like unemployment 
benefits, disability benefits and/or housing allowance, which can compensate for 
a large part of the earning losses in a welfare state like Finland. Therefore, we 
should expect displaced workers to experience smaller income losses than 
earnings losses. To address this issue we have replicated our analysis by using 
taxable annual income (excluding capital income) as the dependent variable in 
place of labour income. As expected, the displacement effect on annual income is 
much smaller than on annual earnings at the lower end of the distribution. In the 
1992 sample, the displacement effect at the two lowest deciles of annual income 
is above 30% in 1999. The corresponding effect at the lower end of the 
distribution for the 1997 sample in 2004 is smaller but statistically significant, 
being around 10%. At the upper end of the distributions, the effects of job loss on 
annual income and earnings are of the same magnitude. These findings are not 
very surprising given that eligibility for income transfers depends on the level of 
labour income. Nevertheless, it may come as a surprise that the displacement has 
an equally long-lasting effect on the distribution of annual income as it has on the 
earnings distribution. Namely, seven years later, a job loss still has a statistically 
significant effect on the entire distribution of annual income for those displaced 
in 1992 and at the lower end of the distribution for those displaced in 1997. 
3.5.4 Comparisons to results from mean regressions 
In Table 3.5 we report the “ordinary” fixed effects estimates of the expected 
earnings losses. We calculated these for illustrating the conventional 
displacement effect results and to make it easier to compare the results with 
evidence from other countries. In these regressions the annual earnings of worker 
i in year s, Yis, is regressed on an individual fixed effect and the same set of 
displacement dummies and control variables as in equation (19), excluding the 
time invariant variables. We ran the regressions for the complete samples (i.e. for 
the same samples used in the quantile regressions) using Yis as the dependent 
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variable, as well as for subsamples of observations with strictly positive earnings 
using both Yis and log(Yis) as the dependent variable.  
Not surprisingly, the mean earnings losses are much larger for those displaced in 
1992 than those losing their jobs in 1997. When all observations are included in 
the analysis, the displacement effect estimates are uniformly higher. Removing 
observations with zero earnings from the analysis reduces the displacement 
effects by some 10–20% in the post-displacement years for men and somewhat 
more for women. Thus the use of the selective sample of observations with 
strictly positive earnings leads to underestimation of the displacements costs and 
to potentially misleading comparisons between women and men. There is no 
evidence of statistically significant mean displacement effects for workers 
displaced in 1997 due to plant closure (except for men with strictly positive 
earnings), even thought we found significant displacement effects at the lower 
end of the earnings distribution in the quantile regression analysis. In other 
words, one may miss a relatively small and heterogeneous effect by looking only 
at the mean effects.  
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Table 3.5 Fixed effects estimates of mean earnings losses 
Displacement from a downsizing plant 
 Displacement in 1992  Displacement in 1997 
 Men  Women  Men Women 
 All Yis > 0 log(Yis)  All Yis > 0 log(Yis)  All Yis > 0 log(Yis) All Yis > 0 log(Yis)
1990 -17 -28 0.0079  0 2 0.0037 1995 198 212 -0.0037 275 261 0.0155
 (504) (502) (0.0108)  (255) (240) (0.0177)  (2,059) (2,069) (0.0121) (536) (529) (0.0175)
1991 -505 -514 -0.0023  -661 -667 -0.0351 1996 398 410 -0.0118 -110 -129 -0.0095
 (504) (502) (0.0108)  (255) (240) (0.0177)  (2,059) (2,069) (0.0121) (536) (529) (0.0175)
1992 -5,628 -5,520 -0.3133   -3,951 -3,750 -0.3489  1997 -635 -605 -0.0548  -1,046 -1,032 -0.1336
  (506) (505) (0.0109)   (255) (242) (0.0179)    (2,070) (2,081) (0.0121)  (536) (530) (0.0175)
1993 -12,800 -10,983 -1.0286  -8,783 -7,188 -0.9337 1998 -2,349 -1,723 -0.1369 -2,718 -2,002 -0.2210
 (507) (546) (0.0117)  (255) (265) (0.0196)  (2,077) (2,113) (0.0123) (536) (540) (0.0178)
1994 -11,874 -10,587 -0.8749  -8,014 -6,781 -0.7683 1999 -3,930 -3,326 -0.1225 -2,315 -1,451 -0.1541
 (508) (541) (0.0116)  (255) (260) (0.0193)  (2,077) (2,121) (0.0124) (536) (545) (0.0180)
1995 -10,793 -9,459 -0.6978  -7,008 -5,701 -0.5693 2000 -4,350 -3,790 -0.1078 -1,487 -861 -0.1105
 (508) (539) (0.0116)  (256) (260) (0.0192)  (2,076) (2,120) (0.0124) (536) (544) (0.0180)
1996 -9,701 -8,340 -0.5366  -6,142 -5,217 -0.4927 2001 -2,897 -2,374 -0.0945 -1,265 -663 -0.0885
 (508) (539) (0.0116)  (256) (256) (0.0189)  (2,078) (2,121) (0.0124) (536) (544) (0.0180)
1997 -8,808 -7,705 -0.4639  -5,317 -4,225 -0.4038 2002 -3,283 -2,792 -0.0869 -1,230 -813 -0.0931
 (509) (537) (0.0115)  (256) (258) (0.0191)  (2,081) (2,133) (0.0124) (537) (544) (0.0179)
1998 -8,252 -7,096 -0.3661  -4,969 -3,770 -0.3253 2003 -3,100 -2,392 -0.0894 -1,574 -1,085 -0.1115
 (511) (537) (0.0115)  (256) (258) (0.0191)  (2,088) (2,155) (0.0126) (537) (547) (0.0181)
1999 -7,600 -6,430 -0.3554  -2,291 -435 -0.2634 2004 -1,972 -1,154 -0.0580 -1,431 -992 -0.0816
 (511) (537) (0.0116)  (256) (260) (0.0192)  (2,089) (2,166) (0.0126) (537) (552) (0.0182)
Displacement from a closing plant 
1990 317 314 0.0172  -77 -65 0.0054 1995 -655 -614 0.0006 -318 -331 0.0302
 (555) (553) (0.0119)  (275) (259) (0.0191)  (3,675) (3,693) (0.0215) (971) (960) (0.0317)
1991 -420 -422 0.0001  -1,211 -1,201 -0.0698 1996 -1,354 -1,308 -0.0215 -345 -358 0.0319
 (555) (553) (0.0119)  (275) (259) (0.0191)  (3,675) (3,693) (0.0215) (971) (960) (0.0317)
1992 -5,922 -5,620 -0.3400   -4,834 -4,569 -0.4263  1997 -3,562 -3,420 -0.1497  -2,287 -2,305 -0.1596
  (555) (556) (0.0119)   (275) (261) (0.0193)    (3,692) (3,715) (0.0217)  (972) (961) (0.0317)
1993 -13,382 -11,374 -1.0361  -9,589 -7,819 -0.9522 1998 -4,567 -3,608 -0.2127 -3,797 -3,061 -0.3165
 (556) (603) (0.0130)  (275) (286) (0.0211)  (3,706) (3,795) (0.0221) (977) (989) (0.0326)
1994 -11,693 -10,118 -0.7985  -8,634 -7,552 -0.8337 1999 -5,079 -4,038 -0.1415 -3,719 -2,513 -0.1937
 (557) (593) (0.0128)  (275) (278) (0.0206)  (3,706) (3,815) (0.0222) (977) (1,003) (0.0331)
1995 -10,909 -9,300 -0.6573  -7,609 -6,220 -0.5881 2000 -5,384 -4,538 -0.1435 -3,011 -2,087 -0.1382
 (557) (594) (0.0128)  (275) (280) (0.0207)  (3,710) (3,815) (0.0222) (976) (998) (0.0329)
1996 -10,263 -8,817 -0.5752  -7,189 -5,891 -0.5285 2001 -3,444 -2,319 -0.1116 -2,119 -1,341 -0.0453
 (558) (592) (0.0127)  (276) (280) (0.0207)  (3,714) (3,849) (0.0224) (976) (996) (0.0329)
1997 -9,202 -8,045 -0.4417  -6,436 -5,374 -0.4653 2002 -3,933 -2,795 -0.0874 -1,413 -644 0.0313
 (559) (588) (0.0126)  (276) (278) (0.0206)  (3,706) (3,849) (0.0224) (979) (1,000) (0.0330)
1998 -8,829 -7,460 -0.3597  -6,043 -5,026 -0.4138 2003 -3,151 -2,218 -0.0721 -1,041 -548 0.0149
 (560) (590) (0.0127)  (276) (277) (0.0205)  (3,706) (3,853) (0.0225) (979) (1,001) (0.0331)
1999 -9,702 -8,690 -0.3611  -5,581 -4,949 -0.3755 2004 -3,345 -2,540 -0.0876 -1,571 -1,071 0.0155
  (560) (589) (0.0127)   (276) (275) (0.0203)    (3,714) (3,872) (0.0226)  (980) (1,012) (0.0334)
Notes: Displacement effects from model C D C Dis i s is s isC s isD s isC s isD isY a d d e eγ β α α η η ε= + + + + + + +'x  
where ai are the person fixed effects, sγ  are the year effects, s∈{t – 3, t – 2,..., t + 7} and t ∈  {1992, 
1997}. The dummies for the displacement groups are the same as in equation (6). Yis > 0 marks estimates 
where observations with no earnings are dropped. The displacement effects are set to 0 for two pre-
displacement years, 1988 and 1989 for workers displaced in 1992, and 1993 and 1994 for workers 
displaced in 1997. Significantly (95%-confidence level) non-zero coefficients in bold. Standard errors in 
(parentheses). 
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3.6 Concluding remarks 
We analysed the earnings losses owing to involuntary job loss among Finnish 
workers who became displaced during a period of depression or recovery. Using 
the quantile regression method, we estimated the effect of displacement at each 
decile of the earnings distribution. Our findings from both time periods suggest 
that 1) displaced workers suffer from substantial and persistent earnings losses, 
2) women are subject to larger earnings losses than men, and 3) the effect of 
displacement is very heterogeneous, being much larger in the lower quantiles and 
implying an increase in earnings dispersion following displacement.  
The first finding is in accordance with the results from the US labour market. The 
results from other European labour markets are mixed in this respect. The second 
result is interesting given that most US studies have not found notable 
differences between women and men (see e.g. table 1 in Couch and Placzek, 
2010), whereas the European studies have not paid much attention to the gender 
aspect of displacement costs. In Finland, as in other countries, women are more 
frequently out of work for family reasons. That may induce employers to favour 
male employees when investing in managerial and professional skills. If so, and 
if such skills are generally transferable, i.e. not lost in job displacement, one can 
expect to find smaller earnings losses for displaced men. Kletzer (1989) finds 
that managerial, professional and technical workers retain a larger share of their 
returns to seniority after job loss than blue collar workers do. Taken together 
with the fact that managerial, professional and technical jobs are 
disproportionately held by men, employers’ investment behaviour may lead to 
larger earnings losses for women. Still, it remains unclear why earnings losses 
differ between men and women in Finland, but not in the US. It should be 
stressed that women’s labour market position is quite different in Finland. On the 
one hand, the relatively generous maternity and parental leave schemes 
encourage career breaks, but on the other hand, public day care and school meals 
help the mothers of young children to work full-time if they want to. Moreover, 
compared to most other countries, part-time work among women is not very 
common, whereas the labour force participation rate of women is rather high in 
Finland.  
The third finding, the heterogeneity in the displacement effect, has important 
implications. First, the positive effect on earnings dispersion means that job loss 
does not only cause a significant decline in expected earnings, but also raises 
uncertainty about the level of future earnings. This suggests an additional welfare 
loss for risk-averse workers, the effect of which has been typically ignored in the 
discussion of displacement costs. Secondly, the dominant effect at the lower end 
of the distribution is consistent with the hypothesis that the relative importance of 
transferable individual-specific skills, which are not lost in job displacement, is 
larger for high-ability workers, who tend to populate the upper part of the 
conditional earnings distribution. Finally, the disproportionately large effect on 
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the first two deciles implies that the effect on the expected earnings loss is in 
large part driven by an increased risk of joblessness and low-paid employment 
following job displacement. This implies that job training and job replacement 
programmes targeted at unemployed job seekers, if effective in enhancing re-
employment, can provide a means to reduce the average displacement cost. 
By contrasting the results of the two periods, we found much larger earnings 
losses for those who lost their jobs during the depression period. Men (women) 
who were displaced in the middle of the depression had approximately 15% 
(20%) lower median earnings seven years after the job loss. Because of the 
exceptionally difficult labour market conditions, their earnings distribution as a 
whole remained below the counterfactual level until the end of the follow-up 
period. By contrast, job loss in the recovery period had a long-lasting effect only 
in the lower half of the distribution. For women displaced in 1997, the median 
effect seven years later was about 8%, whereas it did not differ from zero for 
men. These long-term losses do not vanish even when income transfers are 
accounted for. These results complement the findings of Eliason and Storrie 
(2006) and Couch and Placzek (2010) about the role of the business cycle in 
determining the size of earnings losses. Eliason and Storrie (2006) find that the 
displacement effect, which was first decreasing, started to increase when the 
Swedish economy was hit by a recession. By comparing their results from a 
different period in more favourable economic times to the results of Jacobson et 
al. (1993), Couch and Placzek (2010) conclude that the earnings losses in the US 
labour market are smaller after displacement in “ordinary” economic times than 
in an economic downturn.  
Given that the world economy is currently experiencing its deepest downturn in 
the post-World War II period, our results obtained from the depression period are 
of particular interest. The extent of output and employment losses for many 
countries is projected to be of a similar magnitude that Finland experienced in the 
early 1990,. i.e. much bigger than those in the periods studied by Eliason and 
Storrie (2006) and Couch and Placzek (2010). For example, GDP declined in 
2009 by 4.9% in the United Kingdom, 5.0% in Germany, 7.1% in Ireland, 5.2% 
in Japan and over 10% in the Baltic countries (IMF, 2010). In some countries, 
output is expected to continue falling, albeit at a clearly lower rate, also in 2010. 
Unemployment is rapidly increasing everywhere due to large-scale job 
destruction. The unemployment rate in the United States and in many European 
countries is expected to be around 10% in 2010 (IMF, 2010). 
Unlike the existing displacement literature, which covers periods in a relatively 
stable economic environment, the lessons from Finland’s depression period 
provide a useful point of reference for the size and duration of the earnings losses 
for workers displaced during the current crisis. Our results suggest that, even in 
the case of a rapid return to steady economic growth, millions of people losing 
their jobs during the current downturn will suffer from substantial earnings losses 
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for several years. Our finding of the large and long-lasting displacement effect at 
the lower end of the earnings distribution implies that many job losers will be at 
risk of being outside paid work several years later, possibly withdrawing from 
the labour market altogether. This is a serious concern, especially for many 
European governments that have tried to induce people to retire later in order to 
cope with the financial pressure resulting from an ageing population. Our results 
underline the importance of supportive measures, such as training and subsidized 
jobs, to keep job losers employable over the recession period in order to 
minimize the number of early labour market withdrawals. 
From the methodological point of view, our analysis suggests that the mean 
effect alone can give a rather incomplete picture of the consequences of job loss. 
For example, a moderate effect of displacement on expected earnings may hide a 
notable effect that is present only in the left tail of the distribution, as in our 1997 
sample. 
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 4. Institutional rules, labour demand and 
retirement through disability programme 
participation47 
Abstract 
We use matched employer-employee data from Finland to model transitions out 
of work into sick leave and disability retirement. To identify the role of 
institutional factors we exploit reforms that changed medical requirements for 
disability pension eligibility and experience-rated employer contributions. We 
find that transitions to sick leave and disability pension benefits are relatively 
rare in growing establishments, but rather common in establishments with a high 
degree of excess worker turnover. We also show that transitions to disability 
retirement depend on the stringency of medical screening and the degree of 
experience-rating applied to the employer. 
Key words: Disability pension, sick leave, experience rating 
JEL classification numbers: J14, J23, J26 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The disability benefit scheme is one of the largest social security programmes in 
many countries, and therefore is of particular interest. In Finland, disability is the 
most common reason for early retirement, and disability expenditure accounted 
for some 3.5% of GDP in 2003, which was the third highest share in the EU after 
Sweden and Denmark (Börsch-Supan, 2007). Disability enrolment rates of older 
employees vary strikingly across the European countries and the US. These 
cross-country differences cannot be explained by demographic or health-related 
factors, but are attributable to institutional differences in the disability schemes 
(Börsch-Supan, 2007). During the past two or three decades, many countries 
have also experienced an expansion of disability benefit enrolment. This is a 
serious concern given the common goal to induce people to retire later. The 
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widespread use of disability benefits as an early retirement instrument has been 
argued to be a particularly serious problem in Finland (e.g. OECD, 2008). 
Disability benefits are designed to provide insurance for employees’ labour 
income against the risk of becoming disabled and incapable of regular work. In 
practice, it may be difficult to identify employees who are truly disabled, which 
suggests the possibility that disability benefits can distort labour supply and 
demand in some cases. Autor and Duggan (2003, 2006), for example, argue that 
the rapid growth in disability benefit rolls in the US cannot be explained by 
changes in health, but is driven by a combination of labour demand conditions 
and changes in the disability scheme itself (in terms of generosity, coverage and 
screening intensity). Other authors have also found evidence of the importance of 
the generosity of disability benefits, the stringency of medical screening and the 
economic environment when explaining participation in disability programmes 
(e.g. Gruber, 2000, Black et al., 2002, and Campolieti, 2004). A majority of this 
literature has been motivated by a simple labour supply framework, in which an 
employee chooses whether to apply for disability benefits, while the employer 
has no role at all. Surprisingly little effort has been made to study the labour 
demand side (some exceptions are Hassink et al., 1997, and Koning, 2009). 
When job cuts are necessary, firms often offload their oldest employees first. If 
the health requirements for disability benefit eligibility are weak, early retirement 
via the disability scheme can be a useful strategy in effective downsizing, 
providing a way to reduce the workforce in a “soft” way. On the other hand, 
some firms can also target dismissals at those employees with a high risk of 
disability. In doing so, the employer may avoid disability costs arising from the 
experience-rated contributions of disability pension benefits. Encouraging 
disability retirement can also be an attractive strategy for an employer who wants 
to change the composition of the workforce at a time of stable or growing 
employment when dismissals are difficult to justify. 
This study aims to shed some light on the relationships between labour demand, 
institutional factors and early retirement through disability programmes. We 
consider the importance of the labour demand side by examining the relationship 
between the establishment’s growth and restructuring rates and disability entries 
by its employees. In addition, we assess the effectiveness of two policy 
instruments: the strictness of medical requirements for disability pension 
eligibility and the experience-rating of disability expenditure. The first 
determines the ease of access to disability pension benefits, whereas the latter 
places part of the costs of early retirement on the employer. 
Using matched employer-employee data from Finland, we model transitions out 
of work to sick leave and disability retirement. To identify the role of 
institutional factors we exploit a law change that made the medical requirements 
for disability pension eligibility tougher for a certain group, as well as changes in 
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partially experience-rated employer contributions. We show that transitions to 
sick leave and disability pension benefits are relatively rare in growing 
establishments, but rather common in establishments with a high degree of 
excess worker turnover. We find no evidence of employers actively encouraging 
disability retirement as a way of adjusting their workforce when downsizing. 
Finally, we show that the transition rate to disability retirement depends on the 
stringency of medical screening and the degree of experience-rating applied to 
the employer. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we give a short overview of 
the existing literature. Section 4.3 describes the Finnish social security system for 
sickness benefits and disability pensions. We discuss our data and report 
descriptive statistics in section 4.4. The results of our econometric analyses are 
reported and discussed in section 4.5, which is followed by a concluding section. 
4.2 Related literature 
Disability benefits are typically determined as a function of past earnings, which 
are likely to be correlated with the employee’s preferences for work. The 
resulting endogeneity problem has hampered attempts to quantify the impact of 
disability benefits on labour supply. Gruber (2000) and Campolieti (2004) 
overcome the endogeneity problem by exploiting policy changes in the Canadian 
disability benefit scheme that had differential effects on people living in different 
parts of the country. While Gruber estimates that the elasticity of 
nonparticipation with respect to disability insurance benefits is between  
0.28–0.36, Campolieti finds no statistically significant relationship. In the late 
1980s, which is the period analysed by Gruber, non-medical factors related to the 
availability of suitable jobs in the region and personal skills were taken into 
consideration when determining benefit eligibility. Campolieti considers an 
earlier reform that took place in the early 1970s when the eligibility requirements 
and the stringency of medical screening were tougher. This led Campolieti to 
argue that the generosity of the disability benefits may not distort working 
decisions when it is difficult to qualify for such benefits because of a strict 
screening process. 
Using aggregate data for the US, Black et al. (2002) and Autor and Duggan 
(2003, 2006) find evidence of the relationship between disability participation 
and business cycle conditions. Black et al. use data from the coal boom and bust 
in the 1970s and 1980s, which affected only a few coal-producing counties, to 
construct instrumental variables for local labour market shocks. According to 
their county-level analysis, participation in disability programmes falls during 
economic upturns, and this relationship is much stronger for permanent than for 
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transitory economic shocks. Autor and Duggan discuss a dramatic expansion of 
disability insurance enrolment during the past two decades in the US.48 They 
argue that this growth cannot be explained by a true increase in the incidence of 
disabling illness. Instead, they claim that the reduced stringency of the screening 
for disability benefits after 1984, an increase in the earnings replacement rate, 
and an increase in female labour force participation have played important roles. 
Because of the liberalization of disability benefits in 1984, the disability 
application rates were found to become more responsive to adverse labour 
demand shocks. This result supports Campolieti’s (2004) interpretation of 
Canadian evidence. Autor and Duggan (2003) estimate that the unemployment 
rate of workers aged 25–64 in 1998 was a half percentage point lower than it 
would have been otherwise. They argue that the US disability system has begun 
to “function much like a long-term unemployment insurance programme for the 
unemployable” (Autor and Duggan 2006, p. 74). 
Unlike the US studies based on aggregate data, Vahtera et al. (2005) and Rege et 
al. (2009) analyse individual-specific disability risks. Using matched employer-
employee data for Norway, Rege et al. explain the likelihood of being on a 
disability pension with dummy variables indicating various degrees of plant 
downsizing during the past six years. They find a substantial increase in the 
transition rate to disability retirement following plant downsizing or plant 
closure.49 Whereas Rege et al. do not make a distinction between those who kept 
their jobs and those who lost their jobs in plant downsizing, Vahtera et al. 
consider a risk of disability retirement among Finnish municipal employees who 
kept their jobs after the reduction of personnel in their organisation. These 
employment reductions were carried out between 1991 and 1993, during a period 
of severe recession in Finland. They find an almost twofold risk of being granted 
a permanent disability pension in the next five years after a major downsizing 
(more than 18% reduction in the personnel) than after no downsizing (less than 
8% reduction). Thus, not only employees who lose their jobs, but also those who 
keep their jobs after the employment reduction are subject to an increased 
disability risk. 
Börsch-Supan (2007) points out that disability expenditures and enrolment rates 
vary notably across different countries. In Europe disability expenditures are 
highest in Finland, Sweden and Denmark.50 Börsch-Supan analyses the cross-
                                              
 
 
48 See McVicar (2008) for discussion about the growth in disability benefit rolls in the UK. 
49 They also find an increase in mortality rates among workers whose plants downsized. 
50 Disability schemes represent only a part of the social security system. How people who are unable, or 
unwilling, to work are allocated between sickness, unemployment, disability, and early retirement 
schemes depends on relative compensation levels and eligibility criteria, which vary from country to 
country. Hence, a low disability enrolment rate may be associated with a high rate of sickness absence, 
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country differences in the disability enrolment rates of people aged 50 to 65 
years, using harmonized survey data for 12 European countries and similar 
survey data for the UK and US. He finds very little explanatory power for 
demographic and health-related differences across the countries. By contrast, 
three quarters of the cross-country variation was explained by the institutional 
variables that describe the generosity and the ease of access of the disability 
insurance. The most influential institutional factor turned out to be the strictness 
by which vocational considerations are applied when determining eligibility. 
The studies discussed above do not pay much attention to the employer’s role. 
Hutchens (1999) develops a theoretical framework that helps to understand why 
employers may be actively involved in early retirement decisions. He introduces 
an implicit contract model of a firm that uses early retirement benefits, provided 
by the government, as a form of unemployment insurance. Within this 
framework, the public early retirement benefits effectively subsidize workforce 
reductions. Therefore, the firm responds to slack demand by Encouraging early 
retirement, which leads to an inefficiently high level of early retirement. 
Hutchens also discusses two alternative policies: actuarial adjustments and 
experience rating. An actuarial adjustment places costs on early retirees by 
reducing their future benefits compared to the case where retirement occurs at a 
later day, whereas experience rating places costs on firms by directing part of the 
early retirement expenditure to the former employer. While both of these policies 
can be used to reduce the implicit subsidy, and thereby restore early retirement to 
the efficient level, their implementation is subject to some practical drawbacks. 
Namely, an effective early retirement scheme should vary with individual 
characteristics, like wages and survival probabilities. Since the real-world 
scheme cannot account for all individual heterogeneity, the implicit subsidy will 
exist at least for some groups even if the scheme eliminates the subsidy “on 
average”. 
Theoretical insights of Hutchens (1999) are supported by empirical findings of 
two studies from the Netherlands. Using data on the dismissal and disability rates 
of Dutch firms, Hassink et al. (1997) examine to what extent separations into 
disability are used as an alternative to dismissals. They estimate that about one-
tenth of the observed inflow into disability were effectively dismissals. The data 
used by Hassink et al. covered the years 1988 and 1990 when the experience-
rating of disability benefits was not yet introduced in the Netherlands. In 1998 
the employer’s annual disability insurance contribution rate was tied to the 
amount of disability benefits received by its former employees during a past  
5-year period (beginning 7 and ending 2 years prior to the year in question). As a 
                                                                                                                                    
 
 
long-term unemployment or voluntary early retirement. These kinds of spillovers should be kept in mind 
when interpreting the results from cross-country comparisons. 
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result, the employers became partly liable for the costs of the first five years of 
disability benefits. Koning (2009) compares inflow rates to disability benefits 
between employers that experienced a change in the contribution rate in 2001 
(triggered by a decline or increase in the disability inflow in 1999 compared with 
an earlier period) and those with no change in the contribution rate. He finds that 
in the firms that experienced a (positive or negative) change in the contribution 
rate the disability inflow rate decreased during the next two years compared with 
the firms with no change in the contribution rate. Koning interprets this as 
evidence that employers were not completely aware of the experience rating 
scheme, and hence the change in the contribution rate acted as a “wake-up call” 
to pay attention to experience rating. This in turn induced the employers to 
increase preventive actions, reducing disability events in the subsequent years. 
It is should be stressed that Koning’s data only covered three post-reform years, 
and thereby there were no exogenous changes in the experience rating scheme 
during the observation period. Instead, all the observed changes in the 
contribution rates were driven by changes in firms’ own disability history. While 
Koning’s findings indicate some information imperfections (at least a few years 
after the introduction of the experience-rating system) and imply that experience 
rating does matter, his results do not describe the causal effects of having a given 
degree, or a particular type, of an experience-rating system compared with the 
counterfactual case of having some other scheme. 
In sum, we can draw the following lessons from the existing literature: 1) the 
generosity of disability compensation and negative demand shocks increase the 
entry rates to disability benefit schemes, 2) the strength of this relationship 
depends on the stringency of medical screening, and 3) the experience-rating of 
disability benefit costs can be used to reduce the moral hazard problem. Our 
study complements this literature in a number of ways. First, in addition to 
studying transitions from work to disability retirement, we also consider 
transitions from work to sick leave and from sick leave to disability retirement. 
In this way, we can differentiate between factors affecting the incidence of 
sickness or injury (ex ante effects) and those affecting the intensity or success of 
medical and occupational rehabilitation (ex post effects). This distinction helps us 
to detect the point in the disability pension track when certain policy instruments 
are effective. Second, when analysing the role of labour demand, we pay 
particular attention to excess worker turnover, which describes a degree of 
restructuring for a given employment change. This helps us to show that 
disability benefits may be used to adjust the structure of the workforce at the 
times when the employment level is stable. Third, we take advantage of two 
policy reforms to identify the causal effects of the experience-rating of disability 
benefits. Our results indicate that experience rating reduces the incidence of 
disability and sickness. Finally, by accounting for a firm’s financial position, we 
also show that experience rating has a heterogeneous effect, being less effective 
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for those employers that can easily bear their share of the disability pension 
costs. 
Given that there is hardly any evidence on the experience-rating of disability 
benefits, our analysis of the effects of experience-rated contributions on the 
disability entry rate is the main contribution of the paper. Koning (2009) is an 
exception, but we extend his work in several ways. Most importantly, our 
estimates for the impact of experience-rating can be given a causal interpretation. 
The lack of prior evidence is partly due to the fact that disability benefit 
expenditures are subject to experience rating only in a few countries. Still, the 
topic should be of considerable interest as many countries suffer from high and 
still growing rates of disability programme participation, and experience rating is 
one potentially effective policy instrument. 
4.3 Institutional framework of Finland 
The Finnish social security system has been subject to continuous changes over 
time. Below we describe the features of the system that were in force from the 
early 1990s until 2004, which is the time period covered by our empirical 
analysis. 
4.3.1 Sickness and disability benefits 
An employee who is unable to perform his job due to illness or injury is entitled 
to compensation for income losses. The applicant needs a statement by a doctor 
or hospital certifying that he is not capable of work. For the first ten working 
days the applicant is fully compensated by the employer, after which he can 
claim a sickness benefit from the Social Insurance Institution (KELA). 
Depending on the collective labour agreement, many employers continue to pay 
wages or salary after the mandatory waiting period of ten working days, in which 
case the allowance is paid to the employer. As a result, the time out of work until 
receipt of a sickness benefit directly from the Social Insurance Institution is 
typically one to three months. The sickness benefit is determined by the past 
taxable earnings, and it can be received for a maximum of about one year (300 
working days, Saturdays included). Depending on illness or disability, the 
applicant’s rehabilitation needs and possibilities are assessed in a more extensive 
medical examination during the sickness benefit period. In case of a prolonged 
illness or permanent disability, the employee can apply for a disability pension. 
An ordinary disability (OD) pension is payable to individuals aged 16 to 64 
whose working capacity has significantly decreased. A full benefit is conditional 
on the working capacity loss of at least 60% and a partial benefit for a loss of 40 
to 59%. When determining eligibility, an individual’s capability to support 
herself by regular work, age, education, occupation, and place of residence are 
taken into account along with the medical assessment. The OD pension can be 
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granted either indefinitely (if return to work is not likely) or for a specific period. 
In the latter case, the OD pension is also referred to as a rehabilitation subsidy or 
a cash rehabilitation benefit, and its receipt is conditional on a rehabilitation plan. 
An OD pension may be discontinued if the working capacity of the recipient 
improves, but this rarely happens among older recipients (e.g. OECD, 2008, p. 
116). There is no automatic retesting of the disability status except for new 
periods of the rehabilitation subsidy. 
An individual early retirement (IER) pension is another disability pension, which 
is available for employees who have a long working career and who are unable to 
continue in their current job because of deteriorated health. Compared with the 
OD pension, eligibility for the IER pension is subject to less strict medical 
criteria. The minimum degree of working incapacity is not defined and 
occupational factors like the length of service and working conditions carry 
greater weight. It suffices that working capacity has reduced to such an extent 
that the person cannot continue in her present job or occupation, so that other 
working possibilities are not considered. Unlike the OD pension however, the 
IER pension is payable only to employees above a certain age threshold. In the 
private sector, there was a uniform age threshold of 55 until 1994 when it was 
raised by three years to 58 for people born in 1940 or later. In 2000 the age 
threshold was raised further by two years to 60 for those born in 1944 or later. In 
2004 the IER scheme was abolished entirely from these same cohorts. At the 
same time the medical criteria for OD pension eligibility were somewhat relaxed 
for people aged 60 and over. 
Saurama (2004) provides some survey evidence that bad health is not the only 
reason for entering into a disability pension in Finland.51 As expected, disability 
pensioners reported bad health as one of the main reasons for retirement, but 
many of them said that straining work played an important role as well. In 
particular, 62% of OD pensioners and 74% of IER pensioners had felt that their 
job had become too exhausting or they could not handle their job any more. A 
notable fraction of the respondents had also felt pressure to retire from the 
management or colleagues: 14% of OD pensioners and 24% of IER pensioners 
were partly forced out of their job. Hence, difficulties in performing job tasks and 
the pressure from the workplace are important factors affecting disability pension 
entry. 
                                              
 
 
51 The target population of the survey was all people who received early retirement benefits at the end of 
1998. The early retirees were asked for their reasons of retiring. The response rate was quite low – only 
51.3% – and young disability pensioners were under-represented. The numbers referred to in the text 
were taken from table 12 in Saurama (2004, p. 132). 
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The purpose of the gradual abolition of the IER pension was to reduce the 
disability enrolment rates at higher ages. This reform made the medical 
requirements for disability pension eligibility tougher for the later cohorts who 
have been able to apply only for the OD pension, and thereby should reduce the 
flow into disability pension benefits among those who are not truly disabled. 
Because only those employees born after 1939 (1994 reform) or after 1943 (2000 
reform) were affected, these reforms provide us with a quasi-experimental setting 
for studying the importance of the stringency of medical screening. 
4.3.2 Experience rating of disability pension benefits 
A particular feature of the Finnish disability scheme is that employers are 
partially liable for the disability pension costs of their former employees via 
experience-rated employer contributions. Experience rating is not applied to 
firms with fewer than 50 (300 until 1995) employees, which pay a fixed tariff 
rate for each employee. The larger firms are partially covered by experience-
rated contributions and partially by fixed (age-dependent) tariff rates. The 
employer subject to experience rating must pay its share of the present value of 
disability pension costs at the time when a disability pension is awarded to its 
former employee. Given that disability pension costs can accumulate over several 
years until the person reaches age 65 and transfers to an old-age pension, the 
disability event can become very costly for the former employer in the case of a 
large firm. 
To be more specific, consider an employee i of firm j who is awarded a disability 
pension in year t. Therefore, his employer has to make a lump-sum contribution 
equal to 
 , , 1 ,( ) ( ) ,j i j t i t iC size age bα γ−=  (20) 
where bi is an annual disability pension benefit, g is the present-value multiplier 
and α is the degree of experience-rating applied to firm j. The product of pension 
benefit bi and multiplier g serves as an estimate of the present value of expected 
disability pension benefits up to the age when the entitlement to an old-age 
pension begins.52 The multiplier g is a decreasing function of worker’s age at the 
time of disability retirement, ranging from 9.66 at age 50 to 2.31 at age 62 for the 
groups analysed in this study. 
                                              
 
 
52 We obtained the values of γ from a pension institution. All pension institutions use the same values. 
The multiplier is determined by the average duration of disability pension receipt of persons who are 
granted a disability pension at a given age. It also accounts for the (average) probability that the person 
returns to work and the (average) survival probability until age 65. 
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The realized marginal cost of a disability retirement entry depends crucially on 
the degree of experience-rating a, which is determined by the size of the firm’s 
workforce in year t – 1. Until 1995, a was 0 for all firms with fewer than 300 
employees. In these firms the pension contributions were independent of the 
retirement events of their employees and, consequently, the marginal cost of 
disability retirement was 0. For the larger firms, a increased as a linear function 
of firm size from zero (300 employees) to one (1000 employees); see Figure 4.1. 
In other words, the largest firms with at least 1000 employees were fully liable 
for the expected disability pension costs of their former employees. 
During the time period under investigation, the experience rating scheme 
changed twice. In 1996 the experience rating scheme was first extended to cover 
also firms with 50 to 299 employees. A smaller reform took place in 2000 when 
the maximum liability share was limited to 0.8. As a result of the two reforms, 
the degree of experience-rating varies across firms of a given size over time, 
which can be seen in Figure 4.1. By exploiting this variation for identification, 
we can distinguish the effect of experience-rating from the firm size effect. 
Figure 4.1 The degree of experience-rating (a) as a function of firm size in 
different periods 
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To highlight the size of disability costs for the employer, consider a worker who 
is awarded a disability pension at age 55 g ≈ 7.22. Assuming the pension benefit 
equals 55% of the past annual salary, which is true on average, the maximum 
disability cost for the former employer would be as much as four times the 
annual salary (i.e. α = 1 for a firm with over 1000 employees before 2000). In the 
case of a firm with 400 employees, the disability cost would correspond either to 
7 months’ salary (pre-1996 rules) or 18 months’ salary (rules from 1996 
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onwards). Hence, it is evident that the disability costs for the former employers 
can be quite large, and that these costs changed substantially due to the two 
reforms.53 
The aim of experience-rating is to minimize the employer’s moral hazard 
problem by placing costs on those firms whose employees enter the disability 
pension schemes. When an employee applies for a disability pension, the 
employer has no direct control over the decision made by the pension institution. 
Nevertheless, the employer has the means to influence indirectly the flow into 
sick leave and the likelihood that recipients of sickness benefits will return to 
work rather than retire via a disability pension scheme. If effective, experience 
rating should induce the employer to take preventive measures to minimize the 
flow into sick leave (the ex ante effect), as well as to put effort into getting its 
employees back to work from sick leave (the ex post effect). The preventive 
action may involve reallocation of the workload to minimize stress-related illness 
and arrangements that reduce accidents at the workplace. When helping people 
come back to work from sick leave, occupational rehabilitation and job 
modifications that allow the switching of jobs within the firm are crucial for 
those who cannot perform their old tasks despite medical rehabilitation. 
4.4 Data and descriptive evidence 
Our data set was drawn from the records of the Finnish Longitudinal Employer-
Employee Database (FLEED). Employee information in the database is obtained 
by merging information from over 20 administrative registers with unique 
personal identity numbers. The database covers effectively everyone with a 
permanent residence in Finland. Along with standard socio-demographic 
background variables, the database includes detailed information on annual 
income (from the tax authorities), job spells (from the pension institutes), 
unemployment spells and participation in labour market programmes (from the 
employment offices). For people who are employed in the last week of a given 
year, the ES database also includes the unique identification code of the firm and 
establishment. This allows us to identify individuals who are working for the 
same employer and provides a link to firm records. Thus we are able to measure 
labour turnover and employment changes at establishment and firm levels. 
The principal source of firm records in the FLEED is the Financial Statements 
Statistics (FSS), which is an annual survey conducted by Statistics Finland. The 
                                              
 
 
53 It is worth noting that the Finnish experience-rating system differs from the Dutch one studied by 
Koning (2009) at least in the following ways: 1) the employer’s liability is not limited to the first five 
years of disability benefit costs, 2) the disability event causes a lump-sum payment, having no effect on 
the pension contributions thereafter, and 3) the degree of experience-rating varies much more across firms 
of different size. 
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survey contains corporate income statement and balance sheet data on firms in 
manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale trade, business services, hotel 
and restaurant services, and transportation. This data is available with time 
consistent variable definitions for the period 1986−2005. All firms above a 
certain size threshold, which varies between the sectors and over time, have been 
included in the survey. Until 1996 also a sample of smaller firms was included in 
the survey, but since then Statistics Finland has collected information on the 
small firms only from the administrative registers. So, the survey data for the 
later years have been complemented by adding firm records from the Business 
Tax Register with more limited information content but covering all firms in the 
private sector. The combined survey-register data should be dynamically 
representative over all firms in each year, although some small firms are missing 
from the first six years of our observation period. 
Some key variables in the employee data contain information on sickness 
benefits, paid by KELA during the year, and on the types of pension benefits 
received at the last week of the year. These are used to detect transitions into sick 
leave and disability retirement. As discussed above, employees on sick leave are 
fully compensated by their employers for the first ten days to three months, 
depending on the collective labour agreement under which they are employed. 
Hence, receipt of sickness benefits directly from KELA indicates a prolonged 
illness. 
We can distinguish between OD and IER pension benefits, but we do not know 
the compensation level (partial or full benefit), or whether a disability pension 
was granted indefinitely or for a specific period. We classify an employee as 
being on a disability pension if he or she received either OD or IER pension 
benefits at the last week of the year. 
4.4.1 Incidence of disability retirement 
We begin by considering the extent of the disability problem in Finland. While 
the official retirement age was 65 until 200554, the effective retirement age – the 
average age of new pensioners – has been around 60 due to early retirement 
schemes, of which the disability schemes are the most important ones. In 2007 a 
roughly equal number of new pensioners were granted a disability pension and 
an old-age pension, but a few years earlier the disability pension was the most 
common pathway to retirement. This explains why disability expenditures are so 
high in Finland compared with other industrialized countries. 
                                              
 
 
54 The ordinary old-age pension was available for people older than 61 but only those entering at age 65 
received the full benefits. Since 2005, employees have been able to choose freely at which age between 
63 and 68 they begin to collect the old-age pension benefits. 
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Figure 4.2 Population share of disability pensioners by birth year 
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Note: Age at the end of the year used as a marker for men. Numbers for 1995 are not shown due to data 
errors. Source: Authors’ calculations from the FLEED. 
 
A high incidence of disability is illustrated in Figure 4.2 where the disability 
enrolment rates (including both OD and IER pension recipients) are shown as a 
function of age for four birth cohorts by sex.55 Within all birth cohorts, women 
have lower enrolment rates at each age. 
Compared with the later cohorts, employees born in 1940 are more likely to be 
disabled at all ages. Close to 30% of this cohort were on a disability pension at 
age 60, which is a strikingly large figure. There are no notable differences in 
disability rates at a given age between the 1945, 1950 and 1955 cohorts. To some 
extent the lower disability rates for these cohorts may be related to their 
ineligibility for the IER pension scheme. 
4.4.2 Outcome variables for analysis of transitions 
We distinguish the likelihood of entering sick leave, which often means only 
temporary absence from work, from the likelihood of being granted a disability 
pension, which almost surely means a permanent withdrawal from the labour 
                                              
 
 
55 Statistics Finland changed its procedure of merging register data on pension benefits in 1995. This led 
to an unexplained (small) drop in the number of disability pension recipients in the FLEED for that year, 
reflecting some technical problems. For that reason we chose to break the time series in 1995. 
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market. The determinants of these events can differ and be affected by 
experience rating in different ways. Hence, we shall model transitions from work 
to a disability pension, from work to sick leave, and from sick leave to a 
disability pension. This approach ignores possible spill over effects toward other 
exit destinations, most notably into unemployment, which should be kept in mind 
when interpreting our results. 
In all of our models the risk set in year t includes employees who (i) were 50 to 
62 years old at the end of year t – 1, (ii) held a job at the end of year t – 1 in a 
private-sector firm with at least ten employees, (iii) had been working, without 
receiving any pension benefits, at least for three consecutive years (i.e. from the 
beginning of year t – 3 until the end of year t – 1), and (iv) did not receive 
sickness benefits during year t – 1. 56  We exclude the younger and older 
employees because their transitions into disability retirement are very rare. 
Moreover, for younger employees it is probably very difficult to be granted a 
disability pension without serious injury or illness, whereas the older employees 
can retire via other early retirement schemes, suggesting that the misuse of the 
disability pension schemes is not a serious issue for these groups. We also 
exclude employees from firms with less than ten employees, as the data on very 
small firms is noisy. 
Transitions to disability pension. Because receipt of a disability pension 
typically follows a sick leave and/or rehabilitation measures, there is a gap 
between the job withdrawal, which is of our primary interest, and actual entry 
into disability pension benefits. To detect the year when the process towards 
disability retirement started, we follow each person at risk in year t for the next 
three years (two years from 2002). The employee is classified as becoming 
disabled in year t if her working career was interrupted during that year and she 
was granted a disability pension by the end of year t + 2, without being 
unemployed or employed in the another firm in meantime.57 In other words, we 
are interested in transitions from a given workplace to disability retirement, but 
allow for periods of sick leave and rehabilitation between these two events. The 
majority of disability pensions following job withdrawal in year t are granted 
during year t (46%) or t + 1 (48%), while the number of entries into disability 
retirement drops sharply in year t + 2. A few pensions are also granted at the later 
                                              
 
 
56 The cost of disability pension is borne by the former employer (according to the experience-rating rules 
concerning firm size) only when the employment relationship has lasted for a minimum of three years. 
We also include workers who changed their jobs within 3-year period but control for job tenure in the 
probability models. Excluding these workers from the analysis does not notably affect our results. 
57 Receipt of a disability pension is not observed for some people in 1995 due to the change in the 
procedure of merging the underlying register data. Using the 3-year moving window for transitions to 
disability pension also minimizes this problem. 
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periods but we think that assigning them to the employer at the end of year t – 1 
is too unreliable and hence we discard those cases. 
Transitions to sick leave. Receipt of an OD pension typically follows a one-year 
period on sickness benefits, and therefore almost all OD pensioners have been on 
sick leave before retiring. However, some employees have retired directly via the 
IER scheme without being on sickness benefits first. Since deteriorated health is 
a prerequisite for receipt of an IER pension as well (and since short spells of 
sickness benefits are not observed in the data), also these employees are 
classified as entering sick leave in the year when the pension was granted. Thus, 
an employee at risk in year t moves into sick leave during that year if he started 
to collect sickness benefits or was granted a disability pension during year t even 
without actually receiving sickness benefits. About a quarter of workers who 
were awarded a disability pension did not receive sickness benefits. However, 
apart from the effect of IER pension eligibility, our estimates appear to be fairly 
robust with respect to the treatment of this group. 
Transitions from sick leave to disability pension. When modelling the 
likelihood of being granted a disability pension conditional on being on sickness 
benefits, the risk set in year t includes only those employees who started to 
collect sickness benefits during year t, including also those who were granted a 
disability pension without a period of sick leave. 
Illustration. Four possible labour histories are shown in Figure 4.3. Each of 
these persons is at risk of making a transition to disability retirement and to sick 
leave in year t. Employees A, B and C withdrew from work in year t and were 
granted a disability pension by the end of year t + 2. According to our definition, 
they made a transition from work to disability retirement in year t (Dt = 1). Since 
employees A and D received sickness benefits and employee C started to collect 
disability pension benefits in year t, they are also classified as entering sick leave 
in that year (St = 1). When modelling transitions from sick leave to disability 
retirement, employees A, C and D would be included in the risk set in year t, but 
not employee B who was out of work for an unknown reason. 
Figure 4.3 Examples of labour market histories for persons at risk in year t. 
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4.4.3 Sample design for modelling transition rates 
The transition probabilities (or rates) defined above are closely interrelated but 
not perfectly. Namely, it holds that 
Pr( 1) Pr( 1)Pr( 1| 1), 1991,1992,...,2002,t t t tD S D S t= ≥ = = = =  
where Pr(Dt = 1) denotes the likelihood of starting disability retirement (by the 
end of year t + 2) due to job withdrawal in year t, Pr(St = 1) is the likelihood of 
entering sick leave in year t and Pr(Dt = 1 | St = 1) is the likelihood that a sick 
leave starting in year t eventually lead to disability retirement. It should be 
stressed that employees whose working career was interrupted without receipt of 
sickness benefits in year t and who were granted a disability pension in year t + 1 
or t + 2 contribute to the event on the left-hand side of the equation but not to the 
events on the right-hand side (e.g. person B in Figure 4.3). As a result, the 
product of the two probabilities on the right-hand side is typically less than the 
overall disability probability on the left-hand side. Nevertheless, the product of 
Pr(St = 1) and Pr(Dt = 1 | St = 1) gives a useful decomposition for Pr(Dt = 1) 
although its approximate nature should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
results. By comparing the determinants of Pr(St = 1) and Pr(Dt = 1 | St = 1), we 
aim at making a distinction between the ex ante and ex post effects of the 
covariates of interest. 
Our estimation samples include all employees who are at risk of making a 
transition of interest between the years 1991 and 2002. The sample period ends 
in 2002, because when detecting the timing of job withdrawals, we have to be 
able to follow employees at risk at least for the next two or three years. The first 
period is 1991 because the FLEED employee data are available from 1988 
onwards and we need employee records from the past three years to construct the 
worker flow variables. Our samples are rotating panels where in each year new 
employees enter the risk set while some old ones leave it. 
4.4.4 Raw transition rates 
Table 4.1 reports the sizes of the risk groups and the raw transition rates by age. 
All transition rates increase almost uniformly with age. The likelihood of a 
transition to sick leave becomes five times larger while the likelihood of being 
granted a disability pension grows eightfold from age 50 to 62. This is explained 
by the fact that employees are less likely to return to work from sick leave at 
older ages, as seen in the last column. The transition rate from sick leave to 
disability retirement is strikingly high at all ages; one-half of sickness benefit 
recipients aged 50, and four in five above age 58, do not return to work but end 
up in disability retirement. 
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Table 4.1 Transition rates and the size of risk groups by age 
Age N Pr(D = 1) Pr(S = 1)  R Pr(D = 1 | S = 1) 
50 126,677 0.007 0.012  1,517 0.483 
51 120,358 0.008 0.012  1,496 0.499 
52 115,200 0.010 0.015  1,673 0.546 
53 107,084 0.013 0.017  1,805 0.576 
54 97,444 0.018 0.023  2,227 0.599 
55 80,917 0.021 0.026  2,119 0.640 
56 66,223 0.025 0.027  1,821 0.661 
57 52,680 0.033 0.034  1,812 0.728 
58 40,484 0.038 0.036  1,463 0.759 
59 30,803 0.051 0.045  1,382 0.815 
60 22,044 0.055 0.047  1,040 0.845 
61 16,456 0.061 0.053  869 0.826 
62 10,976 0.059 0.058  634 0.841 
All 887,346 0.019 0.022  19,858 0.655 
Notes: N is the size of the risk group for transitions to disability retirement and sick leave. R is the size of 
the risk group for transitions from sick leave to disability retirement. Pr(D = 1) is the probability of a 
transition to disability retirement. Pr(S = 1) is the probability of a transition to sick leave. Pr(D = 1 | S = 1) 
is the probability of a transition to disability retirement conditional on being on sick leave. 
 
It is noteworthy that the size of the group at risk of entering sick leave or 
becoming disabled declines rapidly with age. While the total number of 
employees at risk is about 127,000 at age 50, the group at risk halves by age 56 
and includes only 11,000 employees at age 62. This declining age pattern reflects 
the fact that people tend to withdraw from employment quite early. In particular, 
it is rather common for private-sector employees to end up in long-term 
unemployment at older ages because employees above a certain age threshold at 
the time of unemployment entry can collect earnings-related unemployment 
insurance benefits until retirement at age 60 via the unemployment pension 
scheme (see e.g. Kyyrä and Wilke, 2007). 
Because of the experience-rating system, variation in the transition rates across 
firms of different sizes is of particular interest. In Table 4.2, employees are 
classified into four groups according to the size of their employer at the end of 
year t – 1. As seen in the last column, there are no systematic differences in the 
transition rates to sick leave or disability retirement in firms with 1000 or fewer 
employees. However, in the largest firms the transition rate to both sick leave and 
disability retirement is notably higher than in the smaller firms. The experience-
rating of disability pension expenditures, which devotes higher cost shares for 
larger firms, would have implied the opposite. Moreover, the transition rate from 
sick leave to disability retirement does not vary with firm size, giving no support 
for the ex post effect of experience-rating. 
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Table 4.2 Transition rates by firm size and establishment growth 
 Establishment’s growth category   
 Past period from t – 4 to t – 1 Current period from t – 1 to t + 2   
Firm size Contracting Stable Expanding Contracting Stable Expanding  All 
          
From work to disability retirement, Pr(D = 1)        
5–50 0.016 0.017 0.016  0.016 0.016 0.016  0.016
51–300 0.020 0.018 0.017  0.019 0.019 0.016  0.018
301–1000 0.019 0.018 0.016  0.019 0.018 0.018  0.018
> 1000 0.023 0.022 0.022  0.023 0.022 0.023  0.022
All 0.020 0.020 0.018  0.020 0.019 0.019  0.019
     
From work to sick leave, Pr(S = 1)        
5–50 0.019 0.020 0.019  0.019 0.020 0.019  0.020
51–300 0.021 0.021 0.019  0.022 0.021 0.018  0.021
301–1000 0.022 0.021 0.019  0.023 0.020 0.020  0.021
> 1000 0.028 0.026 0.025  0.027 0.025 0.027  0.026
All 0.023 0.023 0.021  0.023 0.022 0.022  0.022
     
From sick leave to disability retirement, 
Pr(D = 1 | S = 1)  
      
5–50 0.594 0.615 0.574  0.606 0.605 0.574  0.598
51–300 0.703 0.659 0.645  0.676 0.669 0.640  0.666
301–1000 0.675 0.667 0.655  0.655 0.666 0.683  0.666
> 1000 0.656 0.672 0.643  0.671 0.667 0.632  0.662
All 0.661 0.661 0.634  0.659 0.660 0.631  0.655
Establishments were divided into contracting, stable and growing ones according to 3-year growth rates 
from t – 4 to t – 1 and from t – 1 to t + 2. In contracting establishments the growth rate was below –0.1, in 
stable ones between [–0.1, 0.15) and in growing ones greater or equal to 0.15. 
 
There are reasons why disability and sick leave entries may be associated with 
current or past employment changes at the workplace. The past employment 
reductions can lead to added stress at the workplace such as reduced control over 
one’s chores and increased workload and job insecurity. This could cause health 
problems for those who kept their jobs (e.g. Vahtera et al., 2005). Encouraging 
disability retirement of older employees can be a helpful strategy in downsizing 
and restructuring endeavours of a firm, suggesting that there might be a 
relationship between the current growth rate and disability incidence.58 Since the 
                                              
 
 
58 A recent study by Gielen and Van Ours (2006) analyses age differences in job reallocation and labour 
mobility using matched worker-firm data for the Netherlands. They find that firms adjust their workforce 
mainly via entry for young and prime-age workers, but via separations for older workers. Furthermore, 
employment of old workers is found to be more responsive to firm-specific employment changes. 
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difficulties of laying off older employees probably vary with business conditions, 
the disability entry rates can also vary between downsizing and expansion 
periods. 
To address these questions we examine the relationship between the transition 
probabilities and the past and current growth rates of employment. The growth 
rates are measured over three-year periods to smooth out annual noise in 
employment variation, and because retirement decisions are hardly based on 
yearly variation. Following the job and worker flow literature, we define the 
growth rate as , , ,t s t se eΔ  where ste ,Δ  is the employment change from year t to 
year s in a given establishment, and ,t se  is the average employment level in years 
t and s. The growth rates defined in this way can take values on the interval 
[−2, 2]. Employment is measured by the number of employees in the 
establishment at the end of the year. Since employees at risk in year t were by 
construction all still employed at the end of year t – 1, the past growth rate is 
computed over the period from year t – 4 to year t – 1. With the current growth 
rate we refer to the employment change from year t – 1 to year t + 2, as the 
possible transition to disability retirement must take place by the end of year 
t + 2. 
We believe that labour demand conditions are best described by employment 
changes in the establishment for those who are employed in large firms with 
multiple establishments. Therefore, we consider employment variation at 
establishment level, even though we control the size of the personnel at firm 
level. In Table 4.2, employees are further divided into groups according to the 
past and current growth rate of the establishment at which they worked at the end 
of year t – 1 Establishments whose growth rate lies on the interval [−0.10, 0.15) 
are labelled to be ‘stable’ as opposed to contracting and expanding ones. The 
average growth during the period under investigation was slightly below 0.05, so 
that the contracting and expanding establishments are defined in comparison to 
the growth trend. 
First of all, note that our finding that the transition rates to sick leave and 
disability retirement are highest for the employees of firms with over 1000 
employees holds also when we are conditioning on the past or current 
employment growth category. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the transition rates 
does seem to be sensitive with respect to the past or current growth rates. 
Differences in the transition rates between employees at contracting, expanding 
and stable establishments are generally very small, and do not exhibit consistent 
patterns. These results should not be taken as conclusive, however, since it is 
possible that compositional differences in the older workforce across firms of 
different size, and establishments in different growth categories mask the 
underlying true relationships. 
104  Institutional rules, disability programmes and labour demand 
4.5 Determinants of transition rates 
We apply pooled-data logit models to study the determinants of the transition 
rates. The results from our baseline specification for individual-specific and 
employer-specific covariates are shown in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, respectively. 
We report the odds ratios for dummy variables and the marginal effects for all 
covariates along with standard errors that are robust to clustering to account for 
correlation across individuals working in the same establishment. The marginal 
effects are computed for an average person of the risk group.59 We begin our 
discussion with the impact of individual background characteristics. Then we 
proceed to the parameters of primary interest, describing the effects of the 
strictness of medical criteria, experience rating and growth rates. 
4.5.1 Individual characteristics 
As seen in Table 4.3, the transition rate to sick leave and disability retirement 
increases strongly with age. For example, the likelihood of entering sick leave is 
3.6 percentage points higher at age 62 than at age 50. The difference in the 
likelihood of becoming disabled grows faster with age and is almost six 
percentage points higher at 62. These are relatively large increases as the general 
level of the transition rates is rather low. The average probabilities of entries into 
sick leave and disability retirement are around 2.2% and 1.9% per year, 
respectively, as shown in Table 4.3. In terms of the odds ratios, the effect of age 
on the transition rate from sick leave to disability retirement is largely similar to 
the effect on the transition rate from work to sick leave. 
Women are less likely to move into sick leave and more likely to return to work 
from sick leave, leading to a lower transition rate to disability retirement. This 
finding is in line with women’s lower incidence of disability in Figure 4.2. The 
likelihood of being granted a disability pension decreases uniformly with 
education. The odds of becoming a disability pension recipient is 0.45 for an 
employee with a Master’s degree or higher compared with an otherwise similar 
employee with a basic education, which corresponds to a 1.2 percentage point 
lower annual risk of becoming disabled. Education has no effect on the 
likelihood of returning to work from sick leave. Hence, the lower risk of 
disability for the educated people is explained by their lower transition rates to 
sick leave. 
                                              
 
 
59 The risk group for transitions from sick leave to disability retirement is different from that for other 
transitions, and thereby the marginal effects are evaluated at the different values of the covariates. This 
does not, however, alter our interpretation of covariate effects. 
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Table 4.3 Odds ratios and marginal effects for individual-specific 
covariates from baseline logit models 
 Probability of a transition to 
 Disability Sick leave Db from sick 
 Odds ME Odds ME Odds ME 
Relaxed medical criteria a)  1.6623 0.0102 1.6169 0.0116 1.7359 0.0980
 (0.0558) (0.0009) (0.0526) (0.0010) (0.1310) (0.0122)
1(sickness benefits > 0 at t – 2) 2.1834 0.0207 2.3665 0.0272 1.0112 0.0021
 (0.0865) (0.0015) (0.0780) (0.0015) (0.0769) (0.0140)
Sickness benefit share b) at t – 2  0.0172 0.0126  0.1120
 (0.0042) (0.0046)  (0.0932)
1(sickness benefits > 0 at t – 3) 1.9276 0.0166 2.0315 0.0210 1.0359 0.0065
 (0.0654) (0.0012) (0.0602) (0.0012) (0.0664) (0.0117)
1(sickness benefits > 0 at t – 4) 1.7393 0.0134 1.8566 0.0177 0.9806 -0.0036
 (0.0678) (0.0012) (0.0615) (0.0012) (0.0645) (0.0122)
Age 51 1.1286 0.0025 1.0419 0.0009 1.0981 0.0171
 (0.0536) (0.0010) (0.0384) (0.0009) (0.0868) (0.0142)
Age 52 1.4233 0.0079 1.1866 0.0041 1.2833 0.0447
 (0.0645) (0.0012) (0.0429) (0.0009) (0.0990) (0.0133)
Age 53 1.7575 0.0137 1.3616 0.0078 1.4831 0.0695
 (0.0766) (0.0014) (0.0478) (0.0010) (0.1147) (0.0128)
Age 54 2.1906 0.0207 1.6736 0.0140 1.3776 0.0569
 (0.0961) (0.0016) (0.0604) (0.0012) (0.1065) (0.0131)
Age 55 2.5413 0.0263 1.8173 0.0168 1.5441 0.0758
 (0.1102) (0.0018) (0.0652) (0.0013) (0.1209) (0.0127)
Age 56 2.8782 0.0317 1.8498 0.0175 1.5959 0.0810
 (0.1270) (0.0020) (0.0709) (0.0014) (0.1309) (0.0132)
Age 57 2.9619 0.0329 1.9254 0.0190 1.6309 0.0844
 (0.1523) (0.0024) (0.0827) (0.0016) (0.1547) (0.0150)
Age 58 3.1944 0.0368 1.9852 0.0203 1.7368 0.0941
 (0.1715) (0.0027) (0.0914) (0.0018) (0.1964) (0.0173)
Age 59 4.1360 0.0508 2.2305 0.0252 2.1010 0.1223
 (0.2288) (0.0034) (0.1180) (0.0023) (0.2737) (0.0185)
Age 60 4.4331 0.0558 2.3901 0.0284 2.4589 0.1436
 (0.2580) (0.0038) (0.1306) (0.0025) (0.3418) (0.0182)
Age 61 4.8180 0.0618 2.4240 0.0292 2.6995 0.1553
 (0.2894) (0.0042) (0.1403) (0.0027) (0.3982) (0.0184)
Age 62 4.4704 0.0576 2.7432 0.0355 2.4032 0.1399
 (0.2967) (0.0044) (0.1679) (0.0032) (0.3806) (0.0210)
  
Continued on the next page   
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 Probability of a transition to 
 Disability Sick leave Db from sick 
 Odds ME Odds ME Odds ME 
Female 0.7456 -0.0056 0.8232 -0.0043 0.6938 -0.0685
 (0.0164) (0.0004) (0.0160) (0.0004) (0.0343) (0.0098)
High school 0.9007 -0.0021 0.9157 -0.0021 0.9176 -0.0159
 (0.0173) (0.0004) (0.0158) (0.0004) (0.0366) (0.0075)
Lowest tertiary 0.6686 -0.0073 0.6049 -0.0101 1.0299 0.0054
 (0.0226) (0.0005) (0.0189) (0.0005) (0.0723) (0.0127)
Bachelor 0.5112 -0.0108 0.4553 -0.0140 0.8765 -0.0245
 (0.0262) (0.0006) (0.0224) (0.0006) (0.1069) (0.0231)
Master’s or higher 0.4494 -0.0122 0.4061 -0.0153 0.8670 -0.0266
 (0.0335) (0.0008) (0.0282) (0.0008) (0.1606) (0.0352)
Foreign language 0.5278 -0.0094 0.7669 -0.0053 0.6269 -0.0909
 (0.0764) (0.0016) (0.0844) (0.0019) (0.1579) (0.0512)
Wage position c)  -0.0087 -0.0061  -0.1186
 (0.0010) (0.0010)  (0.0186)
 Log(earnings) -0.0005 -0.0055  0.0901
 (0.0008) (0.0008)  (0.0178)
Spouse working 0.9815 -0.0003 0.9467 -0.0012 1.0859 0.0153
 (0.0181) (0.0003) (0.0160) (0.0004) (0.0430) (0.0073)
Spouse retired 1.3619 0.0066 1.2696 0.0059 1.2539 0.0413
 (0.0313) (0.0006) (0.0278) (0.0006) (0.0688) (0.0097)
Tenure 0.0001 0.0000  0.0017
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0004)
Notes: The models also include controls for year, industry and living region. The reference employee is a 
50-year-old single man who has completed only basic education, speaks Finnish or Swedish as his mother 
tongue, and worked at the end of year t – 1 in an establishment with 10 to 50 employees. Robust standard 
errors in (parentheses). Significantly non-unit odds ratios and non-zero marginal effects in bold (95%-
confidence level) or in italics (90%-confidence level). a) Dummy for those who may be granted an IER 
pension by the end of year t. b) The share of sickness benefits of taxable labour income. c) Employee’s 
position in the establishment’s wage distribution, ranging from 0 for the lowest wage to 1 for the highest 
wage. 
 
Employees holding better jobs at the workplace, as measured by their position in 
the wage distribution, have a lower risk of disability retirement because they are 
less likely to end up on sick leave and more likely to return to work from sick 
leave. Family background also matters. Compared with singles, employees 
whose spouse is still working have a slightly lower probability of sick leave but a 
higher probability of moving from sick leave to a disability pension. It appears 
that employees with a retired spouse are the most likely to enter sick leave and 
the least likely to return to work from sick leave. This may indicate that 
employees with a retired spouse value their leisure time more than the other 
groups. Alternatively, their spouses may require special attention at home if they 
suffer from health problems. 
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Unfortunately, our data do not contain direct measures of health. To approximate 
health history we exploit information on the amount of sickness benefits 
collected in the past years. By construction, the employee at risk in year t did not 
receive sickness benefits in year t – 1. For year t – 2 we add a dummy variable 
indicating whether the employee received sickness benefits, as well as the share 
of sickness benefits of taxable labour income as a proxy for the fraction of the 
time spent on sick leave during that year.60 For the next two years, we also add 
dummy variables indicating receipt of sickness benefits. Not surprisingly, receipt 
of sickness benefits in the past increases the transition rates to sick leave and to 
disability retirement. Having been on sick leave in year t – 2 raises the likelihood 
of becoming disabled at least by 2.1 percentage points, the overall effect 
depending on the time spent on sickness benefits. Conditional on being on sick 
leave, past sickness history has no effect on the likelihood of being granted a 
disability pension. 
4.5.2 Strictness of medical criteria 
In 1994 the age threshold for the IER retirement scheme was increased from 55 
to 58 for workers born in 1940 or later. In 2000 the entire scheme was effectively 
abolished from all private-sector employees born in 1944 or later. Given a 
relatively low emphasis on medical factors when determining eligibility for IER 
pensions, these reforms can be viewed as increases in the stringency of medical 
screening for the disability status. It is worth emphasizing that the oldest affected 
employees were below the pre-reform age thresholds at the time of the reforms. 
This rules out anticipation behaviour towards IER pensions, providing us with a 
quasi-experimental setting for evaluating the impact of the medical criteria. More 
specifically, we exploit the changes in the criteria by including a time-varying 
dummy variable that equals one for employees born before 1940 who were at 
least 54 years old at the end of year t – 1 and for those born between 1940 and 
1943 who were at least 57 years old at the end of year t – 1 (Relaxed medical 
criteria in Table 4.3). These groups of employees can potentially qualify for IER 
pension benefits by the end of year t, so that their disability pension applications 
are subject to the less strict medical assessment compared with all other 
employees. 
Being eligible to apply for an IER pension clearly raises all three transition rates. 
The odds of entering sick leave is 1.6, implying a 1.2 percentage point higher 
transition rate to sick leave for an employee who can apply for an IER pension 
benefit than for an otherwise similar non-eligible employee. Conditional on being 
                                              
 
 
60 This is not an accurate measure because the waiting time until the receipt of sickness benefits from 
KELA can vary between employees, and because the amount of a sickness benefit is determined as a 
decreasing fraction of the past earnings. 
108  Institutional rules, disability programmes and labour demand 
on sickness benefits, the IER pension scheme increases the likelihood of being 
granted a disability pension by 9.8 percentage points. The overall probability of 
moving to the disability pension track is one percentage point higher for 
employees with an option to apply for an IER pension. Not surprisingly, these 
estimates are somewhat sensitive with respect to the treatment of workers who 
moved directly from work to disability retirement without receiving sickness 
benefits first. If these workers are removed from the pool of sickness benefit 
recipients, the impact of IER scheme eligibility becomes weaker: its effect on the 
odds of entering sick leave drops to 1.3 (and the associated marginal effect to 
0.0046) and that on the odds of moving from a sick leave to disability retirement 
reduces to 1.2 (and the marginal effect to 0.0327). Nevertheless, all the effects 
remain statistically significant at the conventional confidence levels, implying 
that our qualitative results are robust. Overall, our findings are in accordance 
with Börsch-Supan’s (2007) conclusion that the strictness by which vocational 
considerations (at the expense of medical criteria) are applied when determining 
eligibility for disability pension benefits is strongly related to disability pension 
incidence. 
4.5.3 Experience rating 
Next we turn to the effects of the covariates that are closely related to the 
experience-rated contributions: firm size, disability cost and equity ratio. The 
first determines the degree of experience-rating but could have an effect on its 
own. The second measures the expected lump-sum payment the employer has to 
pay in the case the employee is granted a disability pension in year t. This 
marginal cost of the disability event is a function of the worker’s age, disability 
pension benefit (determined by earnings history) and the degree of experience-
rating applied to the employer (determined by firm size in a given year).61 As we 
control for age, earnings, firm size and year fixed effects in the model, the effect 
of disability cost is identified by the two reforms in the experience rating scheme 
that were described in section 3.2. The third variable, the equity ratio, measures 
the firm’s ability to incur disability pension costs. 
The model includes three dummy variables for the size of the employing firm at 
the end of year t – 1. The smallest firms with 10 to 50 employees, which were not 
subject to the experience-rated contributions in any year, serve as the reference 
category. This size categorization is relatively coarse, but our results are not 
sensitive with respect to different specifications of the firm size effects. As seen 
in Table 4.4, the likelihood of a transition from work to sick leave increases with 
                                              
 
 
61 The disability costs are estimated using the formula in equation (1). Since the true level of the disability 
pension benefit is not known, we assume the pension benefit would be a fixed per cent (55%) of the 
annual earnings. 
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firm size, being significantly higher for the largest firms. Namely, an employee 
of a firm with over 1000 employees has a 0.9 percentage point higher risk of 
entering sick leave per year than an otherwise similar person in a firm with 50 or 
fewer employees. 
Table 4.4 Odds ratios and marginal effects for employer-specific 
covariates from baseline logit models 
 Probability of a transition to 
 Disability Sick leave Db from sick 
 Odds ME Odds ME Odds ME 
Log(disability cost) -0.0007 -0.0006  -0.0106 
 (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0022) 
Equity ratio a) 0.0037 -0.0009  0.0948 
 (0.0012) (0.0011)  (0.0196) 
Past employment growth 0.0003 0.0000  -0.0018 
from t – 4 to t – 1 (0.0005) (0.0005)  (0.0102) 
Current employment growth -0.0007 -0.0007  0.0115 
from t – 1 to t + 2 (0.0005) (0.0005)  (0.0101) 
Past excess worker turnover 0.0000 0.0000  -0.0224 
from t – 4 to t – 1 (0.0012) (0.0014)  (0.0237) 
Current excess worker turnover 0.0046 0.0040  0.0812 
from t – 1 to t + 2 (0.0012) (0.0012)  (0.0244) 
Log(turnover) 0.0009 0.0005  0.0132 
 (0.0003) (0.0003)  (0.0049) 
Establishment closure at t 0.4327 -0.0113 0.5405 -0.0105 0.4989 -0.1380 
 (0.0571) (0.0012) (0.0676) (0.0016) (0.1410) (0.0589) 
Firm size 51–300 1.1753 0.0028 1.2396 0.0042 1.2889 0.0470 
 (0.0644) (0.0010) (0.0613) (0.0011) (0.1504) (0.0209) 
Firm size 301–1000 1.1408 0.0023 1.2847 0.0049 1.1288 0.0228 
 (0.0950) (0.0015) (0.0926) (0.0016) (0.1836) (0.0302) 
Firm size > 1000 1.3371 0.0054 1.5206 0.0089 1.0971 0.0175 
 (0.1249) (0.0020) (0.1229) (0.0021) (0.1988) (0.0339) 
Mean age of employees 0.0000 -0.0001  0.0011 
 (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0012) 
   
N observations 887,321 887,321 19,858  
N establishments 28,961 28,961 7,438  
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.079 0.219  
Notes: The models also include controls for year, industry and living region. The reference employee is a 
50-year-old single man who has completed only basic education, speaks Finnish or Swedish as his mother 
tongue, and worked at the end of year t – 1 in an establishment with 10 to 50 employees. Robust standard 
errors in (parentheses). Significantly non-unit odds ratios and non-zero marginal effects in bold (95%-
confidence level) or in italics (90%-confidence level). a) Equity as share of assets, bottom coded below 
the 5th percentile and top coded above 95th percentile. 
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In the large firms many people are doing similar work, making it easier to share 
job tasks of a sick person between the remaining employees. This may induce the 
employees of large firms to apply for sickness benefits more frequently, which 
could explain our finding. On the other hand, the likelihood of disability 
retirement conditional on being a recipient of sickness benefits is almost 
independent of the firm size. As a consequence, there is a positive relationship 
between the firm size and the overall risk of ending up with a disability pension. 
Note that these estimates should describe the true firm size effects, as the 
disability cost variable accounts for the effect of the degree of experience-
rating.62 
The expected cost of disability retirement has a negative effect on all the 
transition rates (see Table 4.4). These effects are accurately estimated, but the 
magnitude of the marginal effects is very small. For a recipient of sickness 
benefits a ten percentage point increase in the disability cost decreases the 
likelihood of being awarded a disability pension by 0.1 percentage points. The 
other two marginal effects are even smaller. However, one should note that the 
disability cost variable exhibits a large degree of variation, ranging from zero to 
several times the annual earnings. To get a better picture of the effects of 
experience-rating, we computed the transition probabilities at different ages and 
different values of the disability cost variable, holding all the other covariates 
fixed at their sample means. In the absence of the disability cost due to 
experience rating, the likelihood of being granted a disability pension at age 55 
would be 0.024. 
When the disability cost are introduced and set to the median value of disability 
costs in the sample, this probability declines to 0.017, i.e. a decrease of about 
30%. Furthermore, by introducing the maximum degree of experience-rating, it is 
possible to obtain some 50% decline in the disability risk at age 50 compared 
with the case of no experience rating. A somewhat larger part of these experience 
rating effects can be attributed to the decline in the transition rate to sick leave, 
but the increase in the likelihood of returning to employment from sick leave 
plays a notable role as well. In other words, both the ex ante and ex post effects 
of experience-rating are not only statistically significant, but also economically 
important.63 
                                              
 
 
62 Should we exclude the disability cost from the model, there would be a large effect of firm size on the 
transition rate from sick leave to disability retirement. For the employees of the two largest employer 
groups, the odds of moving from sick leave to disability retirement would be about 0.66, corresponding to 
a decrease of 9 percentage points in the disability probability for the average recipient of sickness 
benefits. 
63 It is not clear at which point the employers became aware of the new experience-rating scheme before 
the law changes. The reforms may also have induced some sort of anticipatory behaviour just before the 
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Since experience rating aims to affect employer behaviour through financial 
incentives, the effectiveness of such incentives should depend on the firm’s 
financial position. When the experience-rated firm is short of liquid assets, it 
might try harder to deter exits to disability retirement to avoid the costs that in a 
dire financial situation might bankrupt the firm. This is a relevant concern 
especially in the Finnish system where the employer has to pay its share of the 
present value of disability costs as a lump-sum payment at the time when a 
disability pension is granted to its employee. To address this question we use the 
equity ratio as a proxy for the firm’s financial position.64 In Table 4.4, the equity 
ratio has a positive effect on the likelihood of being granted a disability pension. 
It also has a strong effect on the likelihood that a sick leave will be followed by a 
disability pension. This implies that a recipient of sickness benefits in a firm in a 
weak financial position returns to work with a relatively high probability. 
Given that the experience-rated contributions depend on firm size and that larger 
firms may have better possibilities to organize retraining and arrange alternative 
job tasks for their employees with reduced working capacity, we should expect 
the effect of the equity ratio to vary across firms of different size. We therefore 
extend our baseline specification by adding interaction terms of firm size 
categories and equity ratio. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 4.5.  
Table 4.5 Marginal effects for the equity ratio by firm size from extended 
logit models 
 Probability of a transition to 
 Disability Sick leave Db from sick 
Equity ratio a) for group  
Firm size 10–50 -0.0017 -0.0030 0.0470 
 (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0362) 
Firm size 51–300 0.0030 0.0010 0.0658 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0311) 
Firm size 301–1000 0.0077 0.0034 0.0278 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0520) 
Firm size > 1000 0.0068 -0.0033 0.1921 
 (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0415) 
Notes: Other covariates as in the baseline specification. Robust standard errors in (parentheses). 
Significantly non-zero marginal effects in bold (95%-confidence level) or in italics (90%-confidence 
level). a) Equity as share of assets, bottom coded below the 5th percentile and top coded above 95th 
percentile. 
                                                                                                                                    
 
 
new rules came into effect. However, if we drop one or two years preceding the reforms from the 
analysis, our results do not change notably. 
64 There are a few extreme values for the equity ratio. To deal with such outliers we bottom and top coded 
the equity ratio at the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively. In other words, we use the threshold values 
for observations below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile. 
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There is no evidence of statistically significant effects in the smallest firms that 
are not subject to experience rating, which is consistent with the claim that the 
effect of the equity ratio is attributable to the experience-rating system. In firms 
that employ more than 300 employees, the likelihood of being granted a 
disability pension increases with the equity ratio. In the case of the largest firms, 
the likelihood of being granted a disability pension for a recipient of sickness 
benefits increases with the equity ratio: an increase of ten percentage points in 
the equity ratio is related to a 1.9 percentage point increase in the disability 
pension incidence. Put differently, large firms that can afford the cost of 
disability pension expenditures seem to put less effort into occupational 
rehabilitation compared with large firms in a weaker economic position. 
In sum, our findings give strong support for the hypothesis that experience rating 
affects employer behaviour. The higher expected cost of the disability event for 
the employer lowers transition rates from work to sick leave and from sick leave 
to disability retirement. This suggests that the firms subject to experience rating 
apply preventive measures to minimize entries to sick leave, as well as put more 
effort in occupational rehabilitation to get their employees on sickness benefits 
back to work. Our results for the effect of the equity ratio give further support for 
the importance of experience-rating effects. Namely, the financial position of a 
firm has an effect on the employees of the larger firms that are liable for a 
significant fraction of disability pension expenditure of their former employees, 
whereas we find no relationship between the equity ratio and transition rates in 
the firms that are not subject to experience rating. 
4.5.4 Employment growth and excess turnover 
In addition to the growth rates, our models include a control variable for excess 
worker turnover, which measures the degree of restructuring at the workplace for 
a given net change in employment.65 In general, the growth and excess turnover 
rates are affected by the outcome of interest, In other words, the worker’s 
transition out of work. To eliminate the resulting endogeneity problem, we have 
adjusted these covariates for each worker by removing the effect of the worker’s 
own mobility in and out of the establishment. 
                                              
 
 
65 Excess worker turnover in year t is defined as ht  + st – |Δet|, where ht and st denote the number of hires 
and separations during year t, respectively, and teΔ  is the employment change from the end of year 1t −  
to the end of year t in a given establishment. This quantity is the worker flow in excess of what is needed 
to explain the net change in the size of establishment’s workforce. Dividing it by the average employment 
level at the end of years t – 1 and t, say ,te  gives the excess turnover rate: ( | |)t t t th s e e+ − Δ , which takes 
a value on the interval [0, 2]. To smooth annual variation we take the average of the excess turnover rates 
between years t – 4 and t – 1 (for the past period) and between years t – 1 and t + 2 (for the current 
period). 
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Excess worker turnover can be either voluntary or involuntary from the 
employees’ standpoint. It may result from the restructuring measures through 
which the employer adjusts the structure of the workforce. Or it may be driven by 
a high level of voluntary quits, perhaps induced by poor working conditions, 
management or wage rates, which are compensated by new hires. As seen in 
Table 4.6, excess worker turnover over the past three years has no effect on the 
transition rates. However, employees in the establishments with high current 
levels of excess worker turnover are more likely to enter sick leave and less 
likely to return to work from sick leave. Consequently, exits via disability 
retirement are more common in workplaces with a high rate of excess worker 
turnover. It should be noted that the effect of excess worker turnover is 
conditional on a given change in the employment level, as we control for the 
employment growth rates. High turnover can result in extra training work for the 
tenured employees and cause other problems at the workplace, and thereby lead 
to an increase in stress factors. When high turnover reflects an ongoing 
restructuring process, our estimates suggest the possibility that the employer 
encourages some older employees to apply for a disability pension. For an 
employer that is adjusting the structure of the workforce but is not downsizing, 
such a policy can be an effective alternative for dismissals that would be difficult 
to justify. If so, we should expect to find a positive effect for the employment 
growth rate as well, but none of the effects of the employment changes during the 
three-year periods differs statistically significantly from zero in Table 4.4. 
The underlying assumption of symmetric effects for the expansion and 
contraction of the workforce is quite restrictive. In Table 4.6 we therefore report 
results from model specifications that do not impose such a restriction but allow 
for different coefficients for positive and negative growth rates. It seems that the 
risk of being granted a disability pension is lower for employees holding jobs in 
establishments that are currently either downsizing or expanding. The effects of 
the current growth rates can be attributed to the increased risk of sick leave, 
whereas the transition rate from sick leave to disability retirement is not affected 
by the current growth rates. 
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Table 4.6 Marginal effects for employment growth rates from extended 
logit models 
 Probability of a transition to 
 Disability Sick leave Db from sick 
Past growth t – 4 to t – 1  
when ≥ 0  0.0018 0.0008 0.0184 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0132) 
when ≤ 0  -0.0039 -0.0021 -0.0628 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0250) 
Current growth t – 1 to t + 2  
when ≥ 0 -0.0187 -0.0190 0.0094 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0321) 
when ≤ 0 0.0030 0.0029 0.0152 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0123) 
Notes: Other covariates as in the baseline specification. Robust standard errors in (parentheses). 
Significantly (95%-confidence level) non-zero marginal effects in bold. 90%-confidence level indicated 
with italics. 
 
The marginal effect of the current decline in employment on the probability of 
disability pension receipt is 0.003. For example, a 50% decrease in the workforce 
over the next three years (i.e. the growth rate of –0.67) is estimated to reduce the 
disability pension entry rate by 0.2 percentage points (= –0.67 × 0.003 × 100) 
compared with the case of no change in the size of the workforce. One possible 
explanation is that employees with health problems are less willing to apply for 
sick leave at the times when they are worried about their jobs. During slack 
demand employers may also use dismissals to get rid of employees with reduced 
working capacity before they apply for a sickness benefit or disability pension. In 
any case, the effect of downsizing is very small. It also implies that the 
employers do not encourage early retirement through the disability schemes as a 
soft way of downsizing. 
The marginal effect of the current employment expansion on the likelihood of 
disability pension receipt is quite large, being –0.0187. Thus, being employed in 
an establishment whose workforce increases by one-half by the end of year t + 2  
(i.e. the growth rate of 0.4) decreases the probability of being granted a disability 
pension by 0.75 percentage points  (= 0.4 × –0.0187 × 100) compared with the 
case of working in a stable establishment. When a firm is expanding its business 
rapidly, it may experience difficulties in hiring the sufficient amount of skilled 
labour. In such a case, the employer may put some extra effort to keep its old 
employees at work, which may explain our finding. Furthermore, for the 
employee an expansion period may indicate better economic opportunities, in 
terms of promotion possibilities or extra pay, which increase the value of staying 
employed despite some health problems. 
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Black et al. (2002) found that negative (positive) demand shocks increase 
(decrease) the entry rate to disability benefit schemes in aggregate US data. We 
have just shown that the reverse relationship holds for the negative shocks at the 
establishment level in the Finnish labour market. Of course, one should bear in 
mind that we are considering only transitions out of work. During economic 
downturns, transitions from nonparticipation and unemployment to disability 
schemes are likely to increase, and such transitions may dominate the US data. 
Compared with the impact of the current growth rates, the past growth rates have 
the opposite effects on the likelihood of being granted a disability pension. 
Namely, both the reduction and expansion in the workforce during the past three 
years increase the transition rate to disability retirement. Hence, our findings are 
in accordance with the results of Vahtera et al. (2005) and Rege et al. (2009), 
who found that a large reduction of the workforce in the past leads to a notable 
increase in the entry rate to disability retirement. This is quite remarkable given 
the differences in the research design. Recall that the risk set of Rege et al. 
included also those who lost their job as a result of plant downsizing, whereas 
Vahtera et al. considered only employed workers but their data came from the 
municipal sector and cover an exceptional period of deep recession. 
4.6 Concluding remarks 
In this study we analysed how labour demand and institutional factors affect 
transitions to sick leave and disability retirement. Using matched employer-
employee data for the Finnish private sector, we were able to measure the 
employment growth rates and excess worker turnover at the establishment level. 
To study the role of the institutional setting, we exploited the law changes that 
affected the medical requirements for disability pension eligibility and the 
partially experience-rated employer contributions. Our main findings can be 
summarized as follows: 
• For older employees a transition to sick leave is often a one-way street out of 
employment, leading eventually to disability retirement. Roughly half of 
50−55 year-olds and over two-thirds of older workers on sickness benefits 
end up in disability retirement within the next three years. This highlights the 
importance of preventive measures aimed at minimizing the flow into sick 
leave. 
• Those employees who can apply for a disability pension under more lenient 
medical requirements are much more likely to enter sick leave and to retire 
via disability pension benefits. Therefore, the abolition of the individual early 
retirement scheme in 2000 significantly reduced the flow into disability 
retirement in the affected groups. 
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• There is ample evidence that experience rating lowers the flow into sick leave 
(i.e. the ex ante effect), and reduces transitions from sick leave to disability 
retirement (i.e. the ex post effect). Moreover, large firms that can easily bear 
their share of early retirement costs due to their strong financial position let 
their employees on sickness benefits exit more easily via disability pension 
schemes than firms in a weaker position do. Financial situation is not an issue 
for smaller firms that are not subject to the experience rating. 
• The transition rates to sick leave and disability retirement are relatively large 
in establishments experiencing a high degree of excess worker turnover. 
When an establishment is growing, transitions to sick leave and disability 
retirement become less frequent. There is no evidence of employers 
exploiting the disability pension scheme as a way of adjusting their workforce 
when downsizing. 
These findings imply two policy recommendations to reduce the disability 
benefit enrolment rate of older workers. First, the stringency of medical criteria 
and medical screening for disability benefit eligibility should be tough enough. 
When non-medical factors are weighted at the expense of medical criteria, 
disability benefits may distort labour supply decisions, thereby also inducing 
workers who are not truly disabled to retire via disability programmes. This 
appears to be mainly a labour supply issue, as we did not find evidence of 
employers encouraging disability retirement when downsizing. Secondly, the 
experience-rating of disability benefit costs seems to be an effective policy 
instrument. It seems to induce employers to take preventive actions to reduce the 
inflow into sick leave, and to put more effort into get their employees on sickness 
benefits back into work. This finding should be of considerable interest, not only 
for Finland, but also for other countries that do not have an experience-rating 
system for disability benefits (yet). Obviously, there are still a number of open 
questions, regarding, for example, the optimal design of experience-rating and 
possible spillover effects on hiring and transitions out of work to other 
destinations than disability retirement. These questions need to be addressed in 
order to get a more complete picture of the consequences of the experience-rating 
of disability benefits. 
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 5. Employment and wage effects of a payroll tax 
cut – evidence from a regional experiment 66 
Abstract 
In this paper, we evaluate the effects of a regional experiment that reduced 
payroll taxes by 3–6 percentage points for three years in northern Finland. We 
match each firm in the target region with a similar firm in a comparison region 
and estimate the effect of the payroll tax reduction by comparing employment 
and wage changes within the matched pairs before and after the start of the 
experiment. According to our results, the reduction in payroll taxes led to an 
increase in wages in the target region. The point estimates indicate that the 
increase in wages offset roughly half of the impact of the payroll tax cut on 
labour costs. The remaining labour cost reduction had no significant effects on 
employment. 
Keywords: Payroll tax, Labor demand, Tax incidence, Propensity score matching 
JEL Classification J18, J23, J38, J58, J65, J68 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A reduction in payroll taxes lowers wage costs and hence boosts the demand for 
labour. Its effect on employment depends on the incidence of the payroll taxes. If 
the tax cut leads to higher wages that entirely offset the reduction in taxes, the tax 
cut has no effect on employment. 
Past evidence on the incidence and the employment effects of payroll tax changes 
is mixed. Studies that rely on cross-country or time-series variation in national 
payroll taxes produce widely varying estimates of tax incidence. An important 
problem in such approaches is the omitted variables bias. In cross-country 
studies, it is difficult to control for all the differences in wage-setting institutions. 
These unobserved, across-country differences may be correlated with differences 
in the level of taxation and employment. In the time-series studies, there may be 
simultaneous changes in other variables that affect wages and employment. For 
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example, Hamermesh (1993) summarizes this literature by noting, “The 
estimates of tax shifting vary across the entire admissible rage and even outside 
it” and concludes, “It is impossible to draw any firm conclusions about the 
incidence of payroll tax from these studies”. 
A more promising approach is to examine the effects of changes in taxes or other 
mandatory employer contributions when these changes differ across otherwise 
similar firms. Following this approach, Gruber (1994) evaluates the effects of 
mandated maternity benefits in the US, and Gruber (1997) the effects of changes 
in mandatory pension contributions in Chile. Anderson and Meyer (1997) and 
Murphy (2007) examine the incidence of unemployment insurance taxes in the 
US. In all these cases, the changes in the payroll tax rates vary between firms 
because of the different composition of their labour force or because the tax rates 
depend on firm characteristics. Another approach that is more directly related to 
our study examines the effects of regional policies that create different changes in 
the payroll tax rates across firms that are located in different regions but that are 
otherwise comparable. Prime examples include Bohm and Lind (1993), who 
evaluate the employment effects of regional wage subsidies in northern Sweden, 
Johansen and Klette (1998), who examine the effects of regional differences in 
payroll taxes in Norway, and Bennmarker, Mellander and Öckert (2009), who 
evaluate the effects of a recent regional wage subsidy scheme in Sweden. These 
studies typically find that changes in payroll taxes are mostly shifted to wages 
with little effect on labour costs or employment. 
In this paper, we evaluate the employment and wage effects of a regional 
experiment in northern Finland. This experiment abolished employer 
contributions to the national pension scheme and the national health insurance for 
firms located in the targeted high unemployment regions. Prior to 2003, these 
employer contributions varied between 2.95 and 6 per cent of the wage bill, 
depending on the capital intensity and size of the firm. From January 1 2003, all 
private employers in the 20 target municipalities located in northern Finland and 
on the islands along the western coast were exempt from these social security 
contributions for three years. In this paper we focus on the effects in northern 
Finland, where over 90 per cent of the eligible firms are located. 
A regionally targeted programme has several benefits compared to an across–the-
board cut in taxes. Perhaps the main benefit for policymakers is that the effects of 
a regional programme are substantially easier to evaluate. The employment 
change in the target region can be compared to similar regions that are not 
affected by the tax cut. If the target and comparison regions are truly similar, 
estimates of the employment effects based on differences in the employment and 
wage changes between the treatment and comparison regions provide much more 
reliable estimates of the effects of the payroll tax cut than time-series or cross-
section variation in payroll taxes could ever do. 
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We use firm-level data to evaluate the effects of the payroll tax cut on 
employment and individual data to evaluate the effect on wages. Our main results 
are based on a comparison of the employment changes in target-region firms and 
the employment changes in firms located in a control region that is as similar as 
possible in terms of unemployment rate, industry structure and the composition 
of the labour force. Finally we compare target-region firms in northern Finland to 
firms located in other high-unemployment areas in northern and eastern Finland. 
Comparison of the employment changes across regions still creates problems if 
the regions are not quite similar in all relevant characteristics. For example, an 
industry-specific boom might have different effects in different regions 
depending on the industry structure of the region. To make the treatment and 
comparison regions more comparable, we adopt a matching procedure to identify 
comparable firms (or rather plants) in the treatment and control regions. We then 
evaluate the effects of the payroll tax cut by comparing firms located in different 
regions but otherwise similar in all their observed pre-treatment characteristics. 
5.2 The experiment 
Payroll taxes in Finland consist of employer contributions to the employees’ 
pension scheme, the unemployment insurance, the national pension insurance, 
the national health insurance, and the employment accident insurance. The tax 
rates of various components vary across sectors and by firm size67. According to 
Statistical Yearbook of the Social Insurance Institution, the average payroll tax 
rate was 23.86% in 2002. 
In March 2002, the Finnish government agreed to a temporary removal of 
employer contributions to the national pension insurance and the national health 
insurance for firms that operated in the twenty target municipalities. Removal of 
these contributions lowered the payroll taxes for the eligible firms by 4.1 
percentage points, on average. The programme was designed as an experiment 
with a stated aim to evaluate the effect of a cut in the payroll taxes on 
employment in the target region. The payroll tax exemption lasted for three years 
from January 1 2003 to December 31 2005. In December 2005, the government 
extended the duration of the experiment to the end of 2009. 
                                              
 
 
67  In 2002, the private sector employers contributed 1.69% of the wage bill to the national health 
insurance, and 1.00% to the employment accident insurance. For calculating the national pension 
insurance contributions the firms are divided into three categories based on their size and capital intensity. 
The contribution rates in these categories were 1.35, 3.55 and 4.45. The Unemployment Insurance 
contributions are progressive, the contribution rate being 0.7% of wage bill for wages up to 840,940 euros 
and 2.7% of the wages exceeding this threshold. The Employees’ Pension Scheme has a relatively 
complicated fee structure. In the large firms, pension contributions vary with the age of the employee and 
are partially experience-rated and depend on the number of previous employees receiving early retirement 
benefits. Small firms pay a flat rate of 17.32%. 
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As the payroll tax exemption may have anticipatory effects, it is useful to note 
that the tax exemption was first suggested by a working group that presented its 
report in December 2001. The law was a part of the government budget proposal 
for the year 2003 that was agreed upon within the government in March 2002. 
The government gave the proposal to the parliament in September 2002. The 
parliament accepted the budget proposal and the president signed the law on the 
payroll tax exemption in December 2002. The payroll tax exemption was also 
widely discussed in press during the spring 2002. It is, therefore, possible that 
firms who anticipated the tax exemption could have altered their employment 
already before the start of the programme in January 2003. However, it is 
unlikely that any employment effects could have occurred before March 2002 
since the nature of the programme was very much an open question until then. 
All private employers and state-owned enterprises that had a “permanent place of 
business” in the twenty target municipalities were eligible for the tax exemption. 
The maximum annual reduction was 30,000 euros per firm. To comply with the 
EU-legislation regulating state-aid that may distort competition within the Union, 
agriculture, fishing, and transport industries were excluded from the experiment. 
An important restriction is also that local governments were not eligible for the 
exemption. 
Prior to the beginning of the experiment the government estimated that 3500 
firms would be eligible for the exemption, and that the budgetary cost of the 
experiment would be eight million euros. To cover the costs without cutting 
benefits financed by payroll taxes the experiment was financed by temporarily 
raising the national health insurance contributions for the employers outside the 
target region by 0.014 percentage points. 
All the target municipalities were located in high unemployment areas. However, 
the geographical borders of the target area were somewhat arbitrary. There were 
other regions outside the target area with comparable, and even higher, 
unemployment rates. The target municipalities were selected through a political 
process and there is no obvious reason why just these municipalities were 
selected. In fact, the original task of the working group that proposed the tax 
exemption was limited to measures that would be targeted only to the three 
northernmost municipalities. In their final report, the working group proposed 
two alternatives: one involving only these three municipalities and another 
involving nine other municipalities in the northern Finland. After the working 
group rendered its final report, but before the government gave its proposal to the 
parliament, two more municipalities in Lapland and six municipalities on islands 
along the western coast were added to the tax exemption region. Eventually the 
target area covered the entire province of Lapland except its capital region 
around Rovaniemi and an industrial region around Kemi-Tornio. On the other 
hand, the working group would have granted a tax exemption also to the local 
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government employers. The final proposal was a compromise that excluded all 
public sector employers with the exception of state-owned enterprises68. 
Applying for the tax exemption was made easy for the participating employers. 
The employers were only required to file a starting declaration to the local tax 
office. The employers could then simply deduct the tax-exempt amount from 
their monthly employer contributions. An additional requirement was that the 
employers also had to report tax exemptions in detail in their annual report to the 
tax administration. The ease of participation was reflected in high take-up rates. 
According to our calculations, all eligible employers with at least 50 employees, 
90 per cent of the eligible employers with at least five employees and 75 per cent 
of the firms with 2–4 employees had filed a starting declaration by December 
2003. 
Table 5.1 Participating firms according to size 
Firm size 
(number of full- 
time employees) 
N firms N Employees Payroll tax 
deduction 
0 456 31,955 
1 424 424 84,075 
2–4 659 1836 382,585 
5–9 369 2451 686,321 
10–19 237 3202 931,020 
20–49 139 4153 1,157,750 
50–99 37 1544 600,498 
101–250 10 1578 289,497 
> 250 3 911 63,555 
Total 2334 17,099 4,227,256 
Source: Authors calculations from data provided by the National Board of Taxes. 
Most firms that applied for the tax exemption were very small. The median firm 
had only four employees. Only ten per cent of the firms had more than twenty, 
and 2.5 per cent more than fifty employees. In terms of employment and payroll 
tax bill, these “large” firms naturally represent a much higher share. The largest 
industries were business services, retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and 
construction. In total, the experiment involved 2334 firms with 17,099 employees 
during the first year. According to our calculations, the reduction of payroll tax 
revenue due to the experiment was 4.2 million euros in the first year. 
                                              
 
 
68 State-owned enterprises are government agencies that operate in the market and compete with the 
private firms. The largest such agencies in the target area are Destia that builds and maintains roads and 
Metsähallitus that mainly maintains state-owned forests and national parks. 
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5.3 Tax incidence and the Finnish wage bargaining system 
According to the textbook model, the incidence of payroll tax cut depends on the 
relative elasticities of labour demand and labour supply. A typical empirical 
finding is that labour supply is relatively inelastic and that the workers therefore 
bear the cost of tax increases. Most often these incidence results are presented 
within the context of competitive labour markets. However, the Finnish wage 
determination system differs substantially from the competitive market model. 
Below we describe the main features of the system focusing on its potential 
effects on tax incidence. 
Wage bargaining in Finland involves a high degree of co-ordination between the 
different unions and the employer organizations. A framework agreement is 
typically negotiated at a national level between the union and employer 
federations on a one- or two-year basis. After central agreement has been 
reached, the individual unions and the respective employer organizations bargain 
over wages separately in each industry. These contracts determine a general wage 
increase applied to all wages in the sector and a wage schedule determining a 
minimum pay in each task. The industry-specific collective labour agreements 
are also binding for the non-union members in the industries where the union 
contract is “representative”. Since union density is roughly 70 percent, most 
industries have a representative contract. There are no statutory minimum wages 
in Finland. 
Even though union bargaining occurs at the national level, there is room for 
regional variation in wages, as well as, wage variation across firms and across 
workers within firms. Local bargaining between individual workers or their local 
union organization and the firms may lead to outcomes that deviate from the 
national contracts. The employer can naturally pay more and if both local parties 
agree, and as long as the minimum provisions are not violated, even less than 
what is agreed in the national contract. Wage drift, defined as wage increase 
exceeding what is agreed in the union contracts, has historically accounted for 
approximately 40 per cent of the wage growth. This fraction has declined over 
time but was still 35 per cent between 1992 and 2000 (Uusitalo 2005). More 
recently firm-specific arrangements such as profit sharing have become more 
important, leading to an increase in across firm variance in wages (Uusitalo and 
Vartiainen 2007). 
The implications of national wage bargaining for the tax incidence are not 
entirely clear. On the one hand, one might claim that wage changes are 
determined at the national level and that a regional payroll tax subsidy scheme 
has little or no impact on wages. On the other hand, the importance of local 
bargaining and the fact that the employee and the employer can freely agree on 
wage increases exceeding what is agreed in the union contract, may lead to a 
situation where the payroll tax cut leads to a wage increase. Even in this case, tax 
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shifting may be different than in a national scheme if the workers are mobile and 
due to factor mobility the elasticity of local labour supply larger than elasticity of 
labour supply in the whole country (Murphy 2007). 
5.4 Empirical strategy 
Our estimates are based on differences in employment and wage changes 
between the firms eligible for tax exemption and a control group. We created the 
control group by a two-stage procedure. We first selected the “counties” (NUTS4 
-level sub-regional units) that were most comparable to the target region in terms 
of unemployment rates, industrial structure and workforce characteristics. We 
based the selection on the regional statistics published in “Seutukunta- ja 
maakuntakatsaus 2002” by Statistics Finland. The target region had a high 
unemployment rate and little manufacturing or other industrial activity. The share 
employed in agriculture was much higher and the average level of education 
much lower than in the rest of the country. To create a comparable control region 
we excluded two regions from the other non-target regions in Lapland because 
they were administrative centres with above average education level (Rovaniemi) 
or major manufacturing regions (Kemi-Tornio). Instead, we included high 
unemployment areas from Eastern Finland just south of the target region. Also in 
choosing the comparison area, we excluded regions with major cities so that the 
comparison area would resemble the target area also in its industry composition 
(see map in Figure 5.1). Our judgment is that the choice of comparison areas was 
rather successful. As shown in Table 5.2, the target and control regions have 
similar unemployment and employment rates, reasonably similar industry 
distribution and a similar population structure. In all these dimensions, the target 
and control regions deviate substantially from the national average. 
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Figure 5.1 Target and comparison regions 
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Table 5.2 Comparison of target and control regions 
 Regions in Lapland All Finland 
 Target Comparison  
Population    
Total population 64,979 238,325 5,194,901 
Population density 1) 0.84 4.72 17.06 
Degree of urbanization 2) 53.28 61.30 83.30 
Percent Swedish 0.18 0.07 5.60 
Percent Pensioners 27.33 28.57 21.87 
Dependency ratio 1.97 1.96 1.30 
Secondary education, % 3) 37.85 37.72 36.10 
University level education, % 14.85 15.53 23.30 
Employment  
Employment rate, % 52.33 53.18 64.16 
Unemployment rate, % 23.56 21.27 12.34 
Municipal employees, % 22.95 20.56 14.12 
Agriculture and fishing, % 11.74 13.39 4.68 
Manufacturing, % 8.90 15.96 19.38 
Hotels and restaurants, % 6.46 2.90 3.05 
Trade, % 9.35 9.39 12.01 
Municipal finance  
State grants, € / person 1782 1498 706 
Tax revenue, € / person 2085 2022 2715 
Notes: 1) inhabitants / km2, 2) Indicates the proportion of population living in built-up areas (%), 
3) Persons aged 15 or over who have a degree from a senior secondary school, vocational or professional 
education institution, or from a university. 
 
In addition to having similar population structure and similar industry 
composition, the aggregate economic development in the target and the 
comparison regions has been remarkably similar before the experiment. For 
example, the unemployment rate has a very similar downward trend in the target 
and comparison regions (Figure 5.2). 
The comparison of unemployment rates in Figure 5.2 also indicates that the 
payroll tax exemption did not have a major impact on unemployment – there is 
no clear difference between the target and the comparison regions after the 
beginning of the experiment in January 2003. It would also be interesting to 
compare changes in employment between the regions, but the available data 
sources offer limited possibilities for doing that in a reliable way. Since the target 
region represents only some 1.3% of the Finnish population, the sample sizes in 
national surveys, such as the Labour Force Survey, become dismally small. 
Eventually, the problem can be solved by computing regional employment 
changes based on register data, but currently only data up to 2003 are available. 
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Figure 5.2 Unemployment rates in the target and the comparison regions 
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Notes: Employment weighted average of the municipality level unemployment rates reported by the 
Ministry of Labour. These unemployment rates are calculated by dividing the number of unemployed job 
seekers in the unemployment register by the number of people in the labour force calculated from 
administrative data in the end of year t – 2. 
 
If the control area is truly similar to the target area, the development in the 
control area can be used as a valid counterfactual estimate of what would have 
happened in the target area in the absence of the payroll tax reduction. Careful 
selection of the comparison region is a necessary pre-condition for the validity of 
this assumption. While focusing on the employment changes “differences away” 
pre-existing differences between the target and control regions, it is still possible 
that the target and the control regions experience different shocks or display 
different pre-existing trends in employment or wages. In particular, a different 
industrial structure may lead to different timing of the business cycle in the 
control and the target regions. 
To further enhance the comparability of the target and the comparison regions we 
matched each firm from the target region with a similar firm or firms from the 
comparison region. We first split the data into seven main industries using the 
industry classification in the Labour Force Survey and then applied matching 
methods to create treatment and comparison croups within these industry classes. 
In practice, we estimated logit-models within each industry explaining whether 
the firm was located in the target region. The explanatory variables were the 
payroll tax bracket, (log)number of employees, (log)total earnings of the 
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employees, (log)total sales of the firm (all measured in 1999, 2000, and 2001) 
and a set of three-digit industry codes. The logit-estimates were then used for 
calculating for each firm the predicted probability of being located in the target 
region, i.e. the propensity score. 
Each target region firm is then matched with its nearest neighbour (or 
neighbours) from the comparison region. We used a genetic matching method 
(Diamond and Sekhon 2005) that uses both the covariates and the propensity 
score to create matched samples. The genetic matching procedure starts with a 
weighting scheme identical to Mahalanobis distance. The weight matrix is then 
iteratively changed using an evolutionary search algorithm (Sekhon and Mebane 
1998, Mebane and Sekhon 1998) until no further improvement in match quality 
is attained (see Diamond and Sekhon for details on match quality criteria). As 
demonstrated in the appendix of our working paper (Korkeamäki and Uusitalo 
2008), this method yields a better match quality with respect to almost all 
matching variables than simple propensity score matching. 
In this evaluation, we will follow the effects during the first two years of the 
programme. We account for potential anticipatory effects by creating matched 
samples based on data from the end of 2001, before any information on the 
programme was made public. To minimize the temptation to re-define the control 
group ex-post, we fixed the design and published the setup before any data on 
employment effects became available in January 2004. (Korkeamäki and 
Uusitalo 2004) The effects of the payroll tax exemption were then evaluated in a 
transparent way by simply comparing the changes in wages and employment in 
the treatment and control firms after January 2003. Our last observation date is 
December 2004. The last year of the experiment is left out because of the 
changes in the comparison area; the firms in ten municipalities in the Kainuu 
County that belong to our comparison area became eligible for a similar payroll 
tax exemption in 2005 as a part of a regional self-government experiment. This 
new experiment may contaminate the results of the original experiment but it 
should not be a major issue up to the end of 2004, because adding payroll tax cut 
to the Kainuu regional self-government experiment was a last-minute change in 
legislation that was announced only in December 2004. 
5.5 Data 
We created the matched sample of target and control firms based on the data 
from the Register of Enterprises and Establishments by Statistics Finland. This 
register includes data on sales, wage bill, and (imputed) employment of each 
plant in Finland. Each plant can also be located to a certain municipality. There 
were 2809 firms in the target area and 7544 firms in the control area. We 
restricted the sample to the private sector firms that had a positive turnover, paid 
at least some wages and employed at least one worker in 2001. We also required 
that the firm has only one plant, so that its location and hence the eligibility for 
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the tax exemption can be determined accurately. We found 1592 such firms in 
the target area and 4265 firms in the control area69. 
The main disadvantage with the establishment register data is that the number of 
employees in the firm is imputed based on the wage bill, composition of 
employment and average wages for various employee groups. It is not clear 
whether the changes in these imputed numbers capture the changes in 
employment, changes in wages, or perhaps changes in the imputation procedure. 
Fortunately, comprehensive data on the employment and earnings outcomes was 
available from the Finnish Tax Administration. The data are based on employer’s 
annual notification that all employers are required to submit to the local tax 
office. The annual notification includes all wages and salaries paid during the 
calendar year. The payments are itemized by employee, and the summary form 
contains the number of recipient itemizations. This number equals the number of 
employees that have received some wages or salaries from the firm during the 
year. Naturally, the number of itemizations is only a rough measure of the 
average employment in the firm. On the other hand, the total wage bill that forms 
the tax base (i.e. the product of hours worked and the average hourly wage 
excluding payroll taxes) is accurately reported. 
The tax data therefore provides a reliable estimate on whether the payroll tax 
deduction had an impact on total wage bill. If the total wage bill increased due to 
the experiment, there must have been an effect on either wages or employment. 
Reliable estimates on the incidence of payroll tax changes require more detailed 
information on wages and hours. There is no single database where this 
information could be gathered for all firms. The best available sources of data on 
wages and hours are the wage statistics of the employer organizations. In 
Finland, there are two large employer organizations: Confederation of Finnish 
Industry and Employers (TT) and Employers Federation of the Service Industries 
(PT)70. Most large employers are members of one of these organizations and the 
data covers about 60 per cent of private sector employment. Both TT and PT 
wage surveys contain individual data on all workers in all their member firms. 
Both surveys contain detailed information on monthly or hourly wages and 
regular weekly hours. In addition, there are a number of background variables on 
the employees, including sex, tenure, occupation and industry. More detailed 
                                              
 
 
69 The reduction of the sample size is mainly due to dropping firms that had no paid employees in 2001. 
Many of these firms still had positive turnover. As a robustness check, we included these firms in the 
sample, but this had no real effect on the results. The sample selection process is described with more 
detail in Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2008). 
70 These two employer organizations merged in 2004. We use data up to 2004 when the wage surveys 
were still conducted separately. 
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description of the data is presented in the Appendix of our working paper 
(Korkeamäki and Uusitalo 2008). 
5.6 Results 
In the following, we first display evidence that matching balances the 
characteristics of the firms in the target and the control regions. Then we proceed 
by presenting the results on the employment changes in the target and 
comparison regions. We conclude this section with the analysis on wage effects. 
5.6.1 Covariate balancing 
Table 5.3 reports the means of the variables used in matching separately in the 
target and comparison regions, and in the matched treatment and control groups. 
In the rightmost column, we also report the national averages of the same 
variables. According to the table, the differences between the firms in the target 
and control regions are rather small to begin with and matching removes most of 
the remaining differences. A comparison between the treatment and the 
comparison regions and the national average reveals that both regions differ from 
the national average and that our comparison region is substantially more similar 
to the treatment region than to the whole country. 
Given the similarity of the target and control regions, there are few strong 
predictors in the logit-model that is used to explain whether the firm is located in 
the target region. This is also reflected in the distribution of the propensity score 
that is rather similar in the target and comparison regions (Figure 5.3). This also 
implies that finding a region of common support is not a major problem – a large 
fraction of firms in both regions has an estimated propensity score between 0.1 
and 0.5. 
As a final check on the comparability between the treatment and the matched 
control group, we examine the pre-experiment trends in some key variables. 
Figure 5.4 presents this comparison for the aggregate wage sum. It appears that 
the firms in the comparison region were larger in the beginning of the period 
(1996) and have experienced somewhat more rapid growth during the last years 
of the 1990s. However, the growth in the matched control firms has been very 
similar to the treatment firms. Note that we use only data from years 1999–2001 
in matching and creating the control group, so the similarity in the growth rates 
before this period is not “forced” into the data, but reflects the similarity between 
the treatment and the matched control firms. Similar analyses of the long-term 
trends in mean firm size and aggregate employment did not detect major 
differences either. 
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Table 5.3 Covariate balancing 
Means,  
all variables in log's 
Target firms Matched 
targets 
Matched 
controls 
Control 
region 
National 
average 
Employment 2001, SF 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.12 1.26
Employment 2000, SF 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.06 1.27
Employment 1999, SF 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.97 1.25
Employment 2001, TA 1.66 1.66 1.63 1.74 n.a.
Employment 2000, TA 1.49 1.50 1.50 1.58 n.a.
Wage sum 2001, TA 9.65 9.64 9.67 9.74 10.16
Wage sum 2000, TA 8.62 8.64 8.72 8.71 10.13
Wage sum 1999, SF 7.57 7.58 7.60 7.59 10.05
Turnover 2001 11.10 11.12 11.13 10.95 12.16
Turnover 2000 10.36 10.37 10.39 10.08 12.11
Turnover 1999 9.50 9.50 9.57 9.23 12.04
Industry distribution of firms 
(percent of firms)  
Manufacturing  13.69 13.46 13.46 15.80 11.47
Construction 13.63 13.84 13.84 15.03 13.16
Trade 20.92 21.11 21.11 21.55 16.62
Hotels and restaurants 12.44 12.37 12.37 7.67 4.48
Transport 12.19 12.05 12.05 9.31 10.35
Business services 13.25 13.46 13.46 14.11 20.71
Other services 13.88 13.71 13.71 16.53 22.28
National pension insurance 
contribution rate   
I (2.95 %) 96.48 96.81 96.81 97.07 92.79
II (5.15 %) 1.01 1.02 1.02 0.98 2.87
III (6.05 %) 2.51 2.17 2.17 1.95 4.34
  
N Firms 2001 1592 1430 1430 4265 136,434
N Employees 2001, TA 12,318 11,034 10,190 39,111 1,318,654
Notes: For the ease of comparison, we calculated the control group mean displayed in the table using 
nearest neighbour matching. In the table the industry distribution is reported at a one-digit level. In the 
actual matching procedure, we use a more detailed industry classification adding 116 three-digit industry 
codes to the logit-models. The national averages are calculated from the firm register of Statistics Finland 
for firms with positive employment, wage sum and turnover. SF = Employment figure supplied by 
Statistics Finland, estimated person-years. TA = Employment figure supplied by Tax Administration.  
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Figure 5.3 Estimated propensity score densities 
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Figure 5.4 Development of the aggregate wage bill before the experiment 
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
A
gg
re
ga
te
 w
ag
e 
su
m
 (i
n 
m
ill
on
s 
of
 €
)
Comparison region Target region
Matched target region Matched comparison region  
Notes: Single plant firms that existed in the end of 2001. Comparison region figures are weighted to 
correspond to the number of firms in the target region at 2001, i. e. weight = number of target firms / 
number of comparison firms. 
 
134  Employment and wage effects of a payroll tax cut 
5.6.2 Employment and wage sum responses to the regional payroll 
tax experiment 
The main purpose of the payroll tax exemption was to promote employment in 
the target region. Therefore, also our main outcome measure is the change in the 
absolute number of employees in a firm. We prefer absolute changes to relative 
changes – this way employment changes add up to the total effect of the 
experiment and no weighting is necessary. However, the qualitative results were 
similar when we use changes in log employment as an outcome measure and 
weighted the estimates by firm size in 2001. 
To reduce noise in employment numbers, we exclude the workers who receive 
only ancillary income from the firm and concentrate on the employees in their 
principal employment. Even this measure is naturally imperfect because it does 
not capture the variation in working hours. 
Our main findings on employment effects are reported in Table . The first two 
columns report the average change in employment in the treatment and control 
groups. The third column labelled “Treated – Controls” is our estimate for the 
programme effect. In each case we first report annual changes. In the lower 
section of the tables, we also calculated two-year changes just before experiment  
2000–2002 and after the start of the experiment 2002–2004. 
The first observation from Table 5.4 is strong employment growth before 2001 
and a strong decrease after 2001 that occurs in both the treatment and the control 
groups. For example, between 2000 and 2001, employment grew by 0.57 persons 
in an average treatment group firm. Between 2001 and employment decreased on 
average by 0.37 persons in the same firms. This pattern is largely due to the entry 
and exit of firms. Our sample consists of firms that existed in the end of 2001. 
The firms that exit before the end of 2001, or enter after 2001, are not included in 
data. On the other hand, exits after 2001 contribute to the average growth rate 
with large negative changes, and firms that enter before 2001 with large positive 
changes. 
A more important observation from Table 5.4 is that employment growth has 
been rather similar in treatment and control groups. The differences in growth 
rates reported in the third column are in most cases smaller than the standard 
error of the estimate, and in no case anywhere close to being statistically 
significant. According to these results, the payroll tax experiment has not had a 
significant effect on employment in the target region. In addition to statistical 
significance, it is interesting to assess the economic significance of the point 
estimates. According to Table 5.4 the two-year change in employment after the 
start of the experiment (2002–2004) was on average 0.103 persons larger in the 
treatment group. Given that there are 1430 firms in the treatment group, the total 
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employment effect of the tax cut amounts to 147 new jobs or 1.3 per cent 
increase in employment. 
Table 5.4 Effect of payroll tax cut on employment 
 Treated Controls Treated – Controls Std. Error 
Change in average number of employees   
2000–2001 0.565 0.550 0.016 0.124 
2001–2002 -0.372 -0.289 -0.083 0.131 
2002–2003 0.003 0.017 -0.014 0.160 
2003–2004 0.204 0.092 0.111 0.160 
2000–2002 0.200 0.261 -0.062 0.159 
2002–2004 0.218 0.115 0.103 0.219 
Notes: The estimates in Table 5.4, Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 are (our favoured) five nearest neighbours 
estimates, estimated using GenMatch procedure as described in Section 4. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedastic treatment effect. 
 
As noted before, the tax data is not ideal for measuring the changes in 
employment. On the other hand, any changes in the wage bill (average hourly 
wage × sum of hours) that form the tax base should be accurately reported. In 
Table 5.5 we calculate the effect of the payroll tax cut on the wage bill in the 
target and control firms. Now the estimates have mostly the “right” sign 
indicating stronger wage bill growth in the treatment group after the start of the 
experiment in 2003. The wage bill increase was 1125 euros larger in the 
treatment group in the first year after the experiment. There was a slight 
difference also in the second year so that the two-year increase in wage bill was 
1728 euros (about 2.7 per cent of an average target area firm wage bill) larger in 
the treated firms. In addition, these estimates are far from being statistically 
significant. 
Table 5.5 Effect of payroll tax cut on wage bill 
 Treated Controls Treated – Controls Std. Error 
Average change in wage bill, €   
2000–2001 5328 4689 639 850 
2001–2002 1026 1661 -635 945 
2002–2003 2263 1137 1125 1597 
2003–2004 1666 1063 603 1222 
2000–2002 6354 6350 4 1276 
2002–2004 3929 2201 1728 2142 
Notes: The estimates in Table 5.4, Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 are (our favoured) five nearest neighbours 
estimates, estimated using GenMatch procedure as described in Section 4. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedastic treatment effect. 
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5.6.3 The effects by firm type 
One could argue that the effect of payroll tax cut might differ across firms. For 
example, firms paying below average wages may be more responsive to wage 
costs if the own price demand elasticity of low-skill workers is higher than that 
of high-skill workers. There could also be different effects in the small and large 
firms. At least the effect is likely to be smaller in the largest firms that paid more 
than the deductible maximum of 30 000 euros in payroll taxes. For these firms 
the payroll tax cut is a lump-sum reduction in taxes and marginal changes in 
employment should not be affected by the tax rate. Finally, the size of the payroll 
tax cut depends on the pre-experiment tax-bracket and one might expect larger 
effects in the firms that face larger payroll tax reductions. 
To examine these issues we first split the sample into quartiles defined according 
to the average wage in the firm and calculated the effects separately in each 
quartile. In addition, we calculated the effects of the payroll tax cut separately for 
the firms that paid less than 25 000 euros in payroll taxes in 2001 and that hence 
were well below the maximum tax deduction. Finally, we calculated the effects 
for the firms that were in the lowest payroll tax bracket. (The number of firms in 
the higher brackets was too small for meaningful calculations). 
Table 5.6 Effect of payroll tax cut by firm type 
 Treatment – control difference in 
 Empl. change 
 2000–02 
Empl. change 
2002–04 
Wage bill change 
2000–02 
Wage bill change 
2002–04 
Full sample -0.062
(0.159)
0.103
(0.219)
4 
(1276) 
1728
(2142)
By wage quartile  
1st (lowest) -0.027
(0.139)
-0.210
(0.133)
-2086 
(604) 
-281
(612)
2nd -0.119
(0.173)
0.724
(0.204)
218 
(1122) 
2666
(1280)
3rd -0.264
(0.273)
0.457
(0.272)
1124 
(2083) 
9217
(3226)
4th (highest) -0.245
(0.177)
0.000
(0.296)
55 
(1999) 
356
(4826)
Firms in lowest payroll tax 
bracket 
-0.122
(0.121)
0.160
(0.159)
66 
(881) 
1264
(1274)
Firms paying less than 
25 000 € in payroll taxes 
-0.122
(0.134)
0.026
(0.175)
559 
(138) 
-455
(1775)
 
Table 5.6 reports the results of these experiments. No clear patterns appear. The 
effect of the payroll tax cut on employment seems to be the highest in the second 
wage quartile. The effect seems also to be higher than full sample average in the 
small firms that are in the lowest payroll tax bracket and in the firms that pay less 
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that 25 000 euros in payroll taxes. The effects on the wage bill change appear 
rather similar, though now the largest positive effects appear in the third wage 
quartile. Due to large standard errors associated with all sub-sample estimates, 
not much can be concluded from these numbers. 
5.6.4 The effect on wages 
To have a closer look at the incidence of the payroll tax cut we examined its 
effect on hourly wages. As noted before wage data is available only for the 
subset of (large) firms that belong to one of the two employer organizations. 
These two organizations have slightly different surveys and different wage 
concepts. The manufacturing sector data is also divided into the white-collar and 
the blue-collar worker files according to whether the employees receive monthly 
salaries or hourly wages. To avoid the need of ad hoc adjustments for different 
measurements, we also report the estimates separately. For the service sector 
workers and for blue-collar workers in manufacturing we have data for the period 
from 2000 to 2004, for the white-collar workers in manufacturing only for  
2001–2004. 
While the firm is a natural unit of observation when measuring changes in 
employment, it is more straightforward to use individual wages to estimate 
average wage growth. Our wage equation estimates are reported in Table 5.7. In 
each case we create a measure that accounts for the variation in working hours. 
For the workers that receive monthly salaries we divide monthly salary by usual 
hours. For workers that are paid by hour we divide total wages during the last 
quarter of the year by total hours during the same period. We estimate the wage 
equations using all wage components (including various bonuses). To account for 
unobserved individual-level variation in wages we use data for the employees 
who appear in the data in the two consecutive years and use the change in real 
log wage as a dependent variable. 
All wage equations include the usual control variables: age, education and 
gender. We also include an indicator for supervisory or trainee status when 
available, and add a full set of two-digit occupational dummies in the wage 
equations. The equations include year fixed-effects as well as a fixed-effect for 
being located in the target region. The effect of the payroll tax cut is identified 
from the interaction between year 2003 and target region indicators. The 
coefficient of this interaction can be interpreted as the difference in wage growth 
rate between the employees in the target and control regions due to the start of 
the experiment. Note that the interaction between year 2004 and the target region 
should be zero unless wage adjustments involve long lags since there were no 
changes in payroll taxes between 2003 and 2004. 
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Table 5.7 Wage effects 
 Service sector  Manufacturing, 
salaried 
 Manufacturing,  
blue-collar 
Year 2002 -0.005
(0.006)
-0.006
(0.005) n.a. n.a.
0.008 
(0.025) 
-0.002 
(0.023) 
Year 2003 -0.009
(0.004)
-0.010
(0.004)
-0.012
(0.013)
-0.012
(0.012)
-0.040 
(0.024) 
-0.046 
(0.024) 
Year 2004 -0.009
(0.005)
-0.011
(0.004)
-0.012
(0.015)
-0.011
(0.014)
0.013 
(0.022) 
0.007 
(0.019) 
Target region -0.003
(0.007)
-0.007
(0.004)
-0.011
(0.010)
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.000 
(0.020) 
-0.041 
(0.013) 
Target region × 2002 -0.001
(0.010) — n.a. n.a.
-0.073 
(0.029) — 
Target region × 2003 
(Treatment effect) 
0.016
(0.010)
0.020
(0.010)
0.015
(0.011)
0.008
(0.006)
0.025 
(0.028) 
0.066 
(0.028) 
Target region × 2004 -0.010
(0.010) —
0.014
(0.015) —
-0.047 
(0.029) — 
   
R2 0.028 0.027 0.070 0.070 0.042 0.040 
N obs. 9972 9972 2493 2493 9721 9721 
N indiv. t-region 746 746 108 108 408 408 
N indiv. c-region 3134 3134 1028 1028 3133 3133 
N firms t-region 81 81 8 8 11 11 
N firms c-region 255 255 39 39 45 45 
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is the change in log hourly wages including overtime, 
benefits (taxable value), and provision payments. All equations include gender, age, age squared, 
dummies for occupations (67 for manufacturing 41 for service sector). Service sector regression has 
additional dummy variables for trainees, supervisors, and managers. Both manufacturing sector 
regressions have controls for education level. Robust standard errors are calculated taking into account 
clustering by firm. From manufacturing sector we have excluded one large target region firm that shut 
down during the observation period. n.a. = not available due to lack of data. 
 
According to results in column 1 of Table 5.7, service sector wage growth seems 
to have been very similar in the target and control regions before the experiment 
started. In 2003, when the payroll taxes were cut, wages grew 1.6 per cent faster 
in the target region though the estimate is not statistically different from zero. 
The point estimates also suggest that wage growth was slightly slower in the 
target region in 2004 but also these estimates are insignificant. 
The specification including all interaction terms reported in column 1 effectively 
compares the differences in wage growth between the reform year 2003 and the 
base year 2001. In column 2, we report results from a specification that restricts 
all the other interactions except the interaction between 2003 and the target group 
to zero, effectively comparing wage changes in the reform year to all other years. 
The estimate is now slightly higher and statistically significant indicating that the 
tax exemption led to 2 per cent faster wage growth among the employees in the 
Employment and wage effects of a payroll tax cut 139 
 
treatment group. This result is robust to small changes in the model specification 
such as restricting the sample to occupations that are present in both target and 
control groups, measuring occupations at three-digit level or excluding bonuses 
from the wage measure. 
In the manufacturing sector the number of target group firms is smaller and the 
results are sensitive to whether one large firm that closed down during the period 
is included in the data or not. The estimates are also generally less robust to small 
changes in specification. In fact, the largest wage changes in manufacturing – 
such as the relative decline in wages in 2002 – seem to be unrelated to the 
reform. 
Above, we estimated all wage equations at the individual level. This may be 
problematic since changes in the large firms have a large weight in the estimates. 
If there are firm-specific shocks, the results may be driven by the shocks that 
occur in some large firms. To reduce the weight of these large firms we 
experimented with re-weighting the data so that each firm gets the same weight. 
Except for the blue-collar workers (where one large firm dominated the results), 
this re-weighting had only a minor effect. In particular, the result that the service 
sector wages grew slightly faster in the target region was robust to re-weighting. 
5.7 Concluding comments 
Well designed policy experiments may provide valuable information for 
policymakers on the effects of taxation on wages and employment. In an ideal 
case, estimates based on regional experiments are more reliable than estimates 
based on cross-country comparisons or time-series data. Estimates from these 
experiments could then be used for cost-benefit analysis and as a basis for future 
tax policy. The main problem in small-scale experiments tends to be the small 
number of observations. Measurements of the employment changes in firms are 
noisy and pinning down the effects of reasonably small changes in payroll taxes 
would require a large experiment. 
The Finnish payroll tax experiment reduced payroll taxes by 4.1 per cent, on 
average. If the estimates for the sub-sample of firms for which wage data is 
available can be generalized to all firms, about half of the effect of the payroll tax 
reduction on labour costs was offset by faster wage growth in the firms that were 
eligible for the payroll tax cut. The remaining two per cent decrease in labour 
costs did not have a significant effect on employment, but the estimates are not 
very precise due to the small sample size. Still, our point estimates of tax 
incidence are somewhat different from earlier results by Gruber (1994, 1997) and 
Johansen and Klette (1998), according to which reductions in payroll taxes are 
almost entirely shifted to wages. These studies imply that labour supply is less 
elastic than labour demand, while according to our estimates the demand and 
supply elasticities are roughly equal. According to our point estimates, the tax cut 
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increased employment by 1.3 per cent, indicating that labour demand elasticity is 
around 0.6, well within the range of earlier estimates. Unfortunately, the 
confidence bands around this estimate are too wide to give much guidance for 
future tax policy. 
The fact that the cut in payroll taxes was targeted at narrowly defined regions, 
and the temporary nature of the tax cut, naturally limits the extent to which the 
results can be generalized to the potential effects of permanently reducing payroll 
taxes in the whole country. First, the payroll tax experiment was financed by 
increasing payroll taxes in the rest of the country. In a national scheme, the 
budgetary cost would need to be financed by raising other taxes. Second, a 
regional experiment may have substitution effects if firms reallocate labour to the 
target region from the rest of the country. This might be beneficial in the sense 
that part of the reasons for the regional payroll tax cut was to boost employment 
in disadvantaged regions. However, this limits the usefulness of the results from 
the experiment in predicting the effects of a national programme. Third, the 
incidence of the tax cut may also be different in a regional programme since 
union contracts are negotiated at the national level. Any nationwide changes in 
payroll taxes may have an impact on the outcome of these negotiations, while a 
regional programme that only affects a small share of employers has little weight 
in national bargaining. Finally, a temporary programme is likely to create smaller 
employment effects than a permanent reduction in payroll taxes. Three years may 
not be a sufficiently long period for firms to adjust their labour demand to a 
relatively small change in labour costs. 
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 6. The Finnish payroll tax cut experiment 
revisited, or where did the money go?71 
Abstract 
In this paper I evaluate the effects of a regional experiment that reduced payroll 
taxes by 3–6 percentage points of the firms’ wage sum in northern and eastern 
Finland. I estimate the effect of the payroll tax reduction on firms’ employment 
levels, wage sum and profits, and on workers’ hourly pay and monthly hours 
worked, by comparing the changes in employment and wages before and after 
the start of the experiment to a comparison region. My results indicate that the 
reduction in payroll taxes did not lead to any unequivocal aggregate effects in the 
target region. 
Key words: payroll tax, labour demand, tax incidence 
JEL classification: J18, J23, J38, J58, J65, J68 
 
6.1 Introduction and background 
The Finnish payroll tax experiment that started in 2003 was originally limited to 
a three-year period and the evaluation is presented in the previous chapter. 
Extension of the experiment until 2012 and the enlargement of the target region 
and the target population of firms to cover almost twice the area and more than 
twice the number of firms warrant a further investigation. In this chapter I take 
different, more straightforward tack on methods, following Bennmarker, 
Mellander and Öckert (2009), and include also the firms’ profits into the set of 
response variables. 
There is a rather strong consensus regarding the labour market effects of payroll 
taxes. The textbook model states that a reduction in payroll taxes lowers wage 
costs and hence boosts the demand for labour. Its effect on employment then 
depends on the incidence of the tax. If the tax cut leads to higher wages that 
entirely offset the reduction in taxes, the tax cut will have no effect on 
employment, and if the labour supply is fully elastic, then the tax cut will result 
in higher employment. The general finding of recent empirical research is that 
                                              
 
 
71 This is a somewhat shortened version of the similarly titled working paper (Korkeamäki, 2011). This 
research was financed by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. I am grateful to Roope Uusitalo 
and Kari Hämäläinen for their comments and suggestions, which considerably improved the paper. 
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changes in payroll taxes are partly shifted to wages, with little effect on 
employment72.  
Textbooks, however, say very little on the effect of payroll taxes on firm 
profitability. In the neoclassical family of labour market models, the zero profit 
constraint seems to void the question altogether. In recent years, empirical 
observations have dented these theories to some extent73. In their book on a 
closely related subject, minimum wages74, Card and Krueger (1995) consider the 
possible mechanisms by which changes in minimum wages could affect firms’ 
profits75. Lacking suitable micro data for direct measurement, they use changes 
in firms’ stock market valuations as an indicator of changes in profits. The 
changes in minimum wage legislation (or announced changes) are used as 
instruments to identify the effect of minimum wages on stock prices, and the 
implied change in profits is calculated. Card and Kruger find tentative evidence 
that announced rises in minimum wages induce investors to adjust their valuation 
of firms downward. 
The first study on the direct effect of minimum wages on firm profitability is 
Draca, Machin and Van Reenen (2008). They use the introduction of a national 
minimum wage to the UK labour market in 1999 as a quasi-experiment to 
identify the effect of a rise in minimum wages on profits. The motivation for 
their study is that in the UK case there was little impact on employment (Machin, 
Manning and Rahman 2003 and Stewart 2004) and also little evidence that firms 
were able to pass on higher costs to consumers by increasing prices (exceptions 
here are Aaronson 2001 and Aaronson and French 2007). Draca et al. find a 
significant reduction in profits and a rise in labour costs owing to the introduction 
of a national minimum wage scheme, but neither employment nor productivity 
changed. They also report that in the longer run the labour cost hike did not seem 
to force the affected firms out of business. 
While there have not been any abrupt changes in wage schemes, the ongoing 
experiment in payroll taxes76 could be used as an instrument to estimate a wage 
                                              
 
 
72 See Bennmarker et al. for a short review of previous studies. 
73 There is a quotation attributed to Paul A. Samuelson that “In economics it takes a theory to kill a 
theory; facts can only dent a theorist’s hide.” 
74 In the part of the wage distribution where minimum wage rules are binding, the effect of minimum 
wages can be considered to be similar to a payroll tax hike. The main difference is that the uneven 
incidence can cause substitution away from low-wage labour towards both capital and higher-wage 
labour. 
75 The focus of the book is on the employment effects of minimum wages, but there is a chapter on how 
much profits change. Unlike the payroll tax case, standard economic theory unambiguously implies that 
wage floors have a negative impact on employment (Borjas 2005, Brown 1999). Empirical evidence is 
considerably more mixed; see the comprehensive review by Neumark and Wascher (2007). 
76 See the previous chapter for a description of the original experiment. 
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cost effect on firms’ profits. The payroll tax exemption was planned to last for 
three years, from 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2005. Already in May 2003, 
the government had decided to start a regional self-government experiment in 
Kainuu, eastern Finland, beginning from 2005. That experiment contained a 
similar provision for lowered payroll taxes as the Lapland experiment and hence 
the payroll tax experiment was expanded and extended to the end of 2009. The 
experiment has since been extended further until the end of 2012. 
To sum up the current situation and motivate the need to assess whether payroll 
tax cuts have had an effect on firm profits, I draw the following conclusions. 1) 
According to our previous research of the first two years of the payroll tax 
experiment, the cut in northern Finland did not seem to have any immediate 
employment effects (Korkeamäki and Uusitalo 2009). This finding is supported 
by evidence from other Nordic labour markets. 2) There was some indication of 
rising wages, but not 1:1 with respect to the tax break – this is a finding that has 
also been made in Sweden and Norway. From 1) and 2) and supported by the UK 
case of a change in minimum wages, it seems likely that changes in payroll taxes 
could have an effect on firm profitability. Models of incomplete competition 
from the IO literature (Aaronson and French 2007) and matching models from 
the labour market side (e.g. Flinn 2006) can accommodate these profit effects, 
but their size remains an empirical question. 
For this study, I have twice the number of firms in the treatment group compared 
to the earlier research, better data and more years of observations. However, I 
still do not find any effects on employment, wage sum or profits. The wage sum 
and profits measured in euro terms grew faster in the target region of the 
experiment, whereas the employment gains were negative, but none of the effects 
are statistically significant. The additional information available here does make 
the previous results concerning wages suspect, however – there still is a positive 
and significant wage effect in Lapland, but in Kainuu the effect is negative and 
significant. Certainly, there might have been a region-specific shock in Kainuu 
causing the negative effect, but I found no reason to believe that the result for 
Lapland was trustworthy. 
That there was a tax cut is a fact and it can be observed to have lowered the cost 
of employment. Other results, however, are either non-existent or drowned in the 
standard errors. It is unfortunate that researchers were not consulted in the design 
phase of the experiment. The selection of the target region and the size of the tax 
cut were mainly driven by political feasibility, not by a focus on facilitating 
reliable and conclusive research. 
6.2 The experiment, target and comparison regions and firms 
At the turn of the millennium there was an ongoing debate over the relative 
merits of across-the-board, low-bureaucracy tax cuts and more targeted measures 
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to promote employment. In March 2002, the Finnish government agreed to a 
temporary removal of employer contributions to national pension insurance and 
national health insurance (see Table 6.1) for firms operating in the 20 target 
municipalities77. The programme was designed as an experiment with the stated 
aim of evaluating the effect of a cut in payroll taxes on employment in the target 
region. The tax cut was designed to fit within the European Union de minimis 
regulations that govern firm subsidies. Therefore the maximum tax cut is 30,000 
euros per year for each firm and the already heavily subsidised industries of 
agriculture, fishing and transport were excluded from the experiment. The payroll 
tax exemption was to continue for three years from January 1 2003 to December 
31 2005. In December 2005, the government extended the duration of the 
experiment to the end of 2009. The original regional tax experiment is 
exhaustively described in Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2009). 
The act on the regional self-government experiment in Kainuu was passed by the 
Finnish parliament in February 2003 and the experiment started on 1 January 
2005. The aim of the self-government experiment is to gain experience of the 
effects of regional self-government on regional development work, basic 
services, citizen activity, the relationship between regional and state central 
government as well as between municipal and state local government. The 
Kainuu experiment provides the same payroll tax cut as the Lapland experiment 
but it is no longer motivated in the law as being an experiment nor is there any 
specific mention of an evaluation of the tax cut. The Kainuu experiment extends 
the payroll tax cut to public sector employers and this provision was extended to 
Lapland from the beginning of 2006. 
The Kainuu region has nine municipalities with an area nearly equalling that of 
Belgium, but a population of only 85,000. The target region in Lapland is even 
larger in area, with a population of 65,000. Both can be described as sparsely 
populated, high unemployment regions with little manufacturing or other 
industrial activity. The share employed in agriculture and forestry is much higher 
and the average level of education much lower than in the rest of the country. 
The biggest employer is local government. 
6.2.1 Finnish payroll taxes 
Payroll taxes in Finland consist of employer contributions to the employees’ 
pension scheme, national pension insurance, national health insurance, 
employment accident insurance, and unemployment insurance. The tax rates for 
the various components vary across sectors and by firm size, and firms’ pension 
                                              
 
 
77 The target region for the original experiment was 14 municipalities in Lapland and 6 municipalities on 
the islands off the south-west coast of Finland. 
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contributions depend on the characteristics of their employees. The components 
of the payroll tax and their evolution over the 15 years from 1995 to 2009 are 
presented in Table 6.1. The largest component – contributions to the employees’ 
pension scheme – has remained stable, while the other components have 
gradually been lowered after the recession in the early 1990s. 
Table 6.1 The components of Finnish payroll taxes, percentage of the wage 
sum 
  National pension insurance + 
national health insurance 
 Unemployment 
insurance 
 Total 
Date of 
change 
Employees’ 
pension 
scheme 
I II III Accident 
insurance
Part of 
wage bill 
under € 
840,940 
Part of 
wage bill 
over € 
840,940 
Group life 
insurance 
Low High 
1.1.1995 16.60 4.000 5.600 6.500 1.2 2.00 6.10 0.120 23.920 30.520
1.1.1996 16.80 4.000 5.600 6.500 1.2 1.00 4.00 0.100 23.100 28.600
1.1.1997 16.70 4.000 5.600 6.500 1.4 1.00 4.00 0.090 23.190 28.690
1.1.1998 16.80 4.000 5.600 6.500 1.4 0.90 3.90 0.080 23.180 28.680
1.1.1999 16.80 4.000 5.600 6.500 1.3 0.90 3.85 0.080 23.080 28.530
1.1.2000 16.80 4.000 5.600 6.500 1.2 0.90 3.45 0.090 22.990 28.040
1.7.2000 16.80 3.600 5.600 6.500 1.2 0.90 3.45 0.090 22.590 28.040
1.1.2001 16.60 3.600 5.600 6.500 1.2 0.80 3.10 0.095 22.295 27.495
1.1.2002 16.70 3.600 5.600 6.500 1.1 0.70 2.70 0.095 22.185 27.085
1.3.2002 16.70 2.950 5.150 6.050 1.1 0.70 2.70 0.095 21.535 26.635
1.1.2003 16.80 2.964 5.164 6.064 1.1 0.60 2.45 0.081 21.545 26.495
1.1.2004 16.80 2.964 5.164 6.064 1.1 0.60 2.50 0.080 21.544 26.544
1.1.2005 16.80 2.966 5.166 6.066 1.2 0.70 2.80 0.080 21.746 26.946
1.1.2006 16.70 2.958 5.158 6.058 1.1 0.75 2.95 0.080 21.588 26.888
1.1.2007 16.64 2.951 5.151 6.051 1.1 0.75 2.95 0.080 21.521 26.821
1.1.2008 16.80 2.771 4.971 5.871 1.0 0.70 2.90 0.080 21.351 26.651
1.1.2009 16.80 2.801 5.001 5.901 1.0 0.65 2.70 0.070 21.321 26.471
1.4.2009 16.80 2.000 4.201 5.101 1.0 0.65 2.70 0.070 20.520 25.671
Notes: contribution to employees’ pension scheme is the average percentage share. The actual 
contribution depends on firm size and the characteristics of employees. The cost of accident insurance is 
also an average. 
 
6.2.2 Target and comparison regions used in the evaluation 
In our evaluation of the beginning of the Lapland experiment, the comparison 
region we chose was in northern Finland in an area with municipalities with 
similar economic and demographic conditions to those in the original target 
region. However, the core of our comparison region was Kainuu. Therefore, it 
became necessary to select a new region to work as a counterfactual for the larger 
experiment region. 
Rather than hand-picking municipalities, I followed Bennmarker et al. and used 
the national firm subsidy rules to find an area where the operating environment 
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for firms is comparable to the target region. The target region is contained in the 
two highest subsidy regions for the period 2000–2006 and in the highest category 
for 2007–2013. In the first period, firms in the Kainuu region and its 
surroundings to the west and south were eligible for the highest subsidies, with 
Lapland belonging to the second category. There was, however, a special 
provision for Lapland that granted firms almost the same investment and other 
subsidies as for firms in the first category78. The subsidy regimes were allocated 
according to EU rules, where the main factor was the level of NUTS3 region 
GDP per capita relative to the EU average – regions with less than 75% of the 
average were eligible for the highest subsidies. 
The comparison region is formed of the non-target municipalities of the two 
highest subsidy regions for the period 2000–2006. I have excluded the largest 
local administrative centres and university towns (Rovaniemi, Joensuu, Kuopio 
and Mikkeli) and one highly industrialised region (Kemi-Tornio) as there is 
nothing comparable in the target region. Figure 6.1 shows the regions on a map. I 
decided to drop the target region in the archipelago from this evaluation since it 
would have been hard to find a credible comparison for this very distinct group 
of municipalities. 
Table 6.2 highlights some important similarities and differences between the 
target and comparison regions and contrasts them with the rest of the country. 
The figures are from 2001, i.e. before the experiment had begun, but the main 
features are quite persistent through the whole period under evaluation. First, the 
part of Lapland that received the tax cut and Kainuu are very sparsely populated. 
The comparison region has more than four times as many inhabitants per square 
kilometre. However, the rest of Finland is more than five times as densely 
populated as the comparison region. Second, the population in both the target and 
comparison regions is declining and not growing. It is also older and less 
educated than the rest of the country. Third, the employment rate was markedly 
lower (and unemployment rate higher) in the target and comparison regions than 
in other parts of Finland. The share of municipal employees is particularly high 
in the Lapland and Kainuu regions and the share in the comparison region does 
not quite match that. The employment share of manufacturing is clearly lower in 
the target region but the shares of other industries are well aligned. I will look at 
the industry composition more closely when I describe the firms in the target and 
comparison regions. Last, if we consider the public finance situation in the region 
that received the tax cut, we can see that the target and comparison regions are 
                                              
 
 
78 The subsidy scheme is quite complex (details in the Aid to Business Act, 1200/2000). To simplify, the 
highest share of investment subsidies in category I is 40% and in the northern part (Lapland) of category 
II it is 34% of the total investment.  
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very alike: both are heavily dependent on state grants to finance their public 
sector. 
Table 6.2 Target and comparison regions in 2001 
 Target Control Rest of Finland 
Population  
Total population 153,452 522,418 4,500,946 
Population density 1) 1.56 6.54 35.94 
Population growth, % / a -1.80 -0.98 0.48 
Percentage pensioners 26.96 27.78 21.01 
Dependency ratio 1.94 1.85 1.28 
Secondary education, % 2) 38.15 37.60 35.68 
University level education, % 16.72 15.40 25.14 
Employment  
Employment rate, % 52.33 55.98 65.70 
Unemployment rate, % 21.05 16.30 11.17 
Municipal employees, % 21.98 18.43 13.47 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing, % 10.02 13.97 3.61 
Manufacturing, % 20.75 25.84 27.00 
Trade, % 9.56 9.16 12.33 
Municipal finance  
State grants, € / person 1,591 1,399 593 
Tax revenue, € / person 2,134 2,007 2,807 
Notes: 1) inhabitants / km2, 2) Persons aged 15 or over with a degree from an upper secondary school, 
vocational or professional education institution, or a university. Source: ALTIKA regional statistics 
database by Statistics Finland. 
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Figure 6.1 Target and comparison regions 
Target region in Lapland
Target region in Kainuu
Comparison region
Joensuu, Kemi-Tornio, Kuopio, Mikkeli, Rovaniemi
 
Notes: Lapland and Kainuu form the target region of the tax cut. Joensuu, Kemi-Tornio, Kuopio, Mikkeli 
and Rovaniemi are removed from the comparison region. 
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6.2.3 Target and comparison firms 
Here I take a short look at the firm population in the tax cut’s target and 
comparison regions. The first observation is that the firms are small – none of the 
firms that have all of their establishments situated in the combined area of the 
target and comparison regions has more than 600 employees. Furthermore, none 
of the firms in the target region has over 300 employees. This leads me to make 
one common support-type restriction for the comparison group: I drop a few 
large firms from the comparison group, as it is unclear if they are comparable to 
any firms in the target area. Other restrictions have to do with EU regulations on 
firm subsidies (firms in agriculture, fisheries and transport are not eligible for the 
payroll tax cut) and the technical properties of the firm and establishment data. I 
use only observations for firms that can be reliably linked between different 
registers and to all of their establishments for each year they occur in the 
datasets. In addition, I require that the information from all sources on the key 
variables is consistent79. 
The main firm-level response variables in this study are employment, wage sum 
and operating profit. Almost all the other variables, e.g. various attributes of the 
firms’ workforces and financial position, are more or less endogenous and hence 
cannot be used as explanatory variables. Were this a matching exercise, however, 
these and other pre-experiment firm characteristics would be used to first match 
and then to assess the quality of the matches. Therefore, I gauge the validity of 
the quasi-experimental setting in a similar manner by comparing the target area 
and comparison area firm populations. The only comparison variables in the 
regressions I run are industry and firm age group dummies. Even though the 
difference-in-differences set-up should remove time-constant firm-specific (and 
hence region-specific) differences in levels, dissimilarities in industry growth 
trends should be taken into account if there are differences in the industry 
distributions between the target and comparison region firm populations. I report 
these distributions in Table 6.3. In addition to the distributions, I also calculated a 
normalised difference for each industry share: Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) 
consider this a good measure to evaluate whether the regression methods are well 
suited to estimate the treatment effects. Imbens and Rubin (forthcoming) argue 
that normalised differences exceeding one quarter in absolute value would 
probably indicate problems. I also calculated a t-statistic for each variable. If this 
is a reasonable thing to do for a set of inter-related dummies might be questioned, 
but in the case of the industry distributions, it is not of importance if they differ 
                                              
 
 
79  Observations are dropped if there is conflicting information on the same variable from different 
sources. For example, if according to Financial Statements data a firm has three establishments but not all 
of those are given in the Business Register, or if there are large discrepancies in total wages or turnover 
from different sources, the observation is removed. 
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in a statistically significant manner. The main point is to show that the 
distributions are similar enough that after controlling for industry the comparison 
between regions is internally valid.  
Table 6.3 Industry distribution of target and comparison region firms in 
2001 
 Target Control 
Normalised 
difference t-statistic 
Mining and quarrying 0.011 0.020 -0.054 -4.39
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.021 0.021 0.002 0.12
Clothes, etc. 0.009 0.010 -0.005 -0.40
Wood, paper, etc. 0.042 0.040 0.006 0.45
Petro-chemical, etc. 0.002 0.004 -0.022 -1.83
Non-metallic mineral products 0.007 0.008 -0.008 -0.65
All metal industries, except  0.037 0.063 -0.085 -6.83
Electronic and optical products 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.03
Water and electricity supply 0.011 0.011 -0.002 -0.14
Construction 0.147 0.170 -0.044 -3.41
Trade of gasoline, repair & trade of motor vehicles 0.044 0.054 -0.031 -2.38
Wholesale and retail trade 0.180 0.175 0.008 0.62
Accommodation and restaurants 0.103 0.071 0.079 5.73
Information and communication 0.126 0.100 0.060 4.38
Finance and banking 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.53
Business services 0.129 0.128 0.001 0.07
Other services 0.125 0.116 0.020 1.46
Notes: Normalised difference is the difference in sample means scaled by the root of the sum of the 
sample variances, i.e. 
2 2
T C
x
T C
X X
S S
−Δ =
+
and 
2 2
T C
T T C C
X X
t
S N S N
−
=
+
. Subscript T refers to the target group 
and C to the comparison group. 
 
According to Table 6.3 there are some statistically significant differences in the 
industry dummies but the standardised differences are well under the 
aforementioned 0.25 in absolute value. Table 6.4 reports the pre-experiment 
values of the dependent variables (and turnover). Here it might be argued that the 
t-statistic is the more interesting measure. If, indeed, there are significant 
differences (in differences) in the main outcomes immediately before the 
experiment, a possible point of concern is whether controlling for firm fixed 
effects is enough to make causal inferences on the effects of the tax cut valid. In 
Table 6.4 there are no statistically significant differences at the one per cent risk 
level. The target region firms are somewhat smaller and their growth two years 
prior to the start of the experiment in Lapland was a little slower than in the 
comparison region. Even if this difference is not significant, this might call for 
the use of firm-specific slopes in the regressions. 
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Table 6.4 Pre-reform comparison of key variables for target and 
comparison region firms 
 Mean 
target 
Mean 
control 
Normalised
difference 
t-value N obs. 
target 
N obs. 
control 
Employment 1)   
2001 3.40 3.70 -0.022 -1.56 2,933 8,851 
2000 3.40 3.69 -0.022 -1.54 2,894 8,620 
1999 3.41 3.65 -0.019 -1.31 2,707 8,117 
Employment growth 2)   
2000–2001 0.01 0.00 0.002 0.13 2,665 8,006 
1999–2000 0.04 0.13 -0.028 -1.78 2,597 7,810 
1999–2001 0.05 0.12 -0.019 -1.22 2,453 7,469 
Wage sum, €   
2001 76,756 79,493 -0.007 -0.42 3,029 9,076 
2000 69,862 76,164 -0.019 -1.29 2,894 8,620 
1999 66,878 72,526 -0.018 -1.19 2,707 8,117 
Wage sum growth   
2000–2001 8,652 4,500 0.018 0.96 2,761 8,231 
1999–2000 4,096 5,857 -0.023 -1.38 2,597 7,810 
1999–2001 13,459 9,824 0.014 0.74 2,540 7,664 
Turnover   
2001 466,197 497,373 -0.009 -0.59 2,933 8,851 
2000 464,644 474,579 -0.003 -0.16 2,894 8,620 
1999 433,121 457,062 -0.007 -0.44 2,707 8,117 
Turnover growth   
2000–2001 2,671 25,464 -0.024 -1.39 2,665 8,006 
1999–2000 32,366 32,945 -0.001 -0.04 2,597 7,810 
1999–2001 41,601 58,119 -0.018 -1.13 2,453 7,469 
Operating profit   
2001 47,418 43,745 0.007 0.41 2,933 8,851 
2000 57,472 42,665 0.015 0.83 2,894 8,620 
1999 45,208 40,667 0.011 0.61 2,707 8,117 
Operating profit growth   
2000–2001 -10,349 957 -0.021 -1.08 2,665 8,006 
1999–2000 13,560 3,201 0.016 0.80 2,597 7,810 
1999–2001 4,396 4,901 -0.003 -0.15 2,453 7,469 
Notes: 1) Employment as in the Financial Statements data. 2) Measured in levels. All other growth 
variables are also in levels, not percentages. For the definition of the normalised difference and t-statistic, 
see Table 6.3. 
 
The numbers in Table 6.4 are in levels but a reproduction of the table in logs 
yields qualitatively similar numbers, only with smaller (less significant) 
differences between the groups. A more rigorous way to look into the validity of 
the target-comparison grouping is to estimate the treatment effect model with 
dummy experiments for the pre-treatment years. This is done in the robustness 
checks section of the results chapter. 
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6.3 Data sets 
The primary data sources are the company panel of Statistics Finland’s Finnish 
Linked Employer Employee Data (FLEED), Business Register and the Structure 
of Earnings data. The FLEED company panel is compiled from the Financial 
Statements data and the information content is harmonised over the years. The 
company panel covers almost all active firms in Finland. The Business Register 
contains basic information on all establishments and firms. 
The information on financial statements and balance sheets in the firm data come 
mainly from the tax authorities and are checked for consistency by Statistics 
Finland. The employment measure, the number of employees on a firm’s payroll 
over the calendar year, which we used in our previous study, also came from the 
tax register. In this study, I use an alternative measure, the number of employees 
in the firm in the last week of the year. This is calculated from the FLEED 
employee panel 80  and was not previously available for the relevant years. I 
consider the cross section information on employment a more reliable measure of 
a firm's average annual employment than the tax register number. The Business 
Register data is used mainly to identify firms that reside entirely in either the 
target or comparison region of this study, i.e. that all establishments of a given 
firm are in the same area. That enables me to keep the multi-establishment firms 
in the data. There are only a few of those but as they are large firms, it is 
potentially important to keep them in the data instead of dropping them 
altogether. In principle, the firms with establishments both in the experiment and 
comparison regions would be very interesting cases but there are very few of 
those in the data and they are dropped from the sample. 
The Structure of Earnings data come from Statistics Finland’s data on wages and 
salaries, which is compiled by combining data collected by employer 
organisations from their members with those from Statistics Finland’s own wage 
and salary survey. The Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) collects 
comprehensive wage data from all of its member firms in October of each year. 
The data consists of complete payroll information, excluding top management 
and owners of the firms. EK member firms cover ~70% of Finnish GDP and 
have ~950,000 employees. The number of employees in EK member firms 
represents approximately half of entire private sector employment (~1.8 million 
in 2009). The Statistics Finland wage survey is sample-based and stratified by 
size category and industry classification. Wage and salary data on employees are 
collected from October. Only firms with five or more employees are sampled and 
                                              
 
 
80 The employee panel includes the total working age population in Finland. The firm panel also has an 
employment measure: average full-time equivalent yearly labour force. However, that number is imputed 
for most of the small firms and hence is not applicable in this study. 
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the sample covers ~10% of workers in unorganised firms. The Structure of 
Earnings wage data covers all organised employers and is representative of 
unorganised employers. However, while the firm-level data consists of near-
complete firm populations, the Structure of Earnings data is much more limited 
in scope. The wage data covers ~5% of the target region firms and ~20% of the 
target region employees and the samples are by no means random. There is also 
quite a lot of yearly variation in the number of wage records per firm. Compared 
to the firms’ personnel as calculated from the FLEED worker panel, or what is 
stated in the firm register, it seems that for some years much of the personnel of 
some firms is missing. Therefore, the validity of the wage data is not as good as 
the firm data. On the other hand, the quality of the information on wages should 
be very good, and much better than a proxy calculated from the firm data. As 
long as the method of selection into the dataset does not vary between the regions 
(it should not), comparisons should be possible. Information on hours is less 
accurately measured. It is calculated as 4.345 times the regular weekly hours plus 
overtime. The reporting of overtime varies, and for employees with a monthly 
salary (two thirds of the wage data) it might be a more error-prone measure than 
for the workers paid by the hour. 
The datasets are available for research in the research laboratory of Statistics 
Finland. 
6.4 Identification 
The starting point for estimating the effect of the payroll tax reduction on firm- 
(or individual-) level responses yi  is a regression 
 ,  1,..., ,it i t it it ity c w u t Tλ τ= + + + + =x γ  (21) 
where λt are year effects, wit indexes the treatment81, xit are the firm-level control 
variables, ci is the firm fixed effect and uit are the idiosyncratic errors 82 . 
Estimation by FE or first differencing to remove ci is standard if the treatment is 
uncorrelated with uit. Removing firm fixed effects would also remove any 
systematic differences between the treatment and comparison groups. While 
focusing on the changes differences away pre-existing dissimilarities between the 
target and comparison regions, it is still possible that the target and the 
comparison regions experience different shocks or display different pre-existing 
trends in the response variables. In particular, differing industrial structures may 
lead to different timing of the business cycle in the comparison and the target 
                                              
 
 
81 wit  is a payroll tax cut indicator that is one if firm i gets the tax cut at time t and zero otherwise. 
82 See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), section 5, for a review of programme evaluation methods under 
unconfoundedness and section 6 for the selection in the unobservables case. 
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regions. It is easy to add region- or industry-specific time trends or their 
interactions to (21). It is also possible to account for differing trends for each 
firm: 
 ,  1,..., .it i i t it it ity c g t w u t Tλ τ= + + + + + =x γ  (22) 
Equation (22), a random linear trend model, is a special case of a correlated 
random coefficient model, which can be consistently estimated for T ≥ 3 by first 
differencing  
 1,  2,..., ,  where it i t it it it t t ty g w u t Tη τ η λ λ −Δ = + + Δ + Δ + Δ = = −x γ  (23) 
and then running a fixed effects regression – or by differencing for a second time 
(Wooldridge, 2005). 
If assignment to the treatment and comparison groups is a random draw or an 
unconfounded natural experiment, (23) estimated with standard regression 
methods will yield unbiased estimates and inference. Donald and Lang (2007), 
Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), and Hansen (2007a, 2007b) consider a 
case with unobserved group effects that introduce dependencies in the error terms 
between firms within groups (Donald and Lang) or over observations of the same 
units over time (Bertrand et al.), and how these could be dealt with in a setting 
where both the number of groups and observed time periods becomes large 
(Hansen). Not accounting for these group-wise or temporally correlated errors 
still gives the correct treatment effect estimate but invalidates inference. 
In the Finnish tax cut case the number of groups is two or, at a stretch, three. 
Hence, the cluster sample methodology of Donald and Lang is not applicable. 
With two clusters, the cluster effect cannot be estimated and inference on the 
treatment effect estimator is impossible. I argue that in the Finnish case the test 
and comparison firms, although situated in geographically distinct areas, are 
actually in the same region as defined by firm subsidy rules. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that there would be a group effect large enough to swamp the sampling 
variance in sample means for treatment and comparison firms. Indeed, the 
identification (rather than the correct inference) of the tax cut effect hinges on the 
experiment being uncorrelated with other shocks in the target or comparison 
regions. On the other hand, it is likely that observations on the same firm are 
correlated over time. Therefore, I use one of the methods advocated by Bertrand 
et al. (2004) to take this type of error correlation into account. 
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In practice I first estimate (21) and (22) without the tax cut indicators. Then I 
aggregate 83  the error terms over the target region firms into pre- and post-
treatment values and regress these on the treatment indicator. The treatment 
indicator is zero for 2001–2002 and one for 2003–2006 in Lapland and the 
indicator is zero over 2001–2004 and one over 2005–2006 in Kainuu. These are 
my preferred estimates reported in the next section. 
I also ran regressions (21) and (22) directly, using policy change indicators for 
each year (2001,…, 2006) separately to better understand the timing of the 
effects and to see if experiments defined in this way obtain significant 
coefficients in wrong years. I comment on these and the other robustness checks 
in the next section. One direct observation is that estimating (21) is not sufficient: 
there appear to be trends in some of the response variables. Therefore, I report 
only results where trends are accounted for. 
The original dataset has information on all relevant variables for the period 
1999–2007. In the regression analysis, I use data on 2001–2006, i.e. from two 
years prior to the start of the experiment in Lapland until the experiment has run 
for two years in the Kainuu region. The main reason for doing this is to avoid 
using years too far from the tax change and thereby avoid mixing up the tax cut 
effect with other possible regionally occurring shocks. Another reason for 
dropping the year 2007 is the start of yet another regional employment subsidy 
scheme, where the experiment area partly overlaps with both the Kainuu region 
and the comparison region used in this study. 
6.5 Results 
The impact of the payroll tax cut is explored in this section. To account for the 
potentially heterogeneous effects of the tax cut I consider the results for four 
groups:  
1) all firms that existed 84  in 2001, i.e. two years before the experiment 
started and before there was any common knowledge of the experiment, 
2) a group of firms where the most capital-intensive firms and the firms with 
the highest turnover per employee ratio (the firms in the highest quartile 
of either measure) are removed, 
                                              
 
 
83 When the response variable is in levels, the aggregation is done by taking the mean of pre and post 
experiment residuals. In the case of first differenced responses, the aggregate is the sum of pre- and post- 
experiment residuals to capture the aggregate growth in the variables. 
84 I define existence as having positive turnover and wage sum. 
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3) firms where the part of payroll taxes to be deducted is well below 
(≤ 25,000) the maximum deduction limit, 30,000 euros a year, before the 
experiment starts (2001 and 2002) and hence face a lowered marginal 
labour cost and 
4) the intersection of groups 2 and 3. 
Group 1 is the base group and groups 2–4 are formed from it according to the 
above criteria. 
These groupings are designed to focus on groups of firms intuitively the most 
sensitive to changes in labour costs and to ascertain that the possible effect of the 
tax cut is not drowned out by other strategic actions by large firms85. Group 3 is 
probably the most interesting as in this group the tax cut makes hiring an extra 
employee cheaper and the restriction does not severely reduce the number of 
observations (see Table 6.5 for number of observations). 
Table 6.5 Number of observations on the response variable Employment in 
firm groups 1–4 and number of firms. 
 Number of observations  Number of firms 
Group 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Levels    
Target 15,137 8,036 14,829 7,977 2,934 1,602 2,879 1,592 
Control 45,483 26,576 44,451 26,262 8,807 5,257 8,617 5,200 
Logs   
Target 12,518 6,605 12,214 6,549 2,706 1,456 2,651 1,446 
Control 37,949 22,225 36,943 21,922 8,165 4,832 7,975 4,775 
First differences and differences in relative changes#    
Target 14,953 7,922 14,646 7,863 2,934 1,602 2,879 1,592 
Control 44,904 26,197 43,877 25,885 8,801 5,252 8,611 5,195 
Differences in logs    
Target 11,750 6,226 11,447 6,170 2,566 1,375 2,511 1,365 
Control 35,710 20,972 34,710 20,672 7,787 4,603 7,598 4,546 
#) Relative changes calculated as 1
1
12 ( )
t t
t t
X X
P
X X
−
−
−
=
+
, i.e. P∈ [–2, 2]. P = 0  when X is zero for periods  
t – 1 and t. 
 
                                              
 
 
85For example, one large electronic components supplier in Lapland shifted its entire operation to China, 
resulting in a large employment effect, certainly not related to the experiment. 
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Some of the response variables are not defined for all observations: there are no 
logarithms for non-positive values, relative changes86 are not defined for two 
consecutive missing values (for two consecutive zeros I set the relative change to 
zero) and for differences one needs two consecutive non-missing observations. I 
choose not to limit the observations to those where all the responses exist and 
therefore, in addition to the groupings, the number of observations differs across 
the response variables. This decision does not affect the estimates much but helps 
to tighten the confidence intervals by making use of all available information. I 
report the number of observations on each response type for employment for the 
aforementioned groupings in Table 6.5. The numbers for the other response 
variables follow these closely and are not reported. 
The most important difference between the measures (levels, logs, differences, 
differences in logs, differences in relative changes) is that for the levels, 
differences and differences in relative changes I have added an observation for 
firm exits. Otherwise, the last change in e.g. employment from a positive value to 
zero would be omitted. For logs or changes in logs, this is not possible. 
6.5.1 Where did the money go? 
As I stated already in the introduction, I found no clear effects on any of the 
measures of firms’ performance. The question arises then whether the experiment 
is too small to register in the data at all or if the quality of the data is too poor for 
the purpose. In this subsection I go directly after the tax cut. 
Compliance on the part of the firms is not a problem. Taking part in the 
experiment only requires firms to notify their local tax office that the firm is not 
going to pay the first 30,000 euros of the combined national pension insurance 
and national health insurance and to report the deducted amount at the end of the 
calendar year. According to the data from the tax authorities, practically all the 
firms with employees in the target area filed a starting declaration. 
The most disaggregated measure in the data containing the waived part of payroll 
taxes (national pension insurance and national health insurance) is called “other 
labour costs”. These labour costs are directly related to the wage sum, excluding 
pension contributions. The waived part is a little over half of this “other labour 
costs” entry. The other half consists mainly of accident, unemployment and 
group life insurance payments (see Table 6.1). The exact amount of the reduced 
payroll taxes for each firm would be available from the tax records, but in order 
to see how reliable the firm register data is, I estimated the effect of the payroll 
tax reduction on other labour costs. If it were not visible at all, it would raise a 
                                              
 
 
86 I use the definition introduced e.g. in Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996, see notes under Table 6.5. 
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serious concern about data quality. The results of these regressions are presented 
in Table 6.6. The first four columns contain estimates from regressions without 
firm-specific slopes, but there are controls for region and industry trends. 
Columns five to eight are from regressions with firm-specific slopes. 
Table 6.6 Effect of tax cut on firms’ “other labour costs” 
      Firm fixed effects 
Group 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
First differences -527 -588 -453 -480 -711 -619 -525 -490
 (341) (187) (159) (168) (307) (176) (146) (159)
Differences in logs -0.1519 -0.0996 -0.1506 -0.1002 -0.1503 -0.0957 -0.1476 -0.0931
 (0.0363) (0.0521) (0.0370) (0.0524) (0.0327) (0.0457) (0.0332) (0.0460)
Differences in 
relative changes# -0.1477 -0.1560 -0.1456 -0.1547 -0.1611 -0.1719 -0.1576 -0.1678
 (0.0333) (0.0485) (0.0339) (0.0488) (0.0308) (0.0445) (0.0313) (0.0446)
    
Differences in share 
of wage sum -0.0232 -0.0006 -0.0232 -0.0004 -0.0227 -0.0002 -0.0228 0.0000
 (0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0029) (0.0043) (0.0030) (0.0043)
Notes: Coefficients in bold are significant at the 5% risk level, standard errors in (parenthesis). Columns 
marked as follows: 1) all firms functional in 2001,  2) firms where turnover / employee ratio and capital 
intensity are in the highest third are dropped, 3) firms with potential payroll tax cut ≤ 25,000 € up till 
2002, 4) firms fulfilling conditions 3 and 4. 
#) Relative changes are calculated as 1
1
12 ( )
t t
t t
X X
P
X X
−
−
−
=
+
, i.e. P∈ [–2, 2]. P = 0  when X is zero for periods 
t – 1, t. All regressions have controls for year effects and firm age. In all regressions without firm fixed 
effects industry is controlled at the 4-digit level (338 classes in data) to account for industry-specific 
trends. 
 
The “other labour cost” regressions show clear reductions, but the reductions are 
smaller than what one would expect. The diff-in-diff's estimates are 
approximately 600 euro, or 2.3% of the wage sum. What is notable, however, is 
that in groups 2 (and 4) the effects in terms of share of the wage sum are very 
small or non-existent. A more careful inspection of the one-year treatment effect 
regressions shows that there might be a problem with the comparability of the 
treatment and comparison regions after all: many response variables for the target 
region firms for 2006, especially in Lapland, indicate that some other factors 
besides the tax experiment are probably driving the differences between the 
regions. Hence I re-estimated the models for differences so that the treatment in 
Lapland lasted only for two years (as in Kainuu), instead of four. The results of 
this exercise are given in Table 6.7. Now almost all the effects on other labour 
costs become larger and more statistically significant – in particular the results 
for groups 2 and 4 change. 
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Table 6.7 Tax cut effect on firms’ “other labour costs”, 2-period treatment 
      Firm fixed effects 
Group 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
First differences -1,264 -870 -1,033 -783 -1,311 -867 -1,044 -783
 (343) (195) (172) (176) (297) (180) (160) (163)
Differences in logs -0.3783 -0.2568 -0.3770 -0.2543 -0.3573 -0.2172 -0.3554 -0.2133
 (0.0393) (0.0543) (0.0401) (0.0547) (0.0369) (0.0498) (0.0376) (0.0501)
Differences in 
relative changes# -0.3340 -0.2826 -0.3291 -0.2790 -0.3354 -0.2833 -0.3301 -0.2779
 (0.0353) (0.0497) (0.0359) (0.0500) (0.0330) (0.0462) (0.0335) (0.0464)
    
Differences in share 
of wage sum -0.0205 -0.0118 -0.0202 -0.0117 -0.0193 -0.0112 -0.0192 -0.0112
(0.0033) (0.0045) (0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0030) (0.0042) (0.0030) (0.0043)
Notes: see Table 6.6 for explanatory notes. 
 
However, dropping treatment status from the years 2005 and 2006 in Lapland 
does not change the results for any other responses – none of the firm-level 
responses becomes statistically significant and the possible negative effect on 
wages remains the same. 
6.5.2 Effect on employment, wage sum and profits 
The coefficients of the treatment indicator from regressions where the dependent 
variable is employment are reported in Table 6.8. The estimates show no 
statistically significant effects on employment. All estimates where the unit of 
measurement is employees (row 1) are negative, meaning that the aggregate 
effect for the target region was also negative. The estimates are positive when the 
response is measured in differences-in-differences in log employment (without 
firm-specific trends) and diff-in-diff’s in percentage terms (with and without 
firm-specific trends). The differences in growth estimators in the lowest row are 
actually not that small and show the largest “effect” for group 3, but the standard 
errors are far too large to warrant any conclusions regarding positive effects. 
While the differences in logs and differences in relative changes measure the 
same thing, the results differ owing to the exclusion of zero employment 
observations from the logs. 
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Table 6.8 Effect of tax cut on employment in firms 
      Firm fixed effects 
Group 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
First differences -0.019 -0.039 0.034 -0.071 -0.077 -0.049 -0.045 -0.081
 (0.107) (0.105) (0.078) (0.101) (0.096) (0.101) (0.075) (0.098)
Differences in logs 0.0017 0.0149 0.0058 0.0140 -0.0141 -0.0017 -0.0102 0.0000
 (0.0178) (0.0224) (0.0178) (0.0226) (0.0166) (0.0209) (0.0166) (0.0208)
Differences in 
relative changes# 0.0338 0.0142 0.0369 0.0122 0.0127 0.0066 0.0152 0.0070
 (0.0297) (0.0386) (0.0302) (0.0388) (0.0273) (0.0353) (0.0277) (0.0354)
Notes: Coefficients in bold are significant at 5% risk level, standard errors in (parenthesis). Columns 
marked as follows: 1) all firms functional in 2001, 2) firms where turnover / employee ratio and capital 
intensity are in the highest third are dropped, 3) firms with potential payroll tax cut ≤ 25,000 € up till 
2002, 4) firms fulfilling conditions 3 and 4. 
#) Relative changes are calculated as 1
1
12 ( )
t t
t t
X X
P
X X
−
−
−
=
+
, i.e. P∈ [–2, 2]. P = 0  when X is zero for periods 
t – 1, t. All regressions have controls for year effects and firm age. In all regressions without firm fixed 
effects, industry is controlled at the 4-digit level (338 classes in data) to account for industry-specific 
trends. 
 
Findings from our previous study87 and the findings from other recent studies of 
northern Sweden and Norway showed that a payroll tax cut is likely to push 
wages up. In Table 6.9 I report the results from regressions on firms’ yearly wage 
sum. 
Table 6.9 Effect of tax cut on firms’ wage sum 
      Firm fixed effects 
Group 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
First differences 2,732 56 2,427 -345 1,720 -29 1,425 -414
 (2,268) (1,660) (1,272) (1,508) (2,038) (1,527) (1,122) (1,309)
Differences in logs 0.0134 0.0140 0.0117 0.0117 0.0014 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0001
 (0.0144) (0.0175) (0.0145) (0.0175) (0.0135) (0.0165) (0.0136) (0.0166)
Differences in 
relative changes# 0.0306 0.0087 0.0300 0.0086 -0.0007 -0.0214 -0.0002 -0.0192
 (0.0202) (0.0284) (0.0205) (0.0286) (0.0173) (0.0245) (0.0175) (0.0244)
See Table 6.8 for explanatory notes. 
                                              
 
 
87 We did not find any statistically significant effects on wage sum but some indication that wage rates 
had risen in service industries. Our earlier estimate for the wage effect, 1,728 euros, was a diff-in-diff’s 
five nearest neighbours matching estimator for Lapland for the years 2003 and 2004. Curiously enough, 
here the diff-in-diff’s estimator with firm-specific slopes for Lapland (2003–2006) and Kainuu (2005–
2006) is a very close hit: 1,720 euros. 
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None of the estimates in Table 6.9 is statistically significantly non-zero. The 
aggregate effect on the target area wage sum is positive (group 1, row 1). The 
estimate coming closest to being significant is the diff-in-diff’s estimator (2,427 
euro) for group three without firm-specific trends. The differences in relative 
changes estimators that were positive for employment are also positive here, but 
are smaller. 
Compared to the wage and employment effects, the detection of profit effects is 
made even harder by the fact that profits is a quantity containing far more 
idiosyncratic and time series variation than the wage sum or employment. The 
measure for profits I use is operating profit. Due to changes in accounting 
practises, this is the only profit measure in the data that is consistent over time. 
As operating profits quite often show negative values (23% of the observations), 
the taking of logs and calculating relative changes is not very meaningful. 
Therefore, I took proportional measures of profits relative to the wage sum. 
Operating profit relative to the wage sum does not directly measure the effect of 
the tax cut on profits but gives an indication of whether the tax cut had an effect 
over and above the effect on wages. The estimation results in Table 6.10 show, 
again, no statistically significant coefficients. 
Table 6.10 Effect of the tax cut on firms’ operating profit 
      Firm fixed effects 
Group 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
First differences 8,951 1,703 1,283 -297 9,811 2,077 395 27
 (19,823) (1,921) (1,792) (1,436) (20,353) (1,895) (1,856) (1,377)
Difference in the 
share of wage sum 0.0265 -0.0140 0.0265 -0.0147 0.0223 0.0053 0.0232 0.0048
 (0.0297) (0.0276) (0.0298) (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0286) (0.0279) (0.0288)
See Table 6.8 for explanatory notes. 
 
6.5.3 Effect on wages and hours, individual wage records 
The number of individual wage and hours observations is decent (see Table 6.11) 
but the number of firms is small compared to the total number of firms. I have 
maintained the same grouping (1–4) as in the previous subsection. The added 
groups are 
5) observations where a worker stayed in the same firm and occupation from t–1 
to t and 
6) firms on 4-digit industry common support, i.e. in industries that are found in 
both the treatment and comparison areas. 
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The main reason for forming group 5 is to reduce noise. On the other hand, it 
could be argued that wage changes often occur in conjunction with a change of 
occupation or employer and therefore such movers should be kept in the data. 
This grouping might also be used to account for different mobility patterns across 
the regions but such differences do not exist. I generated group 6 to account for 
the fact that in the wage data there are a few firms operating in industries that 
were completely lacking in the target (or control) area and thus one could 
consider these parts of the data incomparable to the other region, even after 
controlling for industry. 
Table 6.11 Number of observations on the response variable hourly wages 
in worker-firm groups 1–6. Also a number of individual workers 
and distinct firms in the wage data. 
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 
N observations       
Levels & logs    
Target 9,556 2,110 4,271 1,256 4,473 8,270 
Control 38,016 9,916 14,379 5,539 19,910 23,547 
Diff’s, diff’s in logs, Differences in relative 
changes    
Target 4,951 988 2,118 598 4,095 4,142 
Control 21,356 4,796 7,157 2,444 18,746 12,897 
       
N individuals       
Levels & logs    
Target 4,004 965 1,973 632 1,944 3,595 
Control 14,846 4,636 6,584 2,874 8,022 9,411 
Diff’s, diff’s in logs, Differences in relative 
changes    
Target 2,013 451 946 287 1,813 1,731 
Control 8,242 2,058 3,069 1,110 7,675 5,131 
       
N firms       
Levels & logs    
Target 179 49 151 46 132 158 
Control 561 211 450 180 424 412 
Diff’s, diff’s in logs, Differences in relative 
changes    
Target 135 38 109 35 127 122 
Control 412 149 322 123 405 311 
 
The evidence from the wage regressions to back up the earlier result of the tax 
cut being channelled to higher wages is scant. I present the results in Table 6.12. 
The differences-in-differences estimates without worker fixed effects (left half of 
Table 6.12) are mostly negative and also statistically significant for group 6, 
workers in the industry common support, indicating a wage drop of 26 cents per 
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hour, or 1.6 percent. When worker-specific slopes are added, all estimates 
become smaller in absolute value but those for group 6 retain their statistical 
significance. Here the standard errors are also tight enough to show that wage 
changes cannot have accommodated any large changes in the firms’ wage sum. 
Table 6.12 Effect of tax cut on hourly wages 
Group       Worker fixed effects 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
First differences         
-0.14 -0.03 -0.03 0.35 -0.19 -0.26 -0.11 -0.23 -0.05 -0.15 -0.10 -0.21
(0.09) (0.35) (0.17) (0.59) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.19) (0.10) (0.30) (0.07) (0.09)
Differences in logs         
-0.0049 -0.0146 -0.0125 0.0010 -0.0072 -0.0162 -0.0020 -0.0089 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0117
(0.0059) (0.0159) (0.0090) (0.0205) (0.0060) (0.0069) (0.0046) (0.0101) (0.0060) (0.0147) (0.0043) (0.0053)
Differences in relative changes         
-0.0053 -0.0146 -0.0124 0.0003 -0.0074 -0.0159 -0.0020 -0.0085 0.0001 0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0115
(0.0058) (0.0154) (0.0087) (0.0196) (0.0058) (0.0067) (0.0045) (0.0099) (0.0058) (0.0143) (0.0042) (0.0052)
Notes: Coefficients in bold are significant at the 5% risk level, standard errors in (parenthesis). Columns 
marked as follows: 1) all firms functional in 2001 (positive employment and wage sum), 2) firms where 
turnover / employee ratio and capital intensity are in the highest third are dropped, 3) firms with potential 
payroll tax cut ≤ 25,000 € up till 2002, 4) firms fulfilling conditions 2 and 3, 5) observations where 
worker stayed in the same firm and occupation from t–1 to t, 6) firms on 4-digit industry common 
support, i.e.  in industries that are found in the treatment and comparison areas. 
All regressions have controls for year effects. Industry is controlled up to 16 classes. The individual 
controls are gender, education level, age and age squared, tenure and indicators for firm or occupation 
change. Occupation is controlled at the 3-digit level (91 classes in the data). 
 
The wage sum could rise more than employment without changes in hourly 
wages if the hours worked increase. The Structure of earnings data has 
information on monthly hours but how accurately it measures the actual hours 
worked varies across industries and depends on which collective agreement is 
followed. The regression results where the dependent variable is “monthly hours 
worked” are presented in Table 6.13. The only statistically significant estimates 
are found for group 4 when the measure is diff-in-diff’s without employee-
specific slopes. Most of the estimates measuring proportional changes 
(differences in logs, differences in relative changes) are negative. 
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Table 6.13 Effect of tax cut on monthly hours* 
Group       Worker fixed effects 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
First differences          
0.51 2.74 1.07 5.40 0.50 0.02 0.28 0.59 0.63 2.29 0.34 -0.13
(0.72) (1.67) (1.23) (2.30) (0.69) (0.82) (0.50) (0.97) (0.79) (1.56) (0.45) (0.57)
Differences in logs          
-0.0002 -0.0050 -0.0047 -0.0023 -0.0011 -0.0026 -0.0002 -0.0012 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0009
(0.0019) (0.0061) (0.0026) (0.0075) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0048) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Differences in relative changes#          
-0.0003 -0.0049 -0.0046 -0.0024 -0.0011 -0.0026 -0.0002 -0.0010 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0008
(0.0019) (0.0059) (0.0026) (0.0072) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0033) (0.0015) (0.0047) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Notes: Coefficients in bold are significant at the 5% risk level, standard errors in (parenthesis). See Table 
6.12 for description of the grouping. 
* Hours are calculated as 4.345 times the regular weekly hours + overtime. 
 
6.5.4 Robustness checks 
The payroll tax experiment did not, on average, have a statistically significant 
effect on employment, firms’ wage sum or operating profit at a regional level. It 
might have had a surprisingly negative effect on hourly wages. I did some 
robustness checks to scrutinise these results. 
The role of firm exits 
The proportional diff-in-diff’s estimator for employment is larger than the 
changes in log’s estimator (Table 6.8). As the changes in log’s estimator omits 
the effect of firm exits, the result gives an indirect indication that the tax break 
might have helped some firms to continue operating rather than exiting. The 
yearly number and share of exits of firms that existed in 2001 are given in Table 
6.14. The definition of exit is based on information in Statistics Finland’s firm 
and establishment registers: a real exit occurs during a year if the firm code and 
all establishments linked to it at the end of the previous year disappear from the 
register. 
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Table 6.14 Share and number of firm exits* in target and comparison 
regions 
 Lapland Kainuu  Comparison region 
 Share of exits # of exits Share of exits # of exits  Share of exits # of exits 
2002 0.0267 39 0.0357 51  0.0301 261 
2003 0.0273 38 0.0407 55  0.0249 204 
2004 0.0248 33 0.0317 40  0.0238 186 
2005 0.0252 32 0.0319 38  0.0257 191 
2006 0.0284 34 0.0264 30  0.0274 194 
* Exits are defined based on firm and establishment registers. An exit has occurred if the firm identifier 
and all establishments linked to it disappear from the register in the year following the potential exit. The 
shaded area in the table indicates the tax experiment. 
 
I estimated the effect of the tax experiment on exits using a Cox proportional 
hazards model where I controlled for the treatment area (Lapland and Kainuu 
separately), industry and the firm’s age group. The coefficient of interest is the 
tax cut indicator. I used first the same dataset as in the regressions on 
employment. Then I estimated the model for an extended time period where I 
included all firms functional in 1999 in order to have more pre-experiment years 
for Lapland. The effects of the tax cut on firm exits are similar and they are not 
statistically significant in either case. I report the results only for the 2001–2006 
period (see Table 6.15). 
Table 6.15 Effect of tax cut on firms’ exit probability. Odds ratios from 
proportional hazards model. 
Group 
1 2 3 4 
0.9193 1.0382 0.9090 1.0253
(0.1097) (0.1486) (0.1093) (0.1469)
Notes: Odds ratios in bold are significant at the 5% risk level, standard errors in (parenthesis). Columns 
marked as follows: 1) all firms functional in 2001, 2) firms where turnover / employee ratio and capital 
intensity are in the highest third are dropped, 3) firms with potential payroll tax cut  ≤ 25,000 € up till 
2002, 4) firms fulfilling conditions 3 and 4. 
 
The use of a stock sample, i.e. firms that exist in a certain time period, would be 
problematic if my interest was in the duration dependence of firm survival. Here 
the focus is on the effect of the tax cut on the existing firm population and hence 
the oversampling of long-standing firms would be a different issue. 
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Other subgroups 
The results were derived for subgroups that I considered sensible but that were 
somewhat arbitrary. Here I comment on the results for a number of groupings, 
omitting the tables for the sake of brevity. The first group comprises firms that 
existed throughout the entire observation period of 2001–2006. This is a 
potentially more stable group of firms, and a group that was exposed to the 
experiment for the longest time span. This kind of constraint also excludes 
exiting firms from the sample. On the one hand, exits most definitely belong to 
the data as a vital part of firm dynamics. On the other hand, exits of large firms 
could have a substantial effect on total employment in the region and it could be 
argued that relocating a manufacturing firm to China or Estonia is not directly 
related to small changes in payroll taxes. Therefore excluding these events would 
be justified. These results, however, are very close to those obtained for group 1. 
If one were to look very carefully, the drop in the other labour cost variable is 
largest and the rise in the wage sum biggest in this group, but the differences are 
small. 
To account for the fact that the wage regressions were run on a small subgroup of 
the firm data, I also ran the firm-level regressions for the same subgroup of firm-
year observations that occur in the wage data. The possibly negative wage effect 
is indeed mirrored in these results. Most of the coefficients in the wage sum 
regressions are negative but do not differ significantly from zero. The estimates 
of changes in operating profit are much larger than for the complete firm data. 
Owing to the small sample size, none of the effects is statistically significant. 
For two thirds of the workers in the wage data, hourly pay is calculated from 
monthly wages and information on actual hours worked. If the information on 
hours were for some reason less reliably recorded than wages for this group, it 
could lead to a blurring of the results. I ran separate regressions for workers with 
hourly wage and monthly salary and the results do not reveal any large 
differences. The wage effects (still mostly insignificant) are, however, 
consistently more negative for hourly paid workers and the monthly hours effects 
are larger for salary earners. The difference between the coefficients is 
insignificant. 
The small firms (group 3) were defined in terms of their pre-experiment payroll 
tax payments. Another way of defining small firms is to use a clear personnel 
limit. If I apply a limit of a maximum of 10 employees on any of the pre-
experiment years, I capture 90% of the firms. They account for almost exactly 
half of the total employment in the target and comparison area firms. The results 
for this group are very close to the group 3 results. 
The last subgroup I considered was the large firms, defined as being above the 
maximum payroll tax cut for both 2001 and 2002. This is a small group and does 
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not weigh too much in the firm-level regressions. None of the treatment effects is 
statistically significant for them alone. One reassuring finding amidst the non-
existent effects was that the differences-in-differences estimate with firm-specific 
slopes for the reduction in other labour costs is 23,483 euros for the basic pre-
post estimate and 28,539 euros when the treatment is limited to the two post-
experiment years in Lapland. This gives an indication that the data correctly 
captures the maximum tax cut for this group of firms. 
Yearly (placebo) experiments 
In my regression set-up, the last stage regression is run on observations of one 
pre- and one post-experiment observation per firm. As there are several pre- and 
post- experiment years in the original data, it makes it possible to estimate a 
yearly effect separately for each year. If statistically significant differences 
appear even before the experiment started, this could indicate that something 
other than the payroll tax experiment is driving the results. 
Employment. None of the yearly effects is statistically significant. There also 
does not seem to be any pattern to these effects, neither in the aggregates nor if I 
look at Lapland and Kainuu separately. 
Wage sum. A negative effect on the level of the wage sum can be seen to 
originate from a downward trend in treatment area wage sums compared to the 
comparison area. The estimates for the first observation years are positive and the 
estimates decline year by year. None of the one-year estimates for first 
differenced responses is statistically significant. 
Operating profit. None of the one-year effects is statistically significant. The 
diff-in-diff’s-type estimates are greatest and positive for the start year of the 
experiment (2003 in Lapland and 2005 in Kainuu), giving some weak evidence 
that the firms might have pocketed the savings. 
Hourly wage. The significant and negative effect obtained for the industry 
common support group (group 6 in Table 6.12) originates from the year the 
experiment started in Kainuu (2005), where there was a clear overall wage drop 
of three and a half per cent. In Lapland, however, there is a positive effect of 1.7 
per cent in 2003 – after a negative and significant effect of 3.4 per cent in 2002. 
The other one-year effects are not statistically significant. That the negative 
effect occurs only in Kainuu and that there are statistically significant effects in 
“wrong” years implies that the observed negative effect has probably more to do 
with Kainuu-specific firm dynamics than with the payroll tax experiment. 
The overall conclusion from the yearly effect exercise is that a) in most cases the 
standard errors are large compared to the pre-post regressions and b) the results 
for profits and wage sum give (very weak) support to the previous findings in the 
sense that the timing of the effects seems correct and c) the negative trend in the 
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level of the wage sum implies that the firm- or region-specific trends are 
important and the fixed effects regressions on levels and logs are mis-specified. 
Heterogeneous treatment 
The size of the tax cut depends on the payroll tax class of the firm and could vary 
from three to six per cent of the wage sum, up to the maximum reduction of 
30,000 euros. It would therefore appear reasonable to use the actual reduction 
percentage as the treatment, not just a dummy for being in the target region. 
Almost all of the small firms (groups 2–4) belong to the lowest payroll tax 
category, however, and even though I can classify the larger firms quite 
accurately into the right categories, there are bound to be some errors. That 
makes the usefulness of differentiated treatment level assignment less useful than 
it first appears. The actual percentage reduction in payroll taxes is also 
endogenous for the large firms, where the tax cut is topped at 30,000 euros, since 
it depends on the observed wage sum. I ran the regressions with the percentage 
reduction as the treatment but the results were almost identical with those 
obtained with a treatment indicator. 
Lapland and Kainuu as separate experiments 
I estimated models separately for the Lapland and Kainuu regions, keeping the 
comparison region constant. Keeping in mind the results for the “other labour 
costs” regression indicating that the year 2006 might be a problem in Lapland, I 
also estimated two-year treatment effects for Lapland. 
The differences between the results concerning employment are small. The 
estimates for employment effects are close to each other for Lapland and Kainuu 
and none is statistically significant. The effect on the wage sum is larger in 
Kainuu but again not statistically significant, whereas the estimates for changes 
in operating profit are larger in Lapland, still without being significantly non-
zero. The hourly wage regressions reflect the results already reported in the one-
year effects section; there is a negative and significant effect in Kainuu and a 
positive and significant effect in Lapland that cancel each other out, yielding no 
overall effect. This is the largest difference in results compared to the 
Korkeamäki and Uusitalo paper. 
Seasonality of employment and the data 
The employment measure for a firm used in this study is the number of workers 
with an employment relationship with it at the end of the year. The wage sum 
and profit measures are for the accounting period, which is most often the 
calendar year. The wage records are for the October of each year. This time 
pattern could hide some effects in wages and employment. Spring and summer 
are the high seasons for tourism in Kainuu and Lapland and one could argue that 
a temporary reduction in labour costs would have the largest effect on short-term 
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work contracts during the high season. Unfortunately, municipality-level 
monthly employment figures are not available. The only source would be the 
Labour force survey, but there the sample size in the treated region is not large 
enough for this purpose. Quarterly employment figures are available to a decent 
approximation of the target and comparison areas, however, and they show that 
employment is at its lowest in the first quarter, then rises 5–9 per cent for the 
middle quarters, after which it drops in the last quarter to close to the first quarter 
value. The pattern across regions is stable and similar and does not give rise to 
any concerns that seasonality masks some effects from the experiment. 
Selecting the observation period 
Dropping years from the beginning or the end of the current observation period 
of 2001–2006 has little effect on the results. The aforementioned trouble with 
2006 in Lapland is to some extent present for Kainuu as well. Dropping that year 
lowers all the estimates a little, although none change their sign. Dropping the 
year 2001 has the opposite effect, i.e. the effects become somewhat larger but all 
remain well under the limit of becoming statistically significant. 
6.6 Discussion and some conclusions 
The main results of this study are that the payroll tax cut did not have a 
statistically significant effect on total employment, the wage sum, profits or 
wages in the target area. Most of the estimates are positive but unfortunately the 
standard errors are so wide that they could accommodate values indicating full 
shifting of the tax cut to either the wage sum, profits or, indeed, to employment. 
If we look at the euro-valued point estimates, the conclusion would be that the 
wage sum in the target region firms rose, employment did not and profits grew 
the most. Alternatively, if we consider the point estimates of the percentage 
changes, employment and the wage sum did grow by an equal amount and profits 
did not react. The only unambiguous finding is that the tax cut can be found from 
the Financial Statements data, although even there there was some uncertainty in 
the case of small and the least capital-intensive firms. 
The effect on hourly wages found in Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2009) is not 
found here for the combined target region of Kainuu and Lapland. The effect is 
still found for Lapland – but the estimates for Kainuu would imply a negative 
wage effect. The results also show one statistically significant change in a non-
experiment year and hence do not warrant any strong conclusions. 
Irrespective of the findings from this and other similar experiments in the Nordic 
countries, national pension insurance payments have been gradually lowered over 
recent years. From the beginning of 2010 they were abolished altogether, on the 
grounds that it would be beneficial for employment. There was some debate if 
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this was the most effective way to help firms generate jobs, but empirical facts 
had a rather small role in the discussion. This is partly due to a lack of such facts. 
The Finnish payroll tax experiment is a rare example where a tax change is made 
in an experimental setting with the stated aim of facilitating economic research. 
Hence it is important to evaluate it, even if the results tell rather little about the 
effects on employment. This is also an opportunity to gather information on the 
experiment itself to learn more about how possible future experiments should be 
designed and implemented to the greatest scientific advantage. Based on my 
results I argue that it is still important to continue experimenting – it is also 
important to pre-evaluate future experiments to see if they are likely to yield 
accurate and reliable results. 
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